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Although the specialisation of labour is an important feature, in the labour mar-
ket no one is irreplaceable. If a worker quits, the firm would perhaps shuffle
some tasks and look for a new worker but production will be almost unaffected.
In one occupation we find people with different educational backgrounds and
people with the same education are employed in different occupations. As a con-
sequence, the labour market is relatively flexible and can accommodate to shifts
in the demand for and supply of the various types of workers. However, this
flexibility is probably not unlimited. If for instance an engineer is replaced by an
economist, especially in a large firm, a small shuffle of tasks among the workers
will be enough to leave the production unaffected. However, if all engineers are
replaced by economists, the level of production would undoubtedly be affected
substantially. This raises the question what are the determinants of the possibil-
ities to substitute workers with different skills. Understanding the mechanism by
which tasks are divided in the labour market may contribute to our insight on
why some labour markets are more flexible than others.
In this study we will analyse the flexibility of the labour market, captured by
the concept of substitution, by looking at who is assigned to which task. Our ap-
proach is to consider differences between workers and differences between tasks,
especially between tasks in the same occupation. We assume that firms try to
find the assignment of workers to tasks that maximises production. The optimal
assignment depends on the distribution of the skills of workers and the distribu-
tion of the skills required to perform the various tasks, and responds to factorCHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
demand and supply conditions. On the basis of this framework, we can analyse i)
whether the assignment of workers to tasks influences the substitution process in
the labour market, ii) how this assignment affects the distribution of wages and
productivity through the substitution process, iii) how the educational system
can be optimised for a flexible labour market and iv) whether the substitution
process differs between firms and industries and whether these differences are
related to productivity differences between firms.
To illustrate the relationship between the assignment of workers to tasks and
the flexibility of the labour market, it is interesting to look at US data. In the
United States, the relative employment of college graduates to high-school grad-
uates has almost doubled between 1967 and 1987. As a result, a substitution
process took place between college and high-school graduates. There is fairly
well documented literature, led by Katz and Murphy (1992), that shows that the
substitution process that took place in the US is consistent with an elasticity of
substitution of 1.4. Such a elasticity is often interpreted as a reflection of pro-
duction technology. However, if we look at the assignment of workers to tasks,
our approach can be used to explain the substitution process as follows. The first
extra college graduate has been assigned to the most difficult task high-school
graduates performed until then, and the remaining tasks were reassigned to the
remaining high-school graduates. This process is repeated when the second extra
college graduate has been assigned to the most difficult task high-school gradu-
ates performed until then and the remaining tasks are reassigned to high-school
graduates, etc. As a result of the increasing educational attainment of the work-
force, the substitution process that takes place does not occur homogeneously
across occupations but increases the number of workers finding jobs below their
educational level. This mechanism actually fits quite well with the US data. In-
deed, in response to a tremendous shift in the relative supply of skills, the number
of college graduates working in jobs below their level of education grew from 20%
in the beginning of the 60s to 38% in the mid 70s.'
—•* As Tinbergen (1975) stated, what seems to be a 'mismatch' between a person's
education and the education required for his or her job is actually the result of
rational behaviour. lib brt« «ia5ra.w
'Source: Freeman (1976), Rumberger (1987) and Daly et al. (2000). Freeman (1976) was
the first who raised the issue of the overeducated American. Figures for OECD countries on the
percentage of 'overeducated' workers vary from 20% to 50% regarding the various educational
levels in the late 90s (see Borghans and De Grip (2000)) .1.1. MOITV^TJON
We must make a difference between the education normally re- .,
guined for the execution of a given productive task and the actfuai
*' education of the person engaged for that task...In a situation where
fewer people of lowest (highest) education are available than could
be used in the production process a rational behaviour of both the
demand and the supply side of the market will imply that some work-
ers with higher (lower) education find jobs that norma//j/ required a
lower (higher) education. (Tinbergen (1975), p. 80) viiftnnut)
^ i - ! •'Jsii
Empirical evidence for the dispersion of workers' education in each occupation
seems to be a universal fact. Most empirical research so far focused on the levels of
education and occupation.^ Across countries, the proportion of higher educated
workers who are 'overeducated' for their jobs ranges from 3% in Austria and
Finland to 50% in Japan as indicated in Table 1.1.
Empirical evidence is also found in the allocation of workers with different
educational fields to various fields of occupation. Table 1.1 shows"* the percent-
age of higher educated workers working in higher occupations outside their own
occupational field. The proportion of workers allocated outside their specific oc-
cupational field ranges from 25% in Spain to 55% in the Netherlands. At an
intermediate educational level the proportion of graduates working in the cor-
responding occupational level but outside their own occupational field is about
23% in the Netherlands.-* —•- - -^i- ^ - ••»--•-— —— •• «^«-
Also, large firms tend to allocate relatively more workers to occupations in
which workers' educational level is above the 'required' job level, as indicated
by Danish Matched Employer-Employee data.'' In large firms, the proportion of
workers who are overeducated for their job lies 0.5% points, 1.1% and 2.6% points
above the proportion of small firms in the utilities, construction and manufactur-
ing industry, respectively. ,:
^See Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Groot (1996) and Muysken and Ruholl (2001) for
empirical evidence in the Netherlands, see Muysken et al. (2003) for Germany, see Duncan and
Hoffman (1981), Rumberger (1987) and Cohn and Khan (1995) for US figures, Sloane et al.
(1999) for the UK, Kiker et al. (1997) for evidence in Portugal and for Spain, see Alba-Ramirez
(1993).
"*For more details on the dataset used see Chapter 3.
''For the US, Wilms (1974) finds that 50% of students find employment related to their field
of study and Pincus (1980) reports that 40% are employed outside their own occupational field.
^See Chapter 5 for more details on the Danish Matched Employer-Employee data.CHAPTER i. /NTROD17CT7OAT




































The first column indicates the percentage of higher educated workers who are
overeducated for their jobs, 1998.
The second column indicates the percentage of higher educated workers in higher
occupations but outside their own occupational field, 1998.
" Data source: Baccalaureate and Beyond second follow-up (B&B 92-93).
* Weighted average of BA/BS, Associate and Certificate graduates in the USA in 1990.
Source: Grubb (1997). Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
1.2 Aim of the study and theoretical framework
The aim of this study is twofold. One is to yield an understanding of what
happens when substitution takes place in the labour market. The other is to
understand why some labour markets are more flexible than others.
This study analyses the demand for (heterogeneous) labour in the context of
an allocation model of workers to jobs. Therefore, the study finds its roots in
both a neoclassical framework of labour demand (see Ashenfelter et al. (1986) and
Hamermesh (1993)) and the assignment theory (see Sattinger (1993)). The study
rests on neoclassical labour demand principles in which assignment principles are
incorporated.
In his book Prmdp/es o/Economics, Marshall (1920) emphasises the impor-
tance of labour demand adjustment. Marshall's view of neoclassical economics
focuses on employers' decisions about how many workers to employ. The de-
mand for labour is viewed as derived from consumers' demands for final goodsVfOR9U< ^2. A/M OF THE STUDY AJVD THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
and services:
* "...the direct demand for houses gives rise to a joint demand for
'the labour of all various building trades, and for bricks, stone, wood
•'* etc. which are factors of production of building work of all kinds, or
as we may say for shortness, of new houses. The demand for any one
of these, as for instance the labour of plasterers, is only an indirect
or derived demand. (Marshall (1920), Book V, Chapter VI, Part 1,
p.316.)
In the theory of labour demand, employers are concerned with the availability
of labour and its price. Since firms can adjust both labour and capital services,
the firm must choose the best combination of these two factors of production. So
the demand for labour adjusts employment to current market conditions.
Adjustments in labour demand are usually measured by the elasticity of the
derived demand for labour (Marshall (1920) and Hicks (1970)), that is the per-
centage change in labour demand corresponding to a one-percent change in the
wage rate. Marshall (1920) summarised the four determinants of labour demand
in four laws of derived demand. To illustrate those four laws, we shall use the well
known textbook example by Filer, Hamermesh and Rees (1996) of the production
of a symphony concert.
Example 1 (First Mars hall i an law) 7h order to produce a sympftonu concert
t/ie emp/oyer needs musicians, us/iers and o/ course capita/ services fan opera
/louse, instruments etc.). Suppose t/ie wage o/musicians increases 6y 70 percent.
77ie emp/oyer u>ou/d /i&e to rep/ace musicians 6y eit/ier capita/ services or some
us/iers, i.e. /actors o/production t/iat become re/afive/u c/ieaper, tui mow /ind it
tec/ino/ogica//y di$icu/t to do so. .: .•••• v r" •'•. - t •» >•.:•?- -:;••*•.••. ••
The first Marshallian law stipulates that the demand for musicians will be
more elastic the easier the employer can substitute musicians by other factors
of production. In other words, the elasticity of substitution plays a key role
in determining the magnitude of the adjustment in the demand for labour in
response to changing market conditions.
Example 2 (Second Marshallian law) Suppose tAaf tfte increase in t/ie price
o/ t/ie concert, induced 6y t/ie increase in t/ie uiaoe o/ musicians, does not c/iange
peop/e's wi//ingness to attend t/ie concert. T/ie emp/oyer wou/d t/ien 6e a6/e to
emp/oy a6out as many musicians as 6e/ore tne u/age increase.CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The second Marshallian law indicates that the less elastic the demand for the
final product, the less elastic the demand for musicians. In other words, it implies
that the demand for labour will change little when the employer is able to pass
the wage increase on to the consumers (increase in the price of the final product)
with little loss in the demand for the final product. v=-rr<?w"Rfr
Example 3 (Third Marshallian law) Suppose t/iaf us/iers fcnow /low to pZay
music suc/i f/iat me empZoyer /mds it tec/moZogicaZZy possibZe to substitute us/iers
/or musicians. T/ie empZoyer wiZZ actuaZZy seefc to substitute us/iers /or musicians
since us/iers become reZatiueZy c/ieaper but may not be abZe to do so simpZy because
mere are no usners auaiZabZe in t/ie Zabour market.
The third Marshallian law of derived demand states that the elasticity of the
demand for musicians will be lower the less elastic the supply of other factors of
production.
Example 4 (Fourth Marshallian law) "Suppose t/iat me wages 0/ musicians
comprise 50 pereenf 0/ totaZ costs 0/ a symp/iony concert wftiZe me wages 0/ us/iers
ma/ce up 5 pereent 0/ t/ie costs. Now suppose mat me wages 0/ musicians rise
70 percent, mm ot/ier costs remaining constant. 7b a /irst approximation, me
cost 0/ a concert wiZZ increase by 5 pereent and t/iere wiZZ Zi>fceZj/ be a decrease in
attendance and me demand /or musicians. On ffte ot/ier /land, i/ me wages 0/
us/iers rise by 70 pereent, totaZ cost wiZZ onZy increase by 0.5 percent. Wit/i suc/i
a smaZZ increase mere wiZZ probabZy be just about as many peopZe wiZZing to attend
t/ie concert and me demand /or us/iers wiZZ not /aZZ muc/i." (TiZer, 77amermes/i
and /fees (70967, pp. 756-7. ^
^ The fourth law of derived demand indicates that the demand for musicians
will be less elastic the lower the share of musicians in total cost. For this reason
it is often referred to as the importance 0/ being unimportant.
The elasticity of demand for labour is usually decomposed into two separate
effects: the substitution effect in production that corresponds to the increase in
labour inputs that would result from a decrease in wages /loZding output constant
and the output scale effect in production. The output scale effect is induced
by the fall in the costs of production that follows a fall in wages. With lower
costs of production, the firm will increase its sales by lowering its price, which in
turn enables an expansion of output. Adding both effects together sizes the totalJ.2. AIM OF THE ST[/DY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
effect of a decrease in wages. The linear equation relating the total effect to the
substitution effect and the output scale effect is known as the Slutsky equation
(see Slutsky (1915))."
The second and fourth laws refer to the output scale effect in production. The
first and third laws concern the substitution effect. Provided that the supply of
other factors is perfectly elastic (such that their prices are fixed), the substitution
effect depends only on the elasticity of substitution between the various factors
of production. u> o >sw «•»<**
However, there is more to the elasticity of substitution than merely the substi-
tution effect in production. Hicks (1964) shows indeed that the fourth Marshallian
law is not unequivocally true and holds only under certain conditions imposed on
the elasticity of substitution between factors of production, between musicians,
ushers and capital.
Example 5 Suppose us/iers can pZay music suc/i t/iat t/ie emp/oj/er can substitute
us/iers /or musicians. TTie employer wi/Z substitute t/ie erpenswe musicians by
us/iers resuZtin</ in a moderate increase in i/ie totaZ cost o/ a concert. H^itn t/iis
smai/er increase in t/ie price o/ a concert, there twZZ be just about as many peop/e
wiZZino to attend t/ie concert. .,-..,... , ,
This example illustrates the important role played by the elasticity of substi-
tution in the output scale effect. As Hicks (1964) demonstrates, the importance
of being unimportant holds as long as the elasticity of product demand is greater
than the elasticity of substitution between factors of production. The reverse
is true whenever the elasticity of substitution is greater: "when the employer
can substitute more easily (between factors of production) than the consumer
(between final products), it is an advantage to labour to have a large share in
the initial input mix." (Filer et al. (1996) pp. 156-7) This implies that the em-
ployer's ease to substitute between factors of production not only determines the
demand for labour via the substitution effect but also via the output effect. De
La Granville (1989) corroborates Hicks's (1964) finding by a graphical demon-
stration. De La Granville shows that the larger the elasticity of substitution
between factors of production, the larger the output scale effect in production.
""The Slutsky Equation is geometrically constructed as a parallelogram-shaped area. This
parallelogram becomes a diamond in the case of unit elasticity of substitution (in the case of
a Cobb-Douglas production technology). This has led economists to talk about the 'Slutsky
Diamond'.CHAPTER i. IJVTRODL/CTIOIV
De La Granville considers a family of production functions that only differ by the
magnitude of their elasticity of substitution and shows that the new maximum
output level resulting from a decrease in one input price is higher the greater the
elasticity of substitution/
Yet, adjustments in the demand for heterogeneous labour do not occur ho-
mogeneously across occupations. In the concert industry, substitution occurs, a
priori, only between ushers and musicians in the musician occupation." An al-
location model of workers with different educational backgrounds to various oc-
cupations acknowledges the interdependence of the labour markets for different
educational groups. In such a model, a downward shift in supply of a particu-
lar educational group of workers increases the associated wage rate and induces
substitution between types of labour within occupations. Therefore, labour will
be differentiated in this study with respect to both education and occupation, t
To return to the concert industry, one might wonder how employers can sub-
stitute let say two ushers for one musician. A simple explanation is found in the
theory of comparative advantage and the distribution of skills among workers and
the distribution of required skills among jobs. The employer may find it interest-
ing to substitute a usher for a musician as long as the usher, though not trained
to be a musician, has fairly good musical skills. This statement implies that there
are several types of skills and people are initially endowed with a certain level
of each skill-type. Even then, the employer might not be willing to substitute
the usher, a fairly talented flute player, for a leading pianist. The employer will
probably substitute the usher in question for a flute player of minor importance.
The example emphasises the assignment of heterogeneous workers to hetero-
geneous jobs and the notion of workers' comparative advantage in the labour
market. In order to incorporate this dimension into the analysis of the demand
for heterogeneous labour, we find inspiration in the assignment literature. The
^As mentioned in footnote 6, the Slutsky equation can be constructed as a parallelogram, the
area of which is proportional to the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution. The argument
used by De La Granville relies on the linear approximation made when using the Slutsky
equation in its differential form instead of the true infinitesimal form. He shows that the
order of the magnitude of the error made by using the linear approximation increases with the
magnitude of the elasticity of substitution.
"Note that the ushers who replace the musicians are not ushers anymore but musicians.
This highlights the need to distinguish between workers' actual jobs and potential jobs. This is
precisely what education and occupation variables do: they separate the potential occupations
(determined by education) to the actual occupation or as in Tinbergen's (1973) term required
education (i.e. occupation) and actual education.
8J-2. AJM OF THE STUDY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
assignment of workers to tasks provide a microfoundation to this study. Building
on the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous tasks, an allocation
model will be developed in which several categories of education and occupation
are distinguished. This model relates to those developed in Roy (1950 and 1951),
Tinbergen (1956) and Rosen (1978).^ The model we will develop in this study
offers the opportunity to bridge the gap between the theory of labour demand
and the assignment literature. By explicitly modeling the assignment of tasks
to workers and the self-selection of workers into educational profiles, an indirect
production function can be used in an allocation context to model the assignment
of the marginal task to the workers as well as the self-selection of the workers
into education-occupation profiles.
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the microeconomic assignment of heterogeneous
workers to heterogeneous tasks generates the allocation problem at the aggre-
gate level of education and occupation. In the supply side of the labour market,
individuals are endowed with different capacities. Individuals choose their edu-
cational profiles based on their initial capacities and the market wages associated
with each educational background. The educational choice transforms initial en-
dowments into skills. Since individuals are er ante heterogeneous with respect to
their own endowment, within educational groups, individuals are heterogeneous
with respect to their skills. By analogy to the supply side, the demand side is
decomposed into several occupations. In each occupation, different tasks have
to be done in order to produce output. The tasks differ from one another by
the levels of the various types of skills they require. As a result, tasks are het-
erogeneous within each occupation. The allocation problem is characterised by
the distribution of workers by education to the various occupations. This does
not result into a one-to-one correspondence between education and occupation.
Indeed, even if the supply of workers by education equals the demand for workers
in the corresponding occupation, workers with different educational backgrounds
may be observed working in the same occupation, and vice versa. This allo-
cation pattern emerges because each educational group is composed of workers
that are heterogeneous in terms of their skills and each occupational group is
composed of tasks that are heterogeneous with respect to the skills they require.
Therefore, the optimal assignment of the tasks belonging to each occupation to
"See also Sattinger (1975, 1978, 1979 . 1980 and 1993). Macdonald (1982) and Tfeulings
(1995a, 1995b and 2002).
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Figure 1.1: Allocation and assignment in the labour market
workers in each educational group leads to the presence of workers with different
educational backgrounds in a particular occupation and the presence of work-
ers with the same educational background in different occupations. The optimal
assignment of workers to tasks depends on productivity parameters indicating
the range of tasks that workers with the various educational backgrounds can
perform in each occupation. In this study, the term 'allocation structure' is used
to define this set of productivity parameters. The optimal assignment of tasks
changes as the relative wages of the educational groups change. The assignment
of workers to tasks changes through the supply and demand adjustment process,
which results in allocation changes. ' '"•••~ •••"• <"v-- •• .••-•"•• •-•••;-•
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The structure of the remaining chapters is in accordance with the following line of
thought. To understand how the assignment of heterogeneous workers to hetero-
geneous jobs affects the substitution between groups of workers, we will develop
an allocation model in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we will test the relevance of our
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allocation model in explaining the substitution process between different types
of workers in real data. Chapter 4 follows naturally by addressing the ques-
tion whether some allocation structures can lead to a substitution process that is
relatively more advantageous in terms of market outcomes, i.e. higher labour pro-
ductivity and lower instability. Finally, in Chapter 5 we will investigate whether
different firms have different substitution possibilities. We will evaluate whether
the production functions and thereby the substitution possibilities differ between
firms in the same industry and whether these differences are related to the dif-
ferences in allocation of workers and productivity between firms. This analysis
provides an understanding of how allocation figures observed at the level of a
country are generated at the level of the firm.
The allocation model developed in Chapter 2 is used throughout this study.
First, an overview of the different models related to the assignment theory is
presented. Roy's self-selection model, Rosen's model of the assignment of tasks
to workers and Tinbergen's allocation model are detailed respectively and their
restrictions with respect to the scope of this study are discussed. Building on the
assignment literature, a theoretical model that offers the opportunity to bridge
the gap between labour demand literature and assignment literature is developed.
It is shown that indirect production functions in which different labour inputs
are distinguished along education and occupation can be funded at the micro
level. Moreover, the optimal assignment of workers to tasks also depends on the
allocation structure, i.e. the set of productivity parameters indicating the range
of tasks that workers with the various educational backgrounds can perform in
each occupation. By modeling explicitly the assignment of tasks to workers and
the self-selection of workers into educational profiles it will be demonstrated that
an indirect production function in an allocation context can be used to model
the assignment of the marginal task to workers as well as the self-selection of
workers into education-occupation profiles. The parameters of the elasticity of
substitution between workers with different educational backgrounds within a
particular occupation and of the elasticity of substitution between occupations are
shown to play a crucial role in the distribution of skills and workers to occupations.
In Chapter 3 and 4, the allocation model of workers to jobs developed in Chap-
ter 2 is used in order to investigate the impact of differences (between countries)
or changes (through time) in the range of tasks that workers with each educational
background can perform in the various occupations (i.e. the allocation structure)
on the substitution process. In Chapter 3, we test for the relevance of our al-
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location model in explaining the substitution process between different types of
workers in real data. In the literature related to wage inequality across countries,
the structure of wages is confronted with a (neo-) classical supply and demand
framework. Across countries, differences in the relative supply of labour should
coincide with wage differentials if the substitution process between the various
types of labour occurs freely in each country. Some authors, e.g. Blau and Kahn
(1996), reject the supply and demand explanation of wage differentials across
countries because the magnitude of the substitution effect necessary to match
supply and demand differentials with wage differentials is not plausible. Several
authors, e.g. Leuven et al. (2004) and Freeman and Schettkat (2001), argue that
the skill content of educational groups varies a great deal across countries which
makes educational comparisons difficult. We decompose the substitution effect
into an effect due to differences in the allocation structure induced by differences
in the skill content of educational segments and the true substitution effect re-
sulting from supply shifts only. The use of the allocation model developed in this
study enables us to detect differences in the allocation that are not caused by
supply and demand factors but caused by differences in the skill content across
countries. The remaining supply and demand differential can be compared with
wage differentials to measure the real substitution effect. Empirical results show
that cross-country differences in allocation are to a large extent (50%) due to
differences in the allocation structure. Moreover, once these differences in the
allocation structure are controlled for, wage differentials across countries coincide
with at least 64% of employment differentials.
The question whether some allocation structures can lead to a substitution
process that is relatively more advantageous in terms of a higher labour pro-
ductivity and a lower labour market instability, is addressed in Chapter 4. The
impact of the structure of allocation on the substitution process is investigated by
isolating specific allocation structures. Since workers with general education can
perform a rather large range of tasks in every occupation, they can easily switch
occupations. We would therefore expect that a shift in the supply of workers
between two specific educational fields leads to a reciprocal change in the wage
rate of these two types of workers but leaves the wage of workers with general ed-
ucation unchanged. We show that there is a family of allocation structures that
satisfy this condition which is characterised by three productivity parameters.
Simulations show that the labour productivity and wage dispersion are sensitive
to the relative magnitude of the three parameters and to the relative ease to sub-
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stitute between occupational output compared to the ease to substitute between
workers with different educational fields within occupations. Empirical results
for the Netherlands show that the demand for workers with a general educational
background is less elastic than the demand for workers with technical and social
services vocational specialisation. This result suggests that a relative decrease
in the supply of graduates in general educational fields can only be absorbed by
a relatively large increase in its relative wage, large decrease in labour produc-
tivity and large increase in wage dispersion. The range of tasks that workers
with general, technical and social services educational fields can perform in the
various occupations corresponds to our ex ante expectations. The general educa-
tional field is very similar to our theoretical definition of general education and
the technical and social services educational fields correspond to our theoretical
definition of technical education.
FVom an educational policy perspective, we show that the skill content of a
study in terms of specific and general skills matters for labour productivity and
instability. The more specific the skills of workers the larger labour productivity.
However, the more generic the skills of workers, the larger the range of tasks these
workers can perform outside their own occupation and the smaller the increase
in wage dispersion in case of supply shifts. Moreover, although the specialisation
of labour is an important feature of the labour market, as it enhances workers'
productivity in their vocational occupation, our results suggest that the flexibility
of the labour market, measured by the ease to substitute between occupations and
between workers with different educational backgrounds, should be accounted for
when defining the skill content of the various educational fields. We show that
the larger the elasticity of substitution between occupational outputs compared
to the elasticity of substitution between workers, the larger the percentage change
in labour productivity associated to a decrease in the range of tasks that workers
with general education could perform outside general occupation but the smaller
the percentage change in labour productivity associated to a decrease in the
range of tasks that workers with technical and social services can perform in
general occupations. Therefore countries like the Netherlands, for which the
ease to substitute between occupational outputs is large compared to the ease
to substitute between workers, may benefit from decreasing the range of tasks
that workers with general education could perform outside general occupation,
by increasing the amount of skills that contribute to their productivity in the
general occupation at the expense of the general skills that contribute to their
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Chapter 5 addresses the questions of whether the production functions and
thereby the substitution possibilities differ between firms in the same industry
and whether these differences are related to the differences in allocation of work-
ers and productivity between firms within industries. The hypothesis is advanced
that the differences in labour productivity, capital intensity and skill composition
of the workforce observed between small and large firms lie in the differences in the
production function. The production function of small, medium and large firms in
three industries are estimated separately using matched employer-employee data
for Denmark. Empirical results show that large firms have a higher elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in skilled jobs and a higher
elasticity of substitution between skilled workers in skilled jobs and capital than
small firms. These differences explain the higher labour productivity and capital
intensity observed in large firms. Also, under skill-biased technological change,
the higher elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour in large
firms explains the higher skill intensity in large firms. In turn, the higher produc-
tivity enables large firms to employ skilled workers in low-skilled jobs explaining
the higher rate of overeducated workers observed in large firms. The tendency
of large firms to employ a relatively overeducated workforce can be related to
an 'ant versus cicada' behaviour."' Large firms build in a reserve capacity of
skilled workers in periods of surplus of skilled people in order to anticipate future
demand or supply shocks in the labour market for skilled workers. Large firms
are therefore affected less if the wage of skilled workers increases, since at that
time they retain internal reserves of skilled workers. Large firms can easily recruit
unskilled-workers instead of skilled workers, allocate the newly recruited workers
to low-skill jobs and internally reallocate the skilled workers that are working in
these low-skill jobs to high-skill jobs. .. ...
Chapter 6 concludes and summarises the main findings of this study. . s .-•»••
. (•>!•;»
1.4 Related discussions
The analyses performed in this study are related to several discussions in the
field of labour economics. It relates to the literature on labour demand, the
literature on wage inequality across countries and over time, the literature on the
'"See De La Fontaine (1668). >>• *».•* ?••?)-,
14VKHT1Y1UOV1TW iW.iUU.W} 1.4. RELATED DISCUSS/ONS
'overeducation' of the workforce, the literature on firms' heterogeneity in output,
productivity and input mix and the debate on the relevance of general versus
specific education and the educational structure.
1.4.1 Labour demand
In the standard model of labour demand, labour is homogeneous and knowledge of
the shape of the labour-demand function enables to infer how exogenous changes
in labour supply affect the wage rate or its dual that is how exogenous changes in
the wage rate affect the demand for labour (see Hamermesh (1992)). Studies by
Dhrymes (1969) , Hamermesh (1983) and Levy (1990) for instance emphasise
the degree of price complementarity between capital and labour" and Berndt
and Wood (1975), Diewert and Wales (1987) and Morrison (1988) highlight the
downward sloping property of the aggregate demand curve, i.e. the negative
own-price elasticity of labour.'^ v *.> •i-/.»n -"in •••«>•> •-> .-...<:.
The theory of demand for heterogeneous labour enables us to infer on how
changes in the wage rate of one group of workers affect the demand for labour in
other groups. Hence, changing market conditions lead to changes in the demand
for labour as well as changes in the composition of labour. A well-studied example
is the capital-skill complementarity in production (see Rosen (1968) , Griliches
(1969), Grant and Hamersmesh (1979) and Hamermesh (1993)).'* When the
price of capital decreases, firms substitute capital for labour which results in a
decrease in the demand for labour. Since skilled labour and capital are comple-
mentary, that is when the price of one of the two decreases firms use more of
both, the demand for labour shifts out in favour of skilled labour altering the
skill composition of labour." Grant (1979) and Bresson et al. (1992) show that
the demand for the least-skilled group of workers is most elastic.
"See also Lever (1996), Al-Shamsi (2001), rUmcharran (2001a and 2001b) for recent
estimates.
'*See also Mairesse and Donnont (1985), Allen (1986), Card (1986) and Blanchflower et al.
(1991).
'^See also Johnson (1970), Welch (1970), Dougherty (1972), Berndt and Christensen (1974),
Tinbergen (1973, 1974 and 1975), Brogan and Erickson (1975), Fallon and Layard (1975),
Hamermesh and Grant (1979), Chen and "Ring (1987), Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong (1988)
and Levy (1996).
^Skill is understand in a broad sense here. Griliches (1969), Johnson (1970), Welch (1970),
Tinbergen (1973, 1974 and 1975) and Grant (1979) differentiate labour by education whereas
the other authors differentiate between production and nonproduction workers.
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In our allocation model, the adjustments in the demand for heterogeneous
labour do not occur homogeneously across occupations. This model of the alloca-
tion of workers with different educational backgrounds to the various occupations
acknowledges the interdependence of the labour markets for different educational
groups. A downward shift in supply of a particular group of workers increases
the associated wage rate and induces substitution between types of labour within
and between occupations. In other words, the allocation model infers on the
elasticity of substitution between educational groups of workers within occupa-
tion as well as between different occupations. Allocation models therefore require
to differentiate labour with respect to both education and occupation. Litera-
ture in this field is, to the extent of our knowledge, limited to Dougherty and
Selowsky (1973) , Tinbergen (1973) and Bound and Johnson (1992). Dougherty
and Selowsky (1973) and Bound and Johnson (1992) consider the allocation of
workers with different educational levels to the various industries while Tinber-
gen (1973) emphasises the allocation of workers with different educational levels
to various occupational levels. These models provide the basis for the frame-
work on which we rely throughout this study. The model developed in this study
nests those of Dougherty and Selowsky (1973), Tinbergen (1973) and Bound and
Johnson (1992). .:,-:, ,. ^ <-., :.•-.-> .•>.->.- ,••; • •-•:•:.,
.4.2 Wage inequality
The question whether the allocation structure influences the substitution process
that takes place in the labour market, and thereby the wage structure and labour
productivity, relates to the literature on international differences in the wage in-
equality between skill groups led by Blau and Kahn (1996), Leuven et al. (2004),
Freeman and Schettkat (2001) and Acemoglu (2003) and to the literature on
changes in the structure of wages between skill-groups of workers, e.g. Katz and
Revenga (1989), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) , Murphy
and Welch (1992), Card and Lemieux (1996) , Johnson (1997), Card et al. (1999)
and Acemoglu (2002).'^ In this literature, the structure of wages is confronted
with a (neo-) classical supply and demand framework. Through time, shifts in the
relative supply of certain types of labour induce substitution between the various
types of labour resulting in changes in relative wages, whereas across countries,
"See also Berman et al. (1994), Bermau et al. (1998) and Krusell et al. (2000). •: •Qt/1 ' "•i-i «• -'' iV^ 1.4. RELATED DISCUSSIONS
differences in the relative supply of labour should coincide with wage differen-
tials if the substitution process between the various types of labour occurs freely
in each country. Time-series analyses, e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), indicate
that changes in the wage structure are consistently explained by the substitution
effect (supply and demand) once acknowledged for continuous shifts in the rel-
ative demand for skilled workers, either due to skill-biased technological change
or capital-skill complementarity. However, some authors, e.g. Blau and Kahn
(1996), reject the supply and demand explanation of wage differentials across
countries because the magnitude of the substitution effect necessary to match
supply and demand differentials with wage differentials is not plausible. Several
authors, e.g. Leuven et al. (2004) and Freeman and Schettkat (2001), argue
that the skill content of educational groups varies a great deal across countries
which makes educational comparisons difficult. Our contribution is to decompose
the substitution effect into an effect due to differences in the allocation structure
induced by differences in the skill content of educational segments and the true
substitution effect resulting from supply shifts only. The use of the allocation
model developed in this study enables to detect differences in the allocation that
are not caused by supply and demand factors but caused by differences in the
skill content across countries. The remaining supply and demand differential can
be compared with wage differentials to measure the real substitution effect. The
model can be used to draw conclusions on the extent to which differences in the
wage structure across countries fit with a supply and demand explanation and
how changes in the allocation structure can be linked to changes in the wage
structure.
1.4.3 Effect of overeducation on productivity and wages
The second question we address is whether some allocation structures can lead
to a substitution process that is relatively more advantageous in terms of market
outcomes (higher labour productivity and lower labour market instability). This
question is related to the literature investigating the relationship between allo-
cation, wages and productivity. Empirical evidence acknowledges the interaction
between the supply of workers with different educational backgrounds and the de-
mand for workers in the various occupations. This interaction results in the pres-
ence of workers with different educational backgrounds in the same occupation
whereas workers with the same education are employed in different occupations.
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Since FVeeman (1976), several authors have studied allocation from a supply per-
spective and shed some light on the impact of 'overeducation' on workers' pro-
ductivity and earnings.'" Tinbergen (1973, 1975, 1982 and 1984), Hartog (1980,
1985 and 1992), Duncan and Hoffman (1981) , Hartog and Tsang (1987), Har-
tog and Oosterbeek (1988), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), Alba-Ramirez (1993),
Cohn and Kahn (1995) and Dolton and Vignoles (2000) demonstrate that the
returns to years of 'overschooling' are significantly less than the returns to years
of adequate schooling such that investments in education have not been optimal
for the 'overeducated' workers as well as society.'' A few authors observe wage
differentials between workers with different fields of education when working in
the same occupation (see James et al. (1989) and Dolton and Makepeace (1990)
for instance). Murphy et al. (1991) recognise that the US productivity growth
slowdown may also be due to an improper distribution of 'talented people' among
the different fields of study. They argue that a student's educational choice is
guided by the perspective of sharing rents with employers which alters the sup-
ply of 'talented people' in the various fields of study and lowers productivity.
Tsang (1987) shows that the drop in firms' output due to the 'crowding out' of
less skilled workers from their traditional occupational domains by more skilled
workers can be as large as 8% to an one-year increase in 'overeducation'.'" In his
view, workers with more education than their jobs require are more dissatisfied
with their jobs''-* and exhibit higher rates of turnover" such that "overeducation'
decreases workers' productivity. The allocation model developed in this study
enables to evaluate the impact of various allocation structures on labour produc-
tivity and wage dispersion. Looking at workers with different fields of study, the
model emphasises first the relevance to distinguish between different allocation
structures. We expect that a shift in the supply of workers between two specific
educational fields leads to a reciprocal change in the wage rate of these two types
of workers but leaves the wage of workers with general education unchanged be-
'"See Green et al. (1999), Borghans and De Grip (2000) and Btlchel et al. (2003) for an
overview of the literature.
'^See also Groot (1996), Kiker et al. (1997), Battu et al. (1999), Sloane et al. (1999), Groot
and Maasen Van Den Brink (2000), De Oliveira et al. (2000), Vahey (2000) and Ng (2001).
'"See also Tsang and Levy (1985 and 1989) and De Grip (1989) for a discussion on the impact
of 'overedueation' on productivity.
"See Berg (1970). Note that Bilchel (2002) finds no evidence for higher job dissatisfaction
among 'overeducated' workers in Germany.
™ among others Vroom (1964) and Sicherman (1991). .,:: . >; .„, -.•;•.•••
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cause workers with general education can perform a rather large range of tasks
in every occupation and therefore can easily switch occupations. We show that
there is a family of allocation structures that satisfy this condition. This family
of allocation structures is characterised by three productivity parameters: the
productivity parameter of workers with general education outside their own oc-
cupation, the productivity parameter of both workers with technical and social
services vocational specialisations in each other's occupation and the productiv-
ity parameter of both workers with technical and social services specialisations
in the general occupation. We show that both the labour productivity and wage
dispersion are sensitive to the relative magnitude of these three productivity pa-
rameters.
1.4.4 Firms' heterogeneity
In Chapter 5 we investigate whether the production functions and thereby the
substitution possibilities differ between firms in the same industry and whether
these differences are related to the differences in the allocation of workers and pro-
ductivity between firms. This question relates to the growing literature on firms'
heterogeneity in output, productivity and input mix.^' Among others. Bayard
and Troske (1999), Haltiwanger et al. (1999) and Idson and Oi (1999) suggest a
conjecture that different firms choose different modes of production requiring a
different input mix. This study adds to this literature a theoretical and empirical
analysis of the shape of the production function of heterogeneous firms. We prove
that i) ceteris panftus, the higher the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour, the higher the labour productivity and ii) that given skill-biased
technological change, the larger the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour the larger the skill intensity. Using matched employer-employee
data for Denmark, we evaluate the extent to which the elasticities of substitution
between capital and labour and between skill-groups differ between large and
small firms and whether these differences explain the firm-size effects on labour
productivity, capital intensity and the skill composition of the workforce. Our
main findings are that large firms indeed have higher elasticities of substitution
between skilled workers in skilled jobs and all other inputs than small firms.
These differences in elasticities of substitution are of the magnitude to explain
2'See Baily et al. (1992), Olley and Pakes (1996) and Abowd et al. (1999)). ;
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the higher labour productivity, capital intensity and skill intensity observed in
large firms. As the skill segregation hypothesis suggests, we find that large firms
employ more overeducated workers than small firms. We relate the tendency of
large firms to employ a relatively overeducated workforce to an 'an< versus ci-
cada ' behaviour. The larger productivity enables large firms to build in a reserve
capacity of skilled workers in periods of low wages for skilled people in order to
anticipate demand or supply shocks in the labour market for skilled workers. If
the wage of skilled workers increases, large firms are affected less since at that
time they retain internal reserves of skilled workers. . = '—H » «• i^rm-wsu.- >•=
1.4.5 General versus specific education and the educa-
tional structure
The relevance of vocational specialisation in initial education has long been the
subject of a divergence of opinion. Some authors, e.g. Kang and Bishop (1989)
and Bishop (1995), argue that generic skills are mere tools for developing specific
skills but have no direct market value. Others, e.g. Comay et al. (1973) and
Dothan and Williams (1981), argue that general education offers individuals the
option of choosing among different occupations or careers. This option va/ue
hypothesis would imply that workers with general educational field can perform
a rather large range of tasks in the various occupations. The argument reads as
follows. Since generic skills can be used to perform some of the tasks in specific
occupations, individuals that possess generic skills can perform some of the tasks
in specific occupations.
In this study, we argue that the option value offered by generic skills does
not increase linearly with the amount of generic skills of individuals but rather
that the range of tasks that workers with generic skills can perform in specific
occupations levels off at a certain amount of generic skills. For instance, if a
person with math skills would work as a pharmacist he could calculate the doses
of a prescription but his ability to solve differential equations will not increase
the range of tasks he can perform as a pharmacist. : h-i !*J.VW<J •-,,.; I,,,;I
Moreover, we argue that workers with vocational specialisations also have
an option value. We do expect workers with specific skills to perform a rather
restricted range of tasks in other specific occupations but acknowledge that if
generic skills are tools for developing specific skills, workers with specific skills
have a fair amount of general skills which enables them to perform a quite large
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range of tasks in the general occupation. This option value is confirmed by our
empirical result showing that workers with vocational specialisations can perform
a large range of tasks in the general occupation.
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Assignment models and
substitution
2.1 Introduction ir^.ft ^;/ .
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The aim of this study is to understand the substitution process taking place in
the labour market. Looking at the assignment of heterogeneous workers to het-
erogeneous tasks will help to explain the substitution process and to analyse the
degree of substitution between different skill types of workers. In this chapter we
will develop an allocation model that enables us to understand how the allocation
structure of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs affects the substitution
between educational groups of workers.
The model we will develop builds on the various existing models in the as-
signment literature. Assignment theory' focuses on the relationship between the
distribution of workers' skills, the distribution of the skills required to perform the
various jobs and the resulting income distribution. In the assignment literature,
three general models can be distinguished. These models differ from each other
with respect to the origin of heterogeneity in the labour market, workers and/or
'The assignment literature diverges from the matching theory, see Mortensen (1986) for
instance, and search theory, (see Jovanovic (1979), Diamond (1981) and Pissarides (1984)) by
assuming that workers have full knowledge of all employers" wage offers and that employers
have full knowledge of all workers' abilities. In assignment models, it is assumed that free
choice and competitive markets assign tasks to workers efficiently. Perfect competition ensures
that workers in each group are rewarded according to the productivity of the marginal worker
in the associated group. Free choice ensures that workers select their education according to
their comparative advantage and tasks are assigned according to the structure of comparative
advantage. ••'•-.>• n>' -:!•••! ••-. • ,•:>•;«!•;• -.:* • ••••••: v •. • • ••..;!..-••••
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jobs. The self-selection model proposed by Roy (1950 and 1951) puts the empha-
sis on the supp/j/ side of the labour market by focusing on the heterogeneity of
individuals. Individuals are endowed with different capacities and choose a sector
among a small number of sectors. The demand for workers and wage rates by
sectors are exogenous to the model. An interesting feature of Roy's model is that
it can be used to model individuals' educational choice. Individuals choose their
educational profile based on their initial capacities and the exogenous market
wages associated with each educational background. Although Roy's model can
be used to model individuals' selection of education or occupation, it does not en-
able us to analyse the allocation of workers with various educational backgrounds
to various occupations.
In contrast to Roy's model, Rosen's tasks assignment model (Rosen (1978))
puts the emphasis on the demand side of the labour market by focusing on the
heterogeneity of tasks. Tasks differ from one another by the levels of the various
types of skills they require. Workers are grouped in a small number of homoge-
neous skill groups (educational categories) and the supply of workers and wage
rates by skill groups is assumed to be exogenous. The principal advantage of
this model is that it offers a very convenient framework to analyse substitution
between skill groups of workers. Rosen considers the demand for labour by mod-
eling firms' indirect production function resulting from the assignment of tasks to
workers that maximises output, given exogenous wages. However, in the model
proposed by Rosen tasks are ranked on a single continuum such that there is
implicitly only one occupation considered.
The a//ocotion mode/ proposed by Tinbergen (1956) is situated at the junc-
tion between Roy's (1950) and Rosen's (1978) models as both the heterogeneity
of individuals and tasks are considered. In the allocation model, workers as well
as tasks are defined along a finite number of types of skills and the quantity of
each type of skill workers have and tasks require are continuously distributed.
Since in practice the supply and demand distribution do not coincide, the supply
distribution has to be deformed so as to coincide with the demand distribution
otherwise there will not be an equilibrium. The endogenous income scale serves
to equilibrate the demand and supply distributions. Tinbergen's model is very
general as it incorporates both sources of heterogeneity, but education and occu-
pation are absent from the model. Though in practice it is possible to incorporate
these two concepts into Tinbergen's model, as we will show in this chapter, the
derivation of substitution possibilities between the various labour types is very
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complicated as the type of the implicit function of production is undefined.
Rosen's approach is more appealing for our purpose as it allows to infer on
labour demand, productivity and factor substitution between educational groups
of workers, while taking into account the heterogeneity of tasks and the assign-
ment of tasks to workers. However, in Rosen's tasks assignment model, jobs are
implicitly assumed to be consistently defined by a singie continuum of tasks.
Occupational levels and fields are ranked on a single scale and it becomes impos-
sible to analyse the allocation of workers with different educational backgrounds
to various occupational levels and fields. Therefore, we will develop in this study
an allocation model that builds on Rosen's tasks assignment model but incor-
porates more than one occupation. We will consider a tasks assignment model
with several educational types of workers and seuerai occupations where each
occupation is characterised by a different continuum of tasks. In this model,
workers with the same educational background are assumed to be homogeneous.
In practice, workers heterogeneity can be accounted for if we assume that work-
ers have perfect foresight, as in Willis and Rosen's (1979) application of Roy's
model on educational choice. We will show how to extend our model in order to
simultaneously take into account the heterogeneity of both workers and jobs as
in Tinbergen's model. However, we will show that the structure of factor substi-
tution is similar in both the generalised and restricted models. Since taking into
account workers' heterogeneity within education do not quantitatively change
the structure of factor substitution and allowing for fluctuations in the supply
of labour by education is more realistic for empirical work, the model of section
2.6.1 will be preferred in this study.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide insight in the
way in which the heterogeneity of workers and jobs is related to the substitu-
tion process in the labour market. In Section 2.3 we present Roy's self-selection
model. In Section 2.4 we discuss Rosen's tasks assignment model. In Section 2.5
we present Tinbergen's allocation model. In Section 2.6, we discuss the model
developed in this study (Section 2.6.1) and a possible extension by considering
both the heterogeneity of workers and jobs (Section 2.6.2). We will summarise
and conclude in Section 2.7. • ^ ; •;-. ,.-..•
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2.2 Heterogeneity of workers and jobs and the
substitution process
it fe
Before we discuss the assignment models in details, let us first show, with an
example, how the shape of the production function and thereby the substitution
process both between and within occupations depends on the assignment of jobs
to workers and the extent to which workers and tasks are heterogeneous.
Consider a decrease in the relative wage rate of college to high-school grad-
uates. Since college graduates become relatively cheaper, some of them will be
used to replace high-school graduates such that substitution between college and
high-school graduates takes place. The substitution occurs as in the following
line of thought. The first college graduate is assigned to the most difficult task
high-school graduates performed before the wage shift, and the remaining tasks
are reassigned to the remaining high-school graduates. This process is repeated
when the second extra college graduate has been assigned to the most difficult
task high-school graduates performed until then and the remaining tasks are re-
assigned to the remaining high-school graduates. In the extreme case where the
productivity of a// college graduates relative to the productivity of a// high-school
graduates is constant in all tasks of each occupation, this process lasts until all
high-school graduates would be replaced by college graduates, i.e. perfect substi-
tution between college and high-school graduates. However, in general, at some
point in the substitution process the relative productivity of high-school gradu-
ates compared to college graduates in the marpmai task, i.e. the task to which
the next college graduate should be assigned, compensates for the relative wage
differential. The substitution between college graduates and high-school gradu-
ates is limited to the extent of the marpina/ task. There is imperfect substitution
between workers of different skill types. In the extreme case where the relative
productivity of high-school graduates compared to the first college graduate in
the mon?ina/ task already compensates for the relative wage differential, there
is no substitution possibility between college and high-school graduates and the
production function is accurately depicted by a Leontief production function.
In assignment models, workers are heterogeneous with respect to their skills
and jobs are heterogeneous with respect to the skills they require. These models
generally differ from one another depending on whether workers' skills and the
skills required in the jobs are continuous or discrete, i.e. educational and occu-
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pational categories are discrete variables describing workers' skills and the skills
required in jobs. However, in all models, there need not be a one-to-one relation-
ship between the type of skills workers have and the type of jobs or occupation.
To achieve a one-to-one relationship between workers' skill types and occupa-
tions, workers of different types of skills have to be perfect substitutes within
occupations. This requires that the relative productivity of workers of different
types of skills is constant in all tasks within occupations. In that case the output
of an occupation could be produced with either types of workers and as soon as
the relative wage premium of workers with a particular type of skill increases, aM
workers with this type of skill are immediately replaced by workers of a cheaper
skill type. As a consequence, in each occupation, we will then observe one type of
worker only. This type of production technology within an occupation is known
as a linear production function.
However, because we generally do not observe a one-to-one relationship be-
tween education and occupation, it is reasonable to assume that workers of differ-
ent skill types are less than perfectly substitutable within occupations. Moreover,
because we observe shifts in the allocation of workers with different educational
backgrounds to the various occupations through time, it is reasonable to as-
sume that workers of different skill types are substitutable within an occupation
though less than perfectly. When the wage rate of workers with a particular type
of skill increases, some of these workers will be replaced by workers of a relatively
cheaper skill type within occupations. Therefore, in each occupation, there will
be workers employed with different skill types.
Moreover, the substitution process may occur between occupations as well.
Indeed, although a decrease in the wage rate of for instance economics gradu-
ates will reduce total labour costs, the cost of producing economic papers will
probably reduce more than the costs of producing sciences papers (Marshall's
importance o/ 6em</ unimportant law). This cost differential will in turn induce
substitution between occupations. This substitution process goes on until the
respective marpina/ jobs of all occupations for which a relatively higher costs of
production is observed are replaced by jobs in occupations for which lower costs
of production are observed.
Two extreme cases are noteworthy. First, if all tasks are identical within each
occupation, i.e. the case of perfect substitution between the occupational prod-
ucts, all jobs in occupations with relatively higher costs are immediately replaced
by jobs in occupations with relatively lower costs. In the case of perfect substi-
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tution between occupational products, we would only observe workers in some
occupations, whereas no one is employed in the other occupations. The second
extreme case is met when substitution between occupational products is not pos-
sible. In this case, though the skill composition of workers within occupations
may change in response to wage changes, the output of each occupation is a fixed
proportion of the output in other occupations. Depending on how substitutable
workers of different types are, at least one type of workers would be observed in
each occupation. • w b4>;ri>;r,Y» < • ;,•!•(•.! • u !.:/. ,r••••>. <• <•
2.3 Roy's self-selectivity model: A supply ap-
proach with workers' heterogeneity
The self-selection model developed by Roy (1950 and 1951) focuses on the sup-
ply side of the labour supply by looking at the heterogeneity between individuals.
Roy's perspective is to assume that the demand for labour is exogenous, perfectly
elastic to wages and does not affect the distribution of comparative advantages
among workers. Though Roy's self-selection model is governed by the principle of
comparative advantage, the theory of comparative advantage in labour markets
was formally developed by Sattinger (1975)/* The presence of comparative advan-
tage was later demonstrated empirically in Sattinger (1978 and 1980).^ Changes
in labour demand correspond to changes in relative wages. Extensions of Roy's
model to more than two sectors are provided in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985 and
1990) and Gould (2002).
In this model, the economy is characterised by several educational segments. •*
Individuals, prior to their educational choice, are heterogeneous with respect to
their endowed initial capacities. Individuals choose their education according to
their endowed capacities (vector z). If an individual choose education j, the edu-
cational system transforms this individual's capacities into skills by the function
S also Sattinger (1993) for a survey of assignment models and comparative advantage.
^MacDonald (1982) extends the comparative advantage model to labour markets with in-
complete information.
^In Roy's (1951) original work, workers can choose between two sectors. Willis and Rosen
(1979) and Willis (1986) show that Roy's model expresses the self-selection of people into
educational groups assuming that there is a one-to-one relationship between education and
occupation. Therefore, throughout this section, we will use the term education although we
could use the term occupation.
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t,(x). For example, £,(x) takes an individual's strength, intelligence and so forth
and transforms these endowments into that individual's skills. For the sake of no-
tational simplicity, the skills of workers t,(x) are better understood as measured
in (log) output units per hour.** An individual endowed with capacities x that
chooses education j will have skills level <j(x) and will produce £j(x) (log) units
of output per hour. Note that since individuals are heterogeneous with respect to
their er on<e capacities, they are also heterogeneous with respect to their skills,
ex post, even when they have the same education.
For the sake of convenience, let's consider the original two-sector model. The
population distributions of skills in the two educational segments are charac-
terised by their means, variances and covariance across educational groups. If
workers were randomly distributed over the educational segments, the observed
skill distributions would match the population distributions in the two educa-
tional segments. However, as workers will maximise their utility by pursuing
their comparative advantage, the skill distribution in each educational group will
differ from the population distribution of skills.
In order to illustrate Roy's findings, we assume that workers choose between
two educational segments and that utility maximisation is equivalent to wage
maximisation. Since individuals choose their education once for good, this means
that individuals perfectly foresee what their earnings will be in the future at the
time the educational choice is made. Therefore, we assume that individuals have
perfect foresight.
Suppose workers are endowed with certain capacities, x, which are trans-
formed through education in segment j into skills by the function £_,(x). An
individual with initial capacities x will have skills <i(x) if he chooses education
1 and skills ^(^) if he chooses education 2. Let w^ be the piece rate pay per
unit of output for workers with education j determined in a competitive market.
The log earnings, denoted by j/(x), of an individual with capacities x choosing
education j is given by:
*"Hartog (2001) describes in a basic structure the transformation of individuals' initial endow-
ments (abilities) into earnings. In the first step, individuals' initial endowments are transformed
into skills through an educational production function, the function /J(I). These skills are then
transformed into an individual's output by a production matrix, the function p(/j) with p in-
creasing in /j. To simplify the notation and without loss of generality, we assume that the
function t,- actually encompasses both the educational production matrix and the productivity
matrix, i.e. t,(.r) = p o /j(ar). In the final step, with piece rate output prices, productivities
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An individual chooses education 1 over education 2 if:
Roy assumes" that the distributions of skills are log-normal. . j ..,y ;, v .-:'.•
Let the joint distribution be given by: ,^... ,-,.•. -•:,'.
, „ / CTl CT12
and E =
The correlation between an individual's skills of type 1 and 2 is given by
Cj = <7i2/criCT2- The correlation and variances of the skill distribution play a
crucial role for determining comparative advantages and therefore for determining
the earnings distribution and self-selection. Clearly, someone's choice for one or
the other educational segment depends also on the wage rate in each education.
The larger the relative wage rate in a particular education, the more people will
find it profitable to choose this education. The decision rule can be formalised
by an index / such that a person with potentaa/ skills (<i(x),i2(^)) will choose
education 2 if *2 —*i > lnu>i — lni«2- The index function 7 reads therefore as: <5 =
In u>i— ln^+ti where fj can be interpreted as a person's minimum level of skill of
type 2 necessary to have a comparative advantage in education 2 conditional on
a person's level of type 1 skill and the wage rates in both educational segments.
Three cases are usually distinguished. The first case, usually referred to as
eguaMy o/ comparative adrantafle, is given by skills that are equally concentrated
and perfectly correlated, i.e. <Ti = CT2 and Q = 1. In this case there is no selection
*This is a strong assumption in Roy"s model. Heckman and Honore (1990) show that few of
the implications of Roy"s model survive if the skills are drawn from more general distributions.
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and individuals appear as if they were sorted into the educational segments at
random. Even though we could separate skill types, the skills of individuals could
be considered as a one-dimensional factor.
The second case corresponds to /werarc/Mca/ sorting. This case arises when
the skill distribution satisfies one of the following conditions.
or
These two conditions imply a sufficiently high positive correlation between
both types of skills. It is called hierarchical sorting because e.g. under condition
.A, individuals with education 1 are drawn from the right tail of the distribution
of type 1 skill, whereas people with education 2 are drawn from the lower tail of
the distribution of type 2.
The extreme case of hierarchical sorting, with perfect correlation between
skills, is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The axes correspond to both types of skills,
type 1 (horizontal) and 2 (vertical). The population distributions of both skills
are represented on the associated axes. The index line / is the 'decision' line.
Given market wage rates, line / intersects the bivariate skill distribution in such
a way that people with skills that lie above / choose education 2 and people
with skills that lie below / choose education 1. The joint distribution of skills
corresponds to the degenerate bivariate normal whose density lies along line n.
The index line / and skill distribution line n intersect in point e. Skill points
defined by (<i(x), ^(^)) lie on n/ Any individual whose skill point is situated to
the right of point e chooses education for which the distribution of the associated
skill type is most spread among individuals (education 1 in Figure 2.1), while all
persons whose skill points are situated to the left of e choose education for which
the skills of people are most concentrated (education 2).
The third case is the case of no /»erart/iica/ sorting. This occurs when the
correlation between both types of skill is sufficiently small or if the scope for skills
of type 1 and 2 is about the same and there is a less than perfect correlation.
distribution line n passes through point (TT-^) by definition.
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Figure 2.1: Educational choice under hierarchical sorting.
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This condition reads as:
or
In this case, workers with the highest skills of type j tend to choose education
j. Figure 2.2 illustrates the particular situation where both types of skill are not
correlated (c< = 0). The joint distribution of skills is represented by an elliptical
set of iso-probability contours" whose major axis is either horizontal or vertical
((T1/CT2 > 1 and CTi/cr2 < 1 respectively).^ The index line / partitions the bivariate
distribution on a slant in such a way that the probability that a person has a
comparative advantage in education 1, respectively 2, is an increasing function
of <i, respectively ^- As depicted in Figure 2.2, the average level of type 1 skill
of workers choosing education 1 is larger than the average level of type 1 skill of
workers who choose education 2. Respectively, the average level of type 2 skill
of workers choosing education 2 is larger than the average level of type 2 skill of
workers who choose education 1.
In Roy's model, individual's skills and the distribution of these skills in each
education determine the comparative advantage of workers in the two educational
groups. As Willis and Rosen (1979) and Willis (1986) show, it is possible to
express the self-selection of people into both education and occupation in two
steps by assuming an exclusive relationship between education and occupation.
Suppose that education j is a necessary and sufficient"' condition to work in
occupation j. Then, Roy 's model depicts individuals' self-selection in a particular
education and the related occupation. Given the wage rates in both education-
occupation sectors, people select themselves into education according to their
"In Figure 2.2, we plot the 95% contour. This means that 95% of all individuals are contained
in the ellipse n.
^Note that if the scope for both skills is the same, i.e. the same dispersion of skills in both
educational segments, the joint distribution is represented by a circle set of iso-probability. (see
Salop (1979))
Herewith, one should use the term 'imposed' instead of 'required' education for a job since
both Willis and Rosen (1979) and Willis's (1986) extensions consider a one-to-one relation
between education and occupation. The people who are going to work in occupation 1 have
studied education 1 whereas those who work in occupation 2 have always studied education 2.
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Figure 2.2: Educational choice under non-hierarchical sorting.
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comparative advantage, and find work in the related occupation. ; „ , : , •
2.4 Rosen's tasks assignment model
The assignment model developed by Rosen (1978) focuses on the demand side
of the labour market by considering heterogeneity of tasks. In the theoretical
framework, there is a rather small number of types of workers. The type of
workers refers to a worker's education'' and workers with the same education are
homogeneous with respect to their skills. Jobs refer to certain tasks and there
is a very large set of tasks to be performed in order to produce output. The
supply of labour is assumed to be exogenous, perfectly elastic to wages and does
not affect the distribution of comparative advantage among educational types of
workers. In that sense, the model essentially focuses on the demand for labour.
The model focuses on the problem that consists of finding an assignment of the
various tasks to types of workers in order to maximise output. Opposite to Roy's
model, workers do not select an education given their potentaa/ skills but rather
are assigned to a task depending on the skills this task requires and the wage
rates associated with each type of workers.
We define a task z by the productivity of each type of workers in this task. For
instance, if Sij is the productivity, measured in (log) output per hour, of a worker
with education j in task i then task i is defined by a vector s< = (fijii •••>£<»)
containing the productivity of the various types of workers in this task. The
skills required in task i are the skills possessed by those workers with the largest
productivity in this task, i.e. if maxj s^ = Sj* then the required education in
task i is education fc. In order to produce output, firms define the tasks to
be performed. The firms' demand for labour forms the multivariate frequency
distribution of tasks, say m(si,..., s,,), in terms of workers' productivity.
Similar to Roy's model, great graphical simplification is achieved when there
are two types of workers: workers with education 1 and workers with education 2.
Within each educational group, workers are assumed to be homogeneous in terms
of their skills. Therefore, workers belonging to the same educational group are
equally productive. However, between educational groups, productivity is neither
equal nor constant over tasks. Assume that this joint distribution of productivity
"Similar to Roy's model, there is a one-to-one relationship between education and
occupation.
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follows a bivariate normal distribution: i ^>* *'"*'' k™ ••-^'ISKV'V.- •»•/. ,: ; . >.,
n»(*i, S2) ~ N(s, w) with s =
«'• andE =/''"» '""^
The correlation between the productivity of workers of both types in the
various tasks is given by c, = T12/T1T2. For instance, if c, is close to 1, the tasks
in which workers with education 1 are the most productive are also the task in
which workers with education 2 are the most productive. .-.-•. •.,,-•
Let lniu,- be the log wage rate of workers of type j. Moreover, a worker of
type j assigned to task z produces s<j (log) units of output.
The problem is to assign the tasks to both types of workers in such a way
that output, denoted by //, is maximised. The assignment depends on the wage
rates and the joint distribution of workers' productivity associated to the tasks.
Similarly to Roy's self-selection model, the assignment of tasks is random, hier-
archical sorting or non-hierarchical sorting depending on the magnitude of the
variances and covariance of the distribution of the productivity of both types of
workers in the various tasks.
In order to illustrate the assignment problem, we graph in Figure 2.3 the de-
mand surface that results if we assume that there is no correlation between the
productivity of workers of both types and hence no hierarchical sorting. There-
fore, demand is determined by an elliptic set of iso-probability contours''* whose
axes have arbitrary positions depending on the correlation parameter c«. The
assignment rule can be formalised by an index /, in such a way that a task i with
productivity point (s^, s<2) will be assigned to a worker of educational type 2 if
s«2~~Sji > In W2 ~ In u>i. The index function reads as: sj = Inui2 — lntui+si where
sj is the minimum productivity a worker of type 2 in a given task so that this task
is most efficiently assigned to a worker of type 2 depending on the productivity
of workers of type 1 in this task and the relative wage rate. In Figure 2.3, the
index line 7, partitions the demand ellipse m on a slant so that any task t with
productivity point (««, s^) lying above /„, is assigned to a worker of type 2. The
'"•'In Figure 2.3. we plot the 95% contour. This means that 95% of all tasks are contained in
the ellipse m.
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follows a bivariate normal distribution:
' m(si,S2) ~ N(s,H) with s = (s,,
hi- !;:>.,;;J-'b -.nl Du <• and 5 =
The correlation between the productivity of workers of both types in the
various tasks is given by c, = T12/T1T2. For instance, if c, is close to 1, the tasks
in which workers with education 1 are the most productive are also the task in
which workers with education 2 are the most productive.
Let lnwj be the log wage rate of workers of type j. Moreover, a worker of
type j assigned to task i produces Sij (log) units of output.
The problem is to assign the tasks to both types of workers in such a way
that output, denoted by i/, is maximised. The assignment depends on the wage
rates and the joint distribution of workers' productivity associated to the tasks.
Similarly to Roy's self-selection model, the assignment of tasks is random, hier-
archical sorting or non-hierarchical sorting depending on the magnitude of the
variances and covariance of the distribution of the productivity of both types of
workers in the various tasks.
In order to illustrate the assignment problem, we graph in Figure 2.3 the de-
mand surface that results if we assume that there is no correlation between the
productivity of workers of both types and hence no hierarchical sorting. There-
fore, demand is determined by an elliptic set of iso-probability contours^ whose
axes have arbitrary positions depending on the correlation parameter c,. The
assignment rule can be formalised by an index /«in such a way that a task i with
productivity point (Sji,St2) will be assigned to a worker of educational type 2 if
S12 - sn > In W2 - In u>i. The index function reads as: sj = In W2 — In u>i + si where
s.j is the minimum productivity a worker of type 2 in a given task so that this task
is most efficiently assigned to a worker of type 2 depending on the productivity
of workers of type 1 in this task and the relative wage rate. In Figure 2.3, the
index line /, partitions the demand ellipse m on a slant so that any task i with
productivity point (s^, *<2) lying above /,, is assigned to a worker of type 2. The














Figure 2.3: Assignment of workers to jobs.
index line /, shifts downward as the relative wage rate in educational segment 1
increases. This results in a lower demand for workers of type 1.
The analytic model of Rosen (1978) presents some interesting features. In
the model, tasks are ranked by workers' comparative advantage. To do so, Rosen
defines the continuous index 1; = g(s,, S2) on (0,1) with partial derivatives 5,, < 0,
^ > 0 and 3,,,, < &, x g^. This means that a task t is ranked closer to 0 than
a task J if su - a* > «ii - a«- Workers of type 1 have a comparative advantage
in tasks close to 0 and workers of type 2 have a comparative advantage in tasks
close to 1. The continuum partitions the spectrum of tasks in the following way.
Let 1/TTJ(V) measure the productivity in 'efficiency units' of a worker of type j
at task u." The productivity of workers of type 1 relative to workers of type
2 denned by the function g(t>) = 7T2(U)/?TI(W) is therefore increasing in v (i.e.
si
**Note that for task r such that D = , we have In —T^T = s^, for j = 1,2.
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Table 2.1: The structure of assignment and the marginal task.
Hi
Tasks i> < e
Education
1
g' > 0). Given the wage rates of workers of type 1 and 2, wj and W2, we define
the task e with e£ (0,1) such that all workers of type j are assigned to the tasks
whose value u exceeds e, i.e. g(u < e) > ^, g(e) = ^ and <7(u > e) < ^-. The
assignment structure given the required skills of the marginal tasks f is reported
in Table 2.1.
Let Li and L2 be the number of workers of type 1 and 2, respectively. The
unit isoquant is defined parametrically by integrating the demand for workers per
unit of output over the spectrum u:
7f = / *ri(t>)-dt; (2.1)
-^ = / 7T2(u)-di;
where # is the output level.
The elasticity of substitution between both educational types of workers eval-
uated at the marginal task £ is therefore given by:
where all arguments, i.e. 7Ti, 7r2, W,, 7rj and 9, are evaluated at e.
Equation 2.2 shows that the more similar workers' skills are in the neighbour-
hood of the marginal task, the larger the elasticity of substitution in the marginal
task.
Assume that the functional form of the demand for workers per unit of output
is as follows:"
'••Given the demand for workers per unit of output as described in equation 2.3, for 9(11) to
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(2.3)
-• • • • • • • •• ••'•• •<••• •' ••• ;•;);•• ^v ' f-i vSK >"i'r> jf-*liv"
where ai and a2 are positive constants and/3 G (0,1). . ;,
Then, the unit isoquant in equation 2.1 can be rewritten to yield: ,,^ ,^,, ,^,.^.
Solving the system for e we have:
11/3
• (2-4)
Equation 2.4 reads as a CES production function."' Rosen's (1978) indi-
rect production function indicates that comparative advantages of workers imply
imperfect substitution between the various types of workers. The elasticity of
substitution between the two educational types of workers at the marginal task
is given by cr = yr^ and is constant for all marginal tasks.
Furthermore, given perfect competition in both labour and product markets,
d///<9L, = u;,, we can solve e for the parameters and the relative wage rates u;*
as follows:
(2.5)
increase with w, ^ > 0, we need /? € (0,1). '
'"In general, solving the system for 1 > /3 > 0 yields Rosen's indirect production function.
Imposing the worker demand per unit of output as in equation 2.3 yields the CES form.
39IV Ctf APTEfi 2. ASSIGNMENT MODELS AND SUBSTJTWJON
From equation 2.5, changes in the assignment of the marginal task can be
inferred from exogenous changes in the wage rate of workers with education 2
relative to the wage rate of workers with education 1. Since cr > 1, an increase
in the relative wage rate of workers with education 2 compared to workers with
education 1 will shift the marginal task e towards 1 (2' > 0). Since workers
with education 2 become relatively more expensive after the shock, workers with
education 2 will be assigned to tasks in which they are relatively more productive.
As a result, workers with education 1 will perform a wider range of tasks whereas
workers with education 2 will perform a narrower range of tasks.
2.5 Tinbergen's allocation model: A supply ap-
proach with heterogeneity of workers and
jobs
The allocation model proposed by Tinbergen (see Tinbergen (1956, 1975 and
1977) and Van Batenburg and Tinbergen (1984)) considers heterogeneity of work-
ers and jobs and income depending on both supply and demand factors. The
labour market consists of a (large) number of categories"* of labour, and de-
mand, supply and the equilibrating wage rates have to be distinguished for each
of these categories though a certain degree of interdependence may exist. Tin-
bergen models labour supply by maximising individuals' utility. The demand for
the various categories of labour is assumed to be inelastic.'^ Suppose an index
is introduced for each category, say j. The variables used to characterise the
various categories are the degree to which certain types of skill are required or
present in that category.
In the model, workers are endowed with a bundle of skills. The level of type j
skills a worker possesses is given by tj. The worker's skills are therefore defined by
the vector # = {£ 1, ...£,..., £„) where for instance £j indicates an individual's mathe-
'^Tinbergen actually refers to compartments.
''Tinbergen (1956) show's it is possible to remove the assumption that demand is inelastic
(see section VIII). However, Tinbergen derives a solution if only the mean of the distribution
of required skills (and not the variance and covariance) changes as the wage rates change.
Furthermore, even in this simple case, the derivation of substitution possibilities between the
various labour types is very complicated as the type of the tmp/ictt function of production
remains obscure.
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matics skills, <2 indicates his or her communication skills, et cetera.'" All workers
collectively form the supply of labour that is characterised by the mujtivariate
frequency distribution of workers' skills, say n(ti, ...tj..., t«). Next, Tinbergen de-
fines a task i by the level of each type of skill this task requires to be adequately
performed. The level of type j skills required to do task i is denoted by s^.
Collecting these levels of required skills, Tinbergen defines a^ask i by the vector
Si = (fin, ...Sy...,Sin)» where Si is the mathematics skills required, S2 the commu-
nication skills required, et cetera, in task i.'^ In order tO/tnaximise output, firms
define the tasks to be performed. These tasks differ in the levels of each type
of skill they require. Therefore, firms together form the multivariate frequency
distribution of tasks, say m(si, ...s^..., s,,), in terms of the required skills.
In practice, the frequency distribution of demand m need not coincide with
the frequency distribution of supply n. This introduces tensions between the skills
demanded and the skills supplied. Therefore, by offering adequate remunerations,
employers are able to attract workers for the jobs for which supply is insufficient
and repel them from supplying in jobs with excess supply. .,...:
In the simplified case of two types of skills, labour supply is determined by
the joint distribution n(ti,t2) and the demand by the joint distribution m(si,S2).
The allocation problem at hand can be graphically illustrated as in Figure 2.4.
The supply of actual skills and the demand for required skills are assumed to be
normally distributed with respective distributions:
n («i,*2) ~ #(<, £) with i =
/ <7i CT12 \
and E = I I
'"Mind the difference between the definition of f in Tinbergen and the definition of £ in the
application of Roy's model presented in Section 2.3. In Section 2.3, individuals are endowed
with a vector of initial capacities J that is transformed into a productivity scalar <j(x) by
the educational choice. In Tinbergen, inidviduals are endowed with a vector of skills t =<
<i.-..,«„ >.
'"Mind the difference between Rosen's and Tinbergen's definitions of tasks. In Rosen's model,
tasks are defined by a vector s =< «i, ...,«„ > containing the productivity of the various types
of workers in this task. In Tinbergen, tasks are defined by a vector s =< «i ,....«„ > containing
the level of each type of skills required to do task i.
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', .=,) with s = (si, S2)
7MFti;
and s =
The demand and supply surfaces drawn in the figure result from imposing no
correlation between the two types of skills workers possess (c« = ^^ = 0) and a
positive correlation between the required skills (1 > c, = 7^ > 0). Therefore,
supply is characterised by an elliptic set of iso-probability contours^" whose axes
are arbitrarily chosen parallel to the coordinate axes (since Q = 0, the major axis
is parallel to the horizontal axis when CTI > 02) and demand is determined by
an elliptic set of iso-probability contours whose axes have arbitrary positions de-
pending on the correlation parameter c,.*' For the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, we transformed the space (si,S2) such that (si,S2} = (<i,?2)-
Tinbergen derives solutions for the income distribution so that 'tensions' between
the skills required in a task and the actual skills of the individual performing this
task, i.e. si - <i and S2 - £2, are being compensated for by higher remunerations.
In the simplified version of Tinbergen's model, the income scale influences the
distribution of skills supplied but not the demand distribution:
The t-surface has to be 'deformed' so as to coincide with the s-
surface. (Tinbergen (1956), p.162)
Although not explicitly considered in Tinbergen's original work, individuals'
educational choice 'deforms' the t-surface. Introducing educational choice to the
model provide some insight in why workers with various educational backgrounds
find jobs in the same occupation and why workers with the same educational back-
ground find jobs in different occupations. Rather than assuming that individuals
are directly endowed with skills, we consider that the supply distribution of skills
is the result of a self-selection of heterogeneous individuals in education.^
-"In Figure 2.4, we plot the 95% contours. This means that 95% of all individuals are
contained in the ellipse n and 95% of all jobs are contained in the ellipse m
"Herewith, we have chosen c, > 0. '
that in Tinbergen's view (see Tinbergen (1956)) education...
...stands not only for that concept itself but also for all determinants of earn-
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' Suppose that workers are endowed with a vector of initial capacities and may
choose between two educational categories, namely 1 and 2. The educational
system transforms initial capacities t° into skills £' such that a worker with initial
capacities (£°, tfj) will have skills (£], #j) if he chooses education 1 and skills (f°, tfi)
if he chooses education 2. The distribution of initial capacities is exogenous to
the model but the distribution of skills is endogenous, like the distribution of
skills supplied in Tinbergen, since it results from the self-selection of individuals
in education. Hence, individuals that choose education 1 will tend to have high <i
skills and low ^ skills while individuals that choose education 2 will tend to have
high ?2 skills and low ij skills. For the sake of simplicity, consider that the index
line /( partitions the supply ellipse n on a slant such that workers with skills (<i, £2)
that lie below /j have education 1 and workers with skill point that lie above /f
have education 2. Note that, as in Tinbergen, the income scale equilibrates the
supply and demand such that, given an exogenous shock that results into higher
expected returns to education 1, the distribution of skills will be deformed as
more individuals will find it profitable to choose education 1 instead of education
2. Individuals that shift from education 2 to education 1 will increase their £1
skills and decrease their ^ skills such that the average of type 1 skills, £1, will
increase and the average of type 2 skills, £2, will decrease.^
The demand distribution corresponds to the skills required by firms. As in
Tinbergen, we assume that the demand frequency distribution is inelastic such
that changes in the income scale do not affect the demand distribution of required
skills. Suppose that all tasks that require skills (si,S2) such that f* > A define a
job in occupation 2 and all tasks that require skills such that f < A define a job
in occupation 1. The index line /,, i.e. $2 = Asj, partitions the demand ellipse
m on a slant such that a task i, whose required skills point (s;i, s^) lies above /,,
defines a job in occupation 2 and wee versa.
Prom Figure 2.4, we can see that the relationship between education and
ings that are related with it. Thus education may partly reflect some of the causes
that enable some people more than others to complete a certain level of schooling,
such as innate intelligence, perseverance and the environment in which an indi-
vidual has grown up. Education also reflects whatever financial accommodation is
made available by the community of the availability of schools of the type needed
sufficiently close to a given individual.
Note that the variances and covariance of the distribution may change too. Since this
depends on the before-shock distribution it will not be treated here.
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t2,s2 Tinbergen
Figure 2.4: The allocation problem and the mapping of abilities required and
actual abilities.
occupation is no longer exclusive but overlaps. This arises since the demand dis-
tribution of required skills in occupation 1 and 2 does in general differ from the
supply distribution of actual skills in education 1 and 2 that results from self-
selection on the supply side. The allocation model is characterised by workers
with education 1 finding work in both occupations, whereas the jobs in occupa-
tion 1 are held by workers with different educational backgrounds. There is an
allocation problem inherent in the labour market that depends on both the self-
selection of individuals in education according to their comparative advantage
and the mapping of skill requirements and the skills of workers.
The demand for workers in each occupation and the supply of workers by
education are balanced through the allocation process which yields equilibrium
wage rates by education. In principle, there does not need to be an identity
relationship between a worker's actual education and required education. Since
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each individual will try to get the best job and, inversely, each firm offering a job
will try to recruit the best person for the job concerned, it seems natural that
the allocation process will result in the mapping of supply and demand.
2.6 Allocation model: A demand approach with
heterogeneity of workers and jobs
2.6.1 Tasks assignment model with several types of work-
ers and occupations
To improve our understanding of the substitution process, we develop an alloca-
tion model that builds on Rosen's tasks assignment model (Rosen (1978)). In our
model, jobs belong to a small number of occupational types and each job refers
to a certain task. However, in contrast to Rosen's one-occupation model with a
single continuum of tasks, we consider several occupations. This enables us to
analyse the allocation of workers with various educational backgrounds to various
occupations. Each occupation is also characterised by a different continuum of
tasks. Moreover, there is a discrete number of educational types of workers and
workers of the same type have homogeneous skills. The type of a worker refers to
his or her education. The supply of labour is assumed to be exogenous, perfectly
elastic to wages and does not affect the distribution of comparative advantage
among educational types of workers. In that sense, the model focuses essentially
on the demand for labour. The problem is to find an assignment of the various
tasks of each occupation to educational types of workers in order to maximise
output.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider two occupations, namely occupations
1 and 2, and two types of workers, workers with education 1 and workers with
education 2. Suppose that the productivity of a worker with education j at
task r of occupation i is given by s,.,ij- We rank the tasks of occupations 1 and
2 by workers' comparative advantage. We define two continuous indices vj =
i2) and U2 = M*2i,»22) on (0> 1) with partial derivatives &,, < 0, #,,.j > 0
&,„„ < &,,, x $„,, and /i,,, < 0, /»,„ > 0 and /i,,,,^ < /i,,, x /i,^. These
continuums indicate that workers with education 1 have a comparative advantage
in tasks close to 0 of both occupation 1 and 2 and workers with education 2 have
a comparative advantage in tasks close to 1 of both occupations. The continuum
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Table 2.2: The structure of assignment and the marginal tasks. ' '
Tasks
Occupation 1 i; < £]
v > £i







i>j partitions the spectrum of the tasks of occupation i in the following way. Let
l/7rij(j;j) measure the productivity in 'efficiency units' of a worker of type j at
task Uj of occupation i.^ The productivity of workers with education 1 relative
to workers with education 2, defined by the function g(ui) = ^(viV^n^i),
is therefore increasing in t>j (i.e. q^ > 0). Given the wage rates of the two
types of workers, wi and u>2, we define the task e< with £< € (0,1) such that
the tasks Uj < e, of occupation z are assigned to workers with education z, i.e.
«(»* < eO < £' «(£*) = ^ and g(t;, > £,) > a.
The structure of assignment given the relative productivity of both types of
workers in the marginal tasks in occupation 1, i.e. £1, and occupation 2, i.e. £2,
is reported in Table 2.2. In occupation 1, workers with education 1 perform tasks
fi < £1 and workers with education 2 perform tasks t^i > £j. In occupation 2,
workers with education 1 perform tasks W2 < £2 and workers with education 2
perform tasks t>2 > £2-
The unit isoquant is defined by integrating the demand for workers per unit
of output over the spectrum u.
e that for a task r of occupation 1 such that i>i = </(s,.,ii, «r,i2) we have hi ^ V . =
for i = 1.2. /dem a task r of occupation 2 such that t>2 = /i(«r,2i. «r,22) yields In "| \
for j = 1,2.




-^ = / ^22(^2)
where // is the output level, and L^ is the number of workers with education j
in occupation z.
Knowing the functional form of the demand per unit of output allows us to
infer the form of the indirect production function nested in the unit isoquant
defined above. In order to infer further on the assignment of tasks to workers,
the following demand for workers per unit of output is adopted:^
(2.6)
where ^ and ^ measure occupation-specific efficiency units,^ 6, are constant
and /3<, e (0,1) and /?„ € (-00,1). The parameters a^ are productivity param-
eters reflecting the range of tasks that workers with education j can perform in
occupation i.
ur model reduces to Rosen (1978)'s model when: e, = fj = e and £• = -^, an =
x a2i and 012 = ccmst2 x 022 and /?„ = 1. This means that although' we differentiate
between the tasks in occupations 1 and 2, they are actually identical at a constant proxy.
^The closer A is to 0, the larger the efficiency units in occupation 1. The closer A is to 1,
the larger the efficiency units in occupation 2. Hence, A indicates the relative efficiency unite
in occupation 2.
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Given the specification of demand per unit of output defined in equation 2.6,
the unit isoquant reads as:
1/0.
a7
Solving the system for £1, £2 and A and simplifying we have: _.,. , ,
f r a /}-|"°/0« r ^ 0-|0./0«l^""
//= 6] an^ii + ai2-£<i2 +^021^21+022^22 (2-7)
Equation (2.7) is a two-level CES production function (see Sato (1967)). A
nested CES production function with an allocation problem of workers with ed-
ucational backgrounds 1 and 2 to occupations 1 and 2. This production function
has 6 noteworthy special cases:
i) when /3<, —> — 00 and /?,, —> 0 we have a Leontief-Cobb-Douglas production
function,
ii) when /?„ —• —00 and /?„ —» 1 we have a Leontief-Linear production function,
iii) when /?„ —• 0 and /?„ —> 0 we have a Cobb-Douglas-Cobb-Douglas produc-
., . tion function, , . , .,_, . ;.
iv) when /?„ —> 0 and /^ —• 1 we have a Cobb-Douglas-Linear production
function, _......
v) when /?„ —> 1 and j3, -• Owe have a Linear-Cobb-Douglas production
function and •. • • ..: • •••-•;; :••' ^; ."'••''•. • . /T
vi) when /?„ —» 1 and /^ —> 1 we have a Linear-Linear production function.
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'*•• Equation 2.7 is a CES production function." This extension of Rosen's (1978)
indirect production function indicates that comparative advantages of workers
imply imperfect substitution between the two educational types of workers within
each occupation. The elasticity of substitution between the two educational types
of workers at the marginal task of each occupation is given by cr = y^ and is
constant for all marginal tasks of each occupation.
Furthermore, using the marginal condition of perfect competition in both the
labour and product markets, d///<9L,_, = Wj, we can solve for the marginal task
in occupation 1, i.e. £i and the marginal task in occupation 2, i.e. £2 as well as
the relative efficiency units between occupations 2 and 1, i.e. A as a function of
the parameters and the relative wage rates ur, as follows:
:" ? Ml *.:= !:• -i !,.:. ••. *••»-! i<.'
U/2 i-<O









Since ffe > 1, an increase in the wage rate of workers with education 2 relative
"in general, solving the system yields Rosen's indirect production function. Imposing the
worker demand per unit of output as in equation 2.6 yields the CES form.CHAPTER 2. ASSIGNMENT MODELS AND SLfBSTJTITTION
to the wage rate of workers with education 1 shifts £1 and £2 upward. Because
workers with education 2 become relatively more expensive, they are assigned
only to those tasks in which they excel. Workers with education 1 will perform
a wider range of tasks whereas workers with education 2 will perform a narrower
range of tasks. This implies that in both occupations, the productivity of workers
with education 2 will increase.
»'; Though quite complicated when expressed in terms of wage rates, the ratio of
efficiency units between occupations 2 and 1, A, can be relatively readily expressed
in terms of the marginal tasks in occupations 1 and 2. In Appendix A of this
chapter we show that the relative efficiency unit. A, shifts toward 1 or 0 as a
response to a positive shift in the ratio ^Ai. regarding the relative magnitude
of the technology parameters of substitution (To- TWO cases are classified. An
increase in the ratio of the marginal task in occupation 2 to the marginal task
in occupation 1, i.e. an upward shift in £2/^11 wtil shift the relative efficiency
units toward 0 when the parameter of substitution between occupations is larger
than unity whereas it will shift the relative efficiency units toward 1 when the
parameter of substitution between occupations is smaller than unity. Therefore,
if CTo > 1> a shift in the relative wage rate that results in an increase of the
ratio of the marginal task in occupation 2 induces a relative increase of the
efficiency units in occupation 1. Since workers in occupation 1 produce output
more efficiently, the demand for workers in occupation 1 decreases at constant
output level. Otherwise, the exogenous shock will induce a relative increase of
the efficiency units in occupation 2.
The model we developed in this section offers a very convenient way to esti-
mate the degree of substitution between workers in the labour market resulting
from the assignment of workers to tasks. This estimation can simply be done by
estimating the respective demand for workers by educational group and occupa-
tion as derived from a two-level CES production function.
2.6.2 Tasks assignment and workers' self-selection
An obvious extention of the model is to combine the heterogeneity of workers
and jobs like in Tinbergen's model. In this section we therefore generalise our
model by releasing the assumption that within educational groups workers are
homogeneous. This requires to assume that workers have perfect foresight, as in
Willis and Rosen (1979)'s application of Roy's model to educational choice. In
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this extension of our model, analogous to Tinbergen (1956), both workers and
jobs are heterogeneous with respect to both workers' skills and the skills that
jobs require. However, in contrast to Tinbergen, we will focus on the demand
for labour by solving for the assignment of workers to jobs that maximises firms'
production. We further distinguish several categories of education and occupa-
tion, and model the allocation of workers with different educational backgrounds
to the various occupations. The supply-side determinants are given by the levels
of the various types of skill that workers are endowed with whereas the demand-
side determinants are defined by the levels of the various types of skill that tasks
require. As in the model of section 2.6.1, the allocation problem is characterised
by a matrix containing the distribution of workers by education to the various
occupations. However, each educational group is composed of workers that are
heterogeneous in terms of their skills and each occupational group is composed
of tasks that are heterogeneous with respect to the skills they require. Therefore,
the optimal assignment of the tasks belonging to each occupation to workers in
each educational group leads to the presence of workers with different educational
backgrounds in a particular occupation and the presence of workers with the same
educational background in various occupations. The optimal assignment of tasks
changes as the wage rates by educational groups change through the supply and
demand adjustment process.
Suppose workers are endowed with initial capacities < = (^I,^) where for
instance <i and ^ represent an individual's strength and intelligence, respectively,
and define s = (si,S2) the skills that tasks require.^ We define the continuous
index u = /(ti,^) on (0,1), with partial derivatives /[, < 0, /^ > 0 and /t,^ ^
0, such that workers are ranked by their educational comparative advantage.^
The continuum u indexes a worker's initial endowments £ = (*i, ^2) such that
individuals with a large initial capacity of type 2 compared to type 1 have a
comparative advantage in education 2 and individuals with a large type 1 initial
capacity compared to their type 2 initial capacity have a comparative advantage
in education 1.
Similarly, we define the continuous index v = (/(si, S2) (with partial derivatives
<7si < 0, 5,2 > 0 and p,,^ ^ 0) such that workers are ranked by their occupational
*Note that the definitions of £ and s correspond with the definitions used in Section 2.5 to
describe Tinbergen's model.
^For instance, think of / as: /(*i,ta) = t7+?7-
51i/ CHAPTER 2. ASSIGNMENT MODELS AND Sl/BSTITl/T/ON
comparative advantage. The continuum u indexes a task of required skills s =
(si, S2) such that workers with education 1 have a comparative advantage in tasks
that require relatively more type 1 skills, i.e. u is close to 0, and workers with
education 2 have a comparative advantage in tasks that require relatively more
type 2 skills, i.e. r; is close to 1.
The indexes u and v offer a convenient ordering of both workers and tasks
by comparative advantage."*" Let 1/TTJJ(U, V) measure, in efficiency units, the
productivity of a worker with initial endowments u if he chooses education j
and is assigned to task u of occupation i. Assume that the 7r,j are such that the
function Pi(tx) = 7r;2(u)/7Tii(w) is decreasing in u (i.e. p< < 0) in both occupations.
Then workers with endowed capacities M close to 0 have a comparative advantage
in choosing education 1 and workers with endowed capacities close to 1 have
a comparative advantage in education 2. Moreover, assume that the function
fy (u) = 7T2j(t>)/7Tij(v) is decreasing in u (i.e. gj < 0) so that occupation 1 is
composed of tasks v close to 0 and occupation 2 is composed of tasks 1; closed
to 1. Furthermore, assume that workers with education 1 have a comparative
advantage in occupation 1 and workers with education 2 have a comparative
advantage in occupation 2, <7i(v)/<72(f) > 1-
Assuming that free choice and competitive markets assign people efficiently,
the relative wages are such that the optimal assignment of workers to tasks is
characterised by three variables Ai, A2 and e. Variables Ai, A2 and e depend on
the relative wages. The structure of assignment given Ai, A2 and e is reported in
Table 2.3. Variable Ai indicates the lowest ratio of capacities of type 1 to type
2 of a worker with education 2 assigned to occupation 1. Variable A2 indicates
the lowest ratio of capacities of type 1 to type 2 of a worker with education 2
assigned to occupation 2. Variable e indicates the lowest ratio of skills of type 1
to type 2 that a task in occupation 2 requires.
The individuals' self-selection of education is such that individuals with initial
capacities u < min(Ai, A2) choose education 1, individuals with initial capacities
u > max (Ai, A2) choose education 2 and some individuals with initial capacities
min(Ai,A2) < u < max(Ai,A2) choose education 1 whereas the others choose
education 2/" Occupation 1 consists of the tasks of required skills u < e and
^Rosen (1978) and Macdonald (1982) use a single index to order tasks by comparative
advantage. Teulings (1995a, 1995b and 2002) uses a joint density function of worker type and
job type.
•"This raises the question why individuals with equal comparative advantage, equal u, make
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occupation 2 consists of the tasks of required skills t> > e.
The unit isoquant is defined by integrating the demand for workers per unit
of output over the spectrums u and v. ij <: <i. • •,-,••. •:..>. .-.- • :, i
. 1 ' " '•••:'•,!•> ;r L> •.••;••'> .••j.'i. • !••> Ufa: ;.'•; bi:i-...i .: :o ••.-... ::;-•;- •;) • i -.•••.• '
IT / /
" 7o Vo
-^- = / / 7T21 (ti, U)
-J?. = / / 7T22(u,t;)
Knowing the functional form of the demand per unit of output allows us to
infer the form of the mdtnect production function nested in the unit isoquant
defined above. In order to infer further on the assignment of tasks to workers,
the following demand for workers per unit of output is adopted:^
different choices. The problem can be solved be recognising that two individuals with the
same relative capacities, the same u, need not have the same capacities. Indeed, a person that
is twice as strong as intelligent need not be as strong as another person twice as strong as
intelligent. We assume that if two individuals have the same relative initial capacities u, and
noin (Ai, A2) < u < max (Ai. A2), the individual with an absolute advantage in education 1, that
is the individual with the largest capacity of type 1, will choose education 1 and vice uersa.
^Given the demand for workers per unit of output as in equation 2.11, for Pi(u) and fy(t;)
to decrease with u and 1; respectively, ^ < 0, pj < 0, we need /S,,./^ € (0,1).
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Note that Willis and Rosen's extension of Roy's model can be compared with
our model by imposing a^ = 0 for all z 7^ j. In this case, people choose an
educational sector and get a job in the corresponding occupation.
Given the specification of demand per unit of output defined in equation 2.11,
the unit isoquant reads as:
where &,/?„€ (0,1).
Solving the system for Ai, A2 and £ and simplifying we have:
(2.12)
As indicated by equation 2.12, the production function is a two-level CES
production function similar to the production function of the allocation model
developed in Section 2.6.1. In contrast to the model of section 2.6.1, in the gen-
eralised model workers with the same education are heterogeneous with respect
to their skills and therefore differ in their productivity and wages at equivalent
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task and occupation. However, the structure of factor substitution is identical in
both models.
The marginal condition of perfect competition in both the labour and product
markets, d///5Ly = IUJ, enables us to solve for the initial capacities of the
marginal worker (with education 2) in occupation 1, i.e. Ai, and the initial
capacities of the marginal worker in occupation 2, i.e. A2, as well as the relative
skills required in the marginal task, i.e. e, as a function of the parameters and
the relative wage rates Wj as follows: • ... ,. . . • .,,...,






where o-g = and (To =
An increase in the relative wage rate of workers with education 2 compared to
workers with education 1 shifts Ai and A2 upward. The index of initial capacities
of a worker u = /(<i, ^) increases with the initial capacity of type 2 and decreases
with the initial capacity of type 1. This implies that the ratio of capacities of
type 2 relative to type 1 of the marginal worker in both occupations tends to
increase as the wage rate of workers with education 2 increases. It follows that
an increase of the relative wage of workers with education 2 is accompanied with
a relative increase in the level of type 2 capacity of individuals selecting education
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2. The demand for workers with education 1 increases as the relative wage rate
decreases.^ ;*•!'• .:> • '
In Appendix B of this chapter we show that an increase in the ratio of the ca-
pacities of the marginal worker in occupation 2 compared to that of the marginal
worker in occupation 1, i.e. upward shift in A2/A1, will shift the relative skill re-
quired in the marginal task toward 0. Therefore, a shift in the relative wage rate
that results in an increase of the ratio of the capacities of the marginal worker in
occupation 2 to the capacities of the marginal worker in occupation 1 induces a
relative increase of the level of type 2 skill required in occupation 2.
2.7 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the assignment of heterogeneous workers to het-
erogeneous jobs in relation to the substitution process in the labour market. To
analyse the role of the allocation structure in the substitution process and thereby
its impact on labour demand, productivity and the wage structure, we developed
an allocation model. This model is an extension of Rosen's (1978) tasks assign-
ment model in which several occupations are considered and each occupation has
a different continuum of tasks. We have shown that the assignment of workers
with various educational backgrounds to heterogeneous tasks of several occupa-
tions can be formalised in an allocation model by specifying a two-level constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function.
The model presented admits two noteworthy special cases. Using a one-level
CES production function and differentiating workers according to their education
only (or their occupation only) is comparable to Rosen (1978). Using a two-level
Cobb-Douglas-Linear production function leads to the production function used
inTinbergen (1973).
The model we developed in Section 2.6.1 shows for instance that an increase
of the relative wage of workers with education 2 is accompanied with an increase
in the relative productivity of workers with education 2. Workers with education
1 will perform a wider range of tasks whereas workers with education 2 will
perform a narrower range of tasks. Moreover, a shift in the relative wage rate
Rosen, (!„ > 1 such that an increase in relative wage rate (W2/UJ1) shifts e upward. The
relative skill required in the marginal task shifts toward 1 implying that workers of type 1 will
perform a wider range of tasks whereas workers of type 2 will perform a narrower range of
tasks.
56yr .;; . • j/ ,•. - r .. / < 2.7. Sl/MAMJIY AND CONCLUSION
that results in an increase of the ratio of the marginal task in occupation 2 to the
marginal task in occupation 1 induces a relative increase of the efficiency units
in occupation 1 if the parameter of substitution between occupations is larger
than unity. This increase in efficiency units reduces the demand for workers in
occupation 1 at constant output level.
In Section 2.6.2 we generalised this model by releasing the assumption that
within educational groups workers are homogeneous. In this model workers and
jobs are, similar to Tinbergen (1956), heterogeneous with respect to both workers'
skills and the skills that jobs require. The generalised model shows for instance
that an increase in the wage of workers with education 2 relative to workers with
education 1 is accompanied by a relative increase in the level of type 2 capacity of
the individuals that select education 2. In contrast to the model of section 2.6.1,
in the generalised model workers with the same education are heterogeneous with
respect to their skills and therefore earn different wages at equivalent task and
occupation. However, the generalised model does not allow for supply fluctuations
because it requires to assume that individuals have perfect foresight. Moreover,
the structure of factor substitution underlying the assignment of heterogeneous
workers to heterogeneous tasks is similar to the structure of factor substitution in
the model of section 2.6.1. Therefore, the model of section 2.6.1 will be preferred
to the generalised model for the empirical analyses of this study.
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Appendix A. Elasticity of substitution and effi-
ciency units between occupations \ „.





Since ^ > 0 for all < i, j >, and Wj > 0 for all j, we have:
' v t;J-H-;U 2', and 4 > 0 iff CTe > 1 *••->•* '•• •
^^'-' ' 2; and 22 < OiffCTe<l "«*V '
Noting that A can be expressed as a function of £2/^1 as follows:
A — 23^2/Cu — "l "ll (2.18)
+6j ^21
-1
^Table 2.4: The relative efficiency units between occupations and the number of





Then one can derive the 2o and finds:
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;>ii/-i noi •;}!,!-ii tadjr« lo ^ii:.v(t?jc>13 .8 xr A.
- — I/J «u i/j "21 ^2/
1 — t/e
-2
Hence, since £j and £2 are both strictly positive, the derivative of A is of the
sign of - {5^* and can be expressed as a function of the technological elasticity
parameter CT<,.
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Appendix B. Elasticity of substitution and the
allocation of the marginal task
= -(l-a.).«fi.da-(^) Ki+aS(fr) J (2-20)
J (2.21)
Since a.^ > 0 for all < i, jf >, and u?j > 0 for all j, we have:
2j and 4 > 0 iff <7e > 1
zi and 4 < 0 iff a« < 1




^.-^("..-IJ/d-ff.) , i<7o a«(a.-l)/(l-a.) ^2^ '-" \
Then one can derive the Z3 and finds:
(2.23)
Hence, since Ai and A2 are both strictly positive, the derivative of £ is of the
60rrvt; • ^ ••; -. v i'- 2.7. SlTAfMARY AJVD CONCLUSION
sign of -££ > 0 since &, /?„ G (0,1).
Tkble 2.5: The marginal task and the number of tasks dealt with in each occu-
pation.
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The allocation model developed in Chapter 2 describes how the assignment of
workers to jobs depends on the distribution of skills among workers and the
distribution of skills required in the various jobs. The allocation model explains
how the assignment of workers to jobs relates to the substitution process that
takes place in the labour market. In this chapter we will test for the relevance
of our allocation model in explaining the substitution process between types of
workers observed in real data. Since comparing employment and wages across
countries seems to be a very challenging exercise, we run this test by comparing
the allocation of workers with different fields of study in higher education to
various occupations and their wages between different countries.
The formal test is in accordance with the following line of thought. If the skill
content of the graduates in the same field of study is not the same across coun-
tries, e.g. if the skills of economics graduates in FVance are significantly different
of the skills of economics graduates in the UK, the productivity of workers in
each field of study will vary across countries and so will wages. This will make it
impossible to compare relative employment and wage equilibrium by educational
groups of workers across countries even if the substitution process, linking dif-
ferences in the relative supply of labour by fields of study with educational wage
differentials, occurs freely. According to the model we developed in Chapter 2,
the differences in the productivity of workers with a particular study across coun-
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tries result in a different assignment of tasks to workers in the various educational
groups between countries even at equivalent employment equilibrium situations.
Hence, the difficulty to compare the various educational groups between counties
would lead to reject the supply and demand explanation of wage differentials
across countries because the magnitude of the substitution effect necessary to
match supply and demand differentials with wage differentials is not plausible.
The allocation model developed in Chapter 2, enables us to decompose the substi-
tution effect into an effect due to differences in the allocation structure induced
by differences in the skill content of (particular) fields of study and the 'true'
substitution effect resulting from supply shifts only. Indeed, the allocation model
enables us to detect differences in the allocation that are not caused by supply
and demand factors but caused by differences in the skill content across countries.
Hence, the remaining supply and demand differential can be compared with wage
differentials to measure the real substitution effect.
The question of whether the allocation structure significantly influences the
substitution process relates to the literature on international differences in wage
inequality between skill groups led by Blau and Kahn (1996), Leuven et al.
(2004), Freeman and Schettkat (2001) and Acemoglu (2003), and to the liter-
ature on changes in the structure of wages between skill-groups of workers, e.g.
Katz and Revenga (1989), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992),
Murphy and Welch (1992), Card and Lemieux (1996), Johnson (1997), Card et
al. (1999) and Acemoglu (2002). In this literature, the structure of wages is
confronted with a (neo-) classical supply and demand framework. Through time,
shifts in the relative supply of certain types of labour induce substitution between
the various types of labour resulting in changes in relative wages, whereas across
countries, differences in the relative supply of labour should coincide with wage
differentials if the substitution process between the various types of labour occurs
freely in each country.
Time-series analyses, e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), indicate that changes in
the wage structure are consistently explained by the substitution effect (supply
and demand) once acknowledged for continuous shifts in the relative demand
for skilled workers, either due to skill-biased technological change (see Bound
and Johnson (1992), Juhn et al. (1993), Levy and Murnane (1996), Machin and
Van Reenen (1998) and Acemoglu (2002)) or capital-skill complementarity, e.g.
Berman et al. (1994), Berman et al. (1998), Autor et al. (1998) and Krusell et al
(2000). DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999), Card and Lemieux (2001) and Card
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and DiNardo (2002) claim however that changes in wages do not reflect shifts in
supply and demand. They argue that changes in the labour market institutions
rather than shifts in the relative demand have caused the US increase in wage
inequality during the eighties. Especially the reduction in the real minimum
wage is regarded as a main determinant for increased wage inequality.
Also, some authors, e.g. Blau and Kahn (1996), reject the supply and demand
explanation of wage differentials across countries because the magnitude of the
substitution effect necessary to match supply and demand differentials with wage
differentials is not plausible. However, several authors, e.g. Leuven et al. (2004),
Devroye and FVeeman (2001) and Freeman and Schettkat (2001), argue that the
skill content of educational groups varies a great deal across countries which
makes educational comparisons difficult. They raise questions about the validity
of the skill measure used by Blau and Kahn, which is based on the assumption
that each year of education and each year of experience lead to the same amount
of skills in each country. International comparative studies in which students
or workers in different countries take a similar test, like the Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)' or International Adult Literacy Survey
(IALS) provide direct evidence on cross-country differences in the composition of
skills by educational levels. These international tests focus, however, on a very
specific set of skills. Therefore, they may be neglecting other skills that might be
relevant for a worker's productivity. Using several techniques, especially based
on the results of the IALS, Freeman and Schettkat show that the actual skill
level of workers in Germany, especially with respect to the least skilled workers is
much higher than was accounted for by Blau and Kahn.^ According to Freeman
and Schettkat this less dispersed ability distribution of Germans can not explain
the distribution of their wages completely, i.e. German workers in the lower
segment of the labour market still earn relative more than their US. counterparts
with equal ability. Leuven et al. (2004) use the IALS for a comparison of seven
countries in which they also take into account the effects of supply and demand
on the wage structure. They find, in contrast to Blau and Kahn, that wage
structures are consistent with a supply-demand explanation. The findings of
Leuven et al. (2004) show that analyses of the relationship between aggregate
supply and demand and wages are very sensitive to the way in which skills are
'See also Nickell and Bell (1996) and OECD (2001).
American workers with less than 12 years of schooling score in average less than their
counterparts elsewhere whereas with more than 16 years of schooling the picture is reversed.
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classified. Devroye and Freeman (2001) show in this respect that immigrants seem
to have low IALS-scores compared to their wages, due to the relative importance
of language ability in such tests. > tnrr-t •. • ' - • ii; :s'J*; ;, ro;.! ,"<v?
Our contribution with respect to this literature is that we decompose the sub-
stitution effect into an effect due to differences in the allocation structure induced
by differences in the skill content of educational segments and the true substitu-
tion effect resulting from supply shifts only. The allocation model developed in
this study enables us to isolate differences in the allocation that are not caused
by supply factors but caused by differences in the content of the various studies
across countries. By taking advantage of the information contained in the oc-
cupational allocation of workers, our model is robust for the way in which skills
are classified. The remaining supply and demand differential can be related to
wage differentials to measure the real substitution effect. The model enables us
to evaluate not only the sign but also the magnitude of the effects of supply and
demand on the wage structure. :• . ,1 iv ,;•• i>i .^ ••> i.W.i^ id .••••••
We will compare types of skills (measured by field of study) to avoid the inher-
ent problems of comparing skill levels between countries. We distinguish between
education and occupation and model the allocation of workers with different ed-
ucational fields to the various occupations. Using data on the labour market po-
sition of graduates from higher education in nine countries, we estimate whether
differences in the skill wage structure can be explained by differences in supply
and demand. We find that once we correct for differences in the allocation struc-
ture, the differences in the wage structure are consistent with a supply-demand
explanation and show that with an elasticity parameter of 2.14, wage differentials
across countries coincide with at least 64% of employment differentials.
: The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section covers the sources
and description of the data. In addition, we present measures of wage inequality
for all countries in the data. In a third section, the theoretical model is presented.
Therein, we subsequently derive a method to identify the relationship between
supply and demand and wages, allowing differences across countries in the alloca-
tion structure. The fourth section contains empirical results. Some final remarks
and conclusions appear in Section 3.5. •<> • •>. :••.;
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The data we use for our empirical analysis are taken from the "Careers after
Higher Education European Research Survey" (CHEERS). Samples of graduates
from higher education in the 1994/1995 academic year have been conducted 3
years after graduation (1998). The nine countries for which all necessary data is
available are Italy, Spain, France, Austria, The Netherlands, The United King-
dom, Finland, Germany and Japan. The sample sizes are approximately 3,500
for each country and are representative of the target population defined along
field of study, the type of degree/institution, gender and the region.
For each country, we need information on the allocation of workers with dif-
ferent fields of education to the various occupational fields as well as the wage
rates associated to each educational field.
T/ie ai/ocataon o/ workers - - -.
We make use of the information on the individuals' educational and occupa-
tional fields provided by the International Standard Classification of EDucation
(ISCED, 3 digits) and the International Standard Classification of Occupation
(ISCO, 3 digits) respectively. These two classifications distinguish categories,
with respect to both the Zet;efo and the ./ie/<£s of education and occupation. The
first digit of the two codes give the educational and job /eve/, respectively, while
the two last digits characterize the vocational /le/ds. We re-code the 3-digits
ISCED and ISCO into 7 educational fields and 11 occupational categories ac-
cording to the classification reported in Table 3.6 of appendix A. Since most of
the graduates end up in higher level occupations, and ISCO makes hardly any
distinction between very different occupations at the first digit level, we refined
the classification for high level jobs and take together lower level jobs. Based on
this classification, the number of workers per education and occupation for the
nine countries considered are computed.
The average number of workers per education and occupation in the nine
countries is reported in Table 3.1. The table shows that even though a large
amount of workers is allocated to occupations for which their education is 're-
quired' (largest frequency in bold figures), in each occupation the educational
distribution of workers is fairly spread. The educational group with the largest
frequency (Arts-Humanities field) accounts for 23% of the workers in Other-lower
occupations. Health graduates account for up to 82% of the workers in Health
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Table 3.1: Average number of workers by education and occupation expressed in
























































































































"For each occupation, the educational group with the largest frequency is
represented in bold.
occupations. Over all occupations, the number of workers having an education
that differs from the educational field for which the largest frequency is observed
adds up to about 48%. This figure indicates a fair dispersion in the distribution
of workers by education within occupations.
Allocation turns out to be different between countries. To show this, we
compute the average absolute distances between the allocation of workers with
different education to the various occupations of each country and the nine-
country average allocation defined as: <•. ,. ,••.„•• . . • i .. •M;;,Ht>
;: • ij.
where Ljj is the nine-country average number of workers with education j in occu-
pation t and L°j,. is the actual number of workers with education j in occupation
t observed in country c. Both are expressed in promiles. ' '- .•: !f>u:i:.>
The absolute distances, reported in the bottom row of Table 3.7 of Appendix
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B, indicate large differences in allocation matrices across countries. These differ-
ences may correspond with (i) cross-country differences in supply and demand
situations, (ii) differences in the content of the various fields of study and/or (iii)
differences across countries in the classifications of education and occupation.
Though institutional factors might affect the /eve/ of employment, the re/attw
allocation of workers with different education to the various occupations can
reasonably be assumed unaffected by labour market institutional factors. The
challenge is to separate (i) the demand and supply explanation from (ii) the
classification and the content of the study explanations.
T/ie educational wa</e rates 6j/ country
In order to derive the wage rates by educational categories in each country, we
run hourly earnings regressions independently for each country, including control
for the effects of gender, age (quadratic form), job-tenure (quadratic form), hours
weekly worked (log term), part-time, interaction of gender with age, job-tenure
and part-time. Tenure is measured by means of workers' answers to the ques-
tion: "In which year did you start your current job?" It therefore refers to an
occupation-related-tenure rather than a firm-tenure. We excluded anyone earning
less than 5 euro per hour or more than 150 euro per hour. The log wage-premia
by educational groups are derived from the OLS estimated parameters.
The following equation is estimated for each worker p in country c:
In WV = 7c + Go*** + E <*>.«^ + ^ (3.2)
The variable In W is the log of hourly earnings; Ac is a vector of explanatory
variables including age and its square, tenure and its square, a dummy variable
for part-time work (less than 36 hours per week), gender and its interaction with
age, tenure and part-time, and the log of weekly hours worked. Z£y are dummies
for the fields of education. Reported in Table 3.7 of Appendix B, the estimates
Qj,c can be regarded as educational wage-premia for each country.
Wa<?e megua/ify across countries
In several studies, wage inequality is found very different across countries with
a larger wage inequality in the US and the UK than in continental Europe and1
•*-TMl S.fc CHAPTER 3. TESTING THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL
Japan.-* In order to evaluate the extent to which this stylised fact is reflected
in our data on higher educated workers we compute some measures of wage
inequality.'* sv •)(!??<• n^!-- •/) ::i . • ••; :!"• • •••..:
First we derive from the estimation of equation 3.2 the total variance and the
within and between educational categories variance in log hourly earnings. The
total variance as well as the variance within and between educational categories
in log hourly earnings are given by:
—
where Lj,c is the number of workers with education j in country c, Lc is the
number of workers in country c, hi Wp,c is the estimated log-earnings for workers
p in country c and hi We is the average log-earnings in country c.
We complete the analysis of wage inequality by computing for each worker in
each country, V^ , the male, 40 hours per week, 30 years old, 2.8 years of tenure,
etc.*"... equivalent hourly earnings using equation 3.2 as follows:
= In Wp,c- 7c -G'e(*p,c-X) (3.3)
For each country, the standard-deviation and the 10, 50 and 90 percentiles
of the corrected hourly earnings distribution are computed. The variance de-
composition of the hourly earnings distribution as well as the 50-10, 90-50 and
for instance Blau and Kahn (1996), Leuven et al. (2004), Devroye and FYeeman (2001)
and Freeman and Schettkat (2001).
•"Notice that our measure of 6e<u/een educaiiona/ /ie/<fa wage inequality is part of the
/et«is wage inequality measured in most empirical analyses.
world-wide average age and tenure are 30 years of age and 2.8 years of tenure.
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The variance of hourly earnings is decomposed into between, within and total variance as
obtained from estimation of separate regressions of equation 3.2 for each country.
The standard deviation and the 50-10, 90-50 and 90-10 percentile gaps of the distribution
of corrected hourly earnings as obtained from equation 3.3.
90-10 percentiles gaps in the corrected hourly earnings distribution are reported
for each country in Table 3.2. Whereas most studies that differentiate workers
by their educational level find a significantly higher inequality in the UK, we
find no such evidence among workers with the same educational level. The total
variance in hourly earnings and the variance within educational groups in the
UK is of the same magnitude as that of FVance, Germany and to some extent
Japan. These results are corroborated by those derived from the distribution
of the corrected hourly earnings. The standard deviation of the distribution of
the corrected hourly earnings for the UK is indeed roughly the same as that for
Prance and Germany. Though, the 90-10 gap in earnings differential in the UK
lies above that of Germany, we find no differences between the UK and FVance
and Austria and even a slightly larger 90-10 gap for Italy. This result is con-
sistent with the view that the large wage differentials in the UK reflect a wide
distribution of skill levels among the workforce.
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3.3 Conceptual framework •..., ,, ^ , .., •
3.3.1 Production function ~':. T; ; """ ~"~ '
The economy of each country is assumed to produce one output-good denoted //.
The price of this good is used as numeraire. In each occupation i an intermediate
good, denoted //; is produced with workers from different fields of study as input.
The production function is of the form depicted in the theoretical model of
Chapter 2, i.e. equation 2.7, but with n«, occupations and rie educational groups:''
:' ff = min (Mfc) ... (3.4)
where 6* is a technological parameter measuring the optimal proportion of output
I in output. . , ••••,•.-. .-.• >-•> •••.••*• r ... _.:.•:;
Assuming that the intermediate outputs are inelastic (Leontief production
function at the occupational level), substitution on the goods market is impos-
sible and all adjustments come from educational substitution within the various
occupational groups. Note that allowing for substitution on the goods market
is just a matter of decomposing the adjustments in the demand for workers into
occupational and educational substitution. It would not affect substantially the
magnitude of the adjusments in labour demand/ Within each occupation, edu-
cational groups of workers are imperfect substitutes and occupational technology
is defined by:
(3-5)
where a,j is the productivity parameter of workers with education j in occupa-
tion i and satisfies a^ > 0 Vi,j and 51; "»i = 1- /S is a production technology
parameter and /? < 1. Ly denotes the employment of workers with education j
in occupation i. , , "... .?.--.,!...••
"For the sake of simplicity, we skip the country index, i.e. c on both the parameters and the
variables of the model.
^We reproduced the analysis with the general 2-level CES production function specification
and found similar results as those presented in this chapter.
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The allocation is characterised by the distribution of workers by educational
fields to the various occupational fields. As argued in Chapter 2, several educa-
tional fields may be fairly represented within an occupation. There is an inherent
dispersion due to the heterogeneous character of occupations and its impact on
the assignment of tasks to educational groups of workers. Workers who find em-
ployment in the same occupation need not to perform exactly the same tasks.
Since educational fields differ in their skill content, workers with different educa-
tional backgrounds differ in their ability to perform the various tasks. Therefore,
the optimal assignment of tasks to educational groups of workers leads to the
presence of workers with different education in some (if not all) occupations. The
optimal assignment of tasks changes as the wage rates by educational groups
change through the supply and demand adjustment process. When comparing
allocation across countries, differences in supply and demand should correspond
to differences in wage rates between countries if the skill contents of each study
is comparable across countries. However, when differences in the contents of a
study are observed, the optimal assignment of tasks to groups of workers would
differ across countries generating differences in the allocation even at equivalent
wage rates and supply and demand situations. Furthermore, differences in the
classification of education might cause observed differences in the allocation of
workers. The difficulty to compare educational systems between countries makes
it necessary to take into account such differences.
The parameter of educational substitution elasticity within a single occupa-
tion equals <r = y^. However, since fields of study compete in more than one
occupation, the Allen partial Elasticities of Substitution (AES, see Allen 1938)
between educational groups of workers need not to be equal to <r nor to be con-
stant between all pairs of educational groups of workers, CT measures the partial
elasticity of substitution between two educational groups of workers twt/im an
occupation. The AES between two educational groups of workers equal:
(3.6)
where ^ is the corresponding cross-wage elasticity, s* the cost-share of educa-
tional group A; in total costs, s^.j = °**^i_«, = £"*^'£, the cost-share of workers
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with education ifc in occupation i and L._, = ^ Ly the demand for workers with
education j.
Assuming that both the labour and commodity markets are perfectly compet-
itive, the demand for workers with different fields of study in the various occupa-
tions is derived by equating marginal products to the respective wage rates. The
demand for workers with education j in occupation i, expressed in logarithmic
terms, reads as:
hi Ly = In H - In ^ + cr hi a^ - 0- In w, + a In PQ (3.7)
with
where Wj stands for the wage of workers with education j. The function PC,
represents the shadow price of producing one extra unit of intermediate output
in occupation i (the unit cost function).
Prom equation 3.7 we can derive changes in the demand for workers with edu-
cation j in occupation z as a function of changes in wages, output and productivity
parameters, i.e. a^. The demand equation in infinitesimal form equals:
(3.8)
Using workers with education i in occupation 5 as reference group, changes
in the relative allocation of workers with different educational backgrounds and
occupations read as:
xdln^ + V t!"^' xdln^ (3.9)
w, ^ 5 In a/a (ty
The change in the allocation of workers with education j in occupation i is
decomposed into a supply and demand effect (denoted SD), initiated by changes
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in the relative wages of the various educational fields, and an allocation struc-
ture effect (denoted AS) characterised by differences in the production function
parameters a^.
The supply and demand effect equals:
xdln— (3.10)




Changes in the demand for workers with the various educational backgrounds
in the various occupations can be linked to exogenous changes in wages, due to
shifts in the composition of supply and exogenous changes in the productivity
parameters of the various types of workers.
In the context of cross-country analysis, exogenous changes in wage rates cor-
respond to the distance between the relative wages observed in each country, and
arbitrarily chosen new relative wages common to all countries. However, if the
skill content of the graduates in the same field of study is not the same across
countries, the relative productivity of workers in each field of study will vary
across countries and so will wages. This will make it impossible to compare rel-
ative employment and wage equilibrium by educational groups of workers across
countries even if the substitution process, linking differences in the relative sup-
ply of labour by fields of study with educational wage differentials, occurs freely.
To illustrate the operation of the model we consider the differences in the rela-
tive wage of engineering graduates to business graduates in Prance and the UK.
Great graphical simplification is achieved with only one occupation. Therefore
in the following example we consider only workers in the managerial occupation.l/J SH 1A^ CHAPTER 3. TESTING THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL







Figure 3.1: Decomposition of wage differentials across countries.
Figure 3.1 shows the relative demand for and relative supply of graduates in that
occupation. In France, the relative wage observed is -0.1 and is accompanied
by a relative supply of -2.97. Intuitively, an increase in the relative wage rate
from -0.1 to 0.08 (?/;„*, relative wage in the UK, is 0.08) induces substitution
between both engineering and business workers and reduces the relative demand
from L/r to L'^ through the operation S.D in equation 3.9 (movement from A
to B on the French demand curve). The fact that the new equilibrium point in
France, i.e. point £? in Figure 3.1, does not correspond with the equilibrium point
in the UK (Z/,,. < -2.97 < -1.03 = £„*), i.e. point C, implies differences in the
productivity parameters between both countries. To match the UK equilibrium,
the relative demand function in France has to shift from L2. to L^t through the
operation of AS in equation 3.9. • •: -s-frrnir^nRr^ > ^, • in:
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3.3.2 Isolating supply and demand from allocation struc-
ture effects -^••"••*"'" -"'^ »"*•<**•!«* -'-"- •-<"•--'• »n-iu-,
Since institutions in some countries may choose to compress wages for social co-
hesion purposes, relative wages observed may, in those countries, not correspond
to competitive wage rates. We therefore choose to correct for supply and demand
differences across countries independent from observed wage rates. We do so
by equalising labour supply and demand by educational group and occupation
in the various countries. In other words, for each country, we set the total sup-
ply of workers in each educational segment and the total demand for workers in
each occupation to the nine-country average. After controlling for demand and
supply differences between countries, the allocation of workers with different ed-
ucation to the various occupations in each country c, say £{_,<., satisfies thereby
the following conditions: •..,.... •,..,-,-. •
.(•! <f.
Vc •-. uini-sjoiJr (3.12)
Equation 3.7 shows that changes in the allocation of workers as derived from
the production function are bi-proportional and break down into an occupation
specific Rj and an education specific 5j effect.
, ^/) (3.7)
In —^ = -In — +<rln—^--aln—f -I- a In
In—p--ln—^- = -cr I In —f - In —£ I + a In-——T—r - In __, , „,
'•••'• L' L° •'•''•' "''••' ' '•"
ln-f = lnRi + ln5j + ln-^- . .;. (3.13)
Therefore, the new allocation of workers with education j in occupation i in
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each country, L^, can be derived by finding vectors i? and S that satisfy the
border conditions (same supply and demand vectors across countries) given the
structure of allocation in country c, i.e. given the Oy,c of country c.
Equation 3.13 is equivalent to the RAS method.* Using an iterative procedure
in order to avoid approximation problems involved when inverting large matrices,'
we derive the demand and supply vectors i?,,c and S,,c for each country such that
the border conditions (equation 3.12) are satisfied, given the allocation observed
in each country, L^. ' *"'" '" ''"" ' •'
This approach to derive changes in the allocation without taking wages ex-
plicitly into account is conceptually comparable to Tinbergen (1984). Tinbergen
presents two structures related to our approach. The so-called Northwest-corner
rule, (-method, that minimizes the (ota/ tension (in the case of diagonal matrix,
when the demand vector equals the supply vector, i.e. 'educational equilibrium',
only the main diagonal is non-empty) and, the independency solution met when
the supply and demand probability distributions are independent.'"
3.3.3 Allocation structure
Since the border conditions are equal for all countries, if all countries would have
the same production function, i.e. the same a^, the allocation after correction
for supply and demand differences should be equal for all nine countries. Hence,
the differences between the nine-country average allocation and these constructed
allocation matrices provides information about the differences in the production
functions across countries. We use the distance between the logarithm of the
"See Stone and Brown (1964), Evans and Lindley (1973), Kadas and Klafzky (1976) and
Van Eijs and Borghans (1996).
'For more details see Evans and Lindley (1973) and van Eijs and Borghans (1996).
'"Tinbergen notices that since the first solution concenirnte* all observations whereas the
second solution spreads them evenly over the matrix, the actual allocation matrix may be some-
where in between. Our method minimises the relative entropy, £j,o(L') = Hj-ii-c^I^)'
such that the new matrix {£';,,.} satisfies the border conditions conditional on the reference
matrix L°. The relative entropy reaches a global minimum, i.e. 0, when the allocation Ljj,. is
equal to the allocation L^,.. Therefore, this method can be seen as a minimisation of tension
given relative scarcity of certain workers' characteristics (border vectors) and initial allocation.
It is comparable to Tinbergen's {-method. However, in contrast with Tinbergen, our method
uses a production function as underlying structure. Furthermore, when educational eguiiiorium
is readied (supply vector equals demand vector) the resulting allocation would not necessarily
lead to unimodal distribution of workers by education within each occupation and the new
allocation satisfies the properties of equation 3.7.
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relative average allocation and the logarithm of the new relative allocation to
proxy the differences in the production function parameters across countries:
(3.14)
Obviously, if we would have observed one occupation only, then A5 would
equal zero for all educational groups j and all countries even if the true produc-
tion functions" are different across countries. In order to disentangle allocation
structure differences across countries, at least two occupations are necessary. In-
tuitively, if one only knows that the relative employment of engineering graduates
in Prance is twice the relative employment in the UK, one cannot conclude on
whether the relative supply of Prance engineering graduates is twice that of the
UK or whether the engineering graduates in France are more productive in each
occupation, compared to their UK counterparts. Our proxy therefore only picks
up differences in occupation specific productivity assuming the relative average
productivity between educational groups to be about the same in each country.
3.3.4 Supply and demand
Bearing in mind the possible differences in production function parameters be-
tween countries, we confront observed relative wage rates to supply and demand
across countries using the structural equation of the model, equation 3.9. The
equation relates the allocation of workers to on the one hand supply and demand,
and on the other hand the structure of allocation. If wages reflect supply and de-
mand they should explain allocation consistently after controlling for differences
in production function. Comparing both the allocation structure and wages with
the nine-country averages, we get:
'' With one occupation, say t, even if the Oy parameters are different in the various countries,
imposing the border conditions, Zj,,. = L^ = IJ = Ii> implies ASi>,c = In ^i - In p"*- = 0.
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9'
3.3.5 A supply and demand explanation of wage differen-
tials across countries ,
The remaining question is how much of the observed differences in allocation
across countries is due to observed differences in wage rates, allocation structures
and other unobserved differences that might reflect labour market institutions. To
answer this question we decompose the allocation differences between countries
into three factors. To that aim we introduce three quantities.
Quantity Ac measures the distance between observed allocation and nine-
country average allocation.
Quantity Be measures the distance between country-specific allocation at
equalised wage rates by education and nine-country average allocation.
in which L^ represents the allocation associated with equal wages for all educa-
tional fields for each country:
I
80101/: ''ii-/ ••;>•;. -UVi '/Mr.T, 3.3. CONCEPTt/AL FRAMEWORK
-IJ,C = -5 In 1 - In -4,c 1 + ioi 1& 1 .£X
^X] (*fc,«,c ~ «k.9,c) I In 1 - In -^, c I +
Rearranged and taking the exponential:
In 1 indicates that the new allocation matrix Ljj,. is associated to equal wage
rates between educational groups of workers.
This measure of the distance between the allocation in different countries
is corrected for country-specific wage-premia, that is those wages equilibrating
country-specific supply and demand vectors^ but includes country-specific allo-
cation structure and unobserved country-specific effects.
Quantity Cc measures the distance between country-specific allocation given
same supply and demand vectors across countries and nine-country average allo-
cation matrix:
Therefore quantity Cc measures the distance between the allocation structure
of each country with an average structure/yardstick structure.
'^This would imply equalised supply and demand vectors across countries if and only if the
allocation structures were equal across countries.XftOWSMASPl JLMJ CHAPTER 3. TESTING THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL
3.4 Empirical results
ft
3.4.1 Estimation of the substitution elasticity parameter
and relative equilibrium wages
Prom the theoretical model we derive four nested specifications.
First, assuming that all countries have the same allocation structure, i.e. there
are no differences in the production functions, the model reduces to specification
(sit,i,c - Sfc,g,c) In ^ - In -£, c + £y,c (3.16)
= SD /'••.•«
In specification (II), we model the allocation changes against differences in
the allocation structure only.
(3.17)
In the third and fourth specifications, both changes in wages and differences
in the allocation structure are nested. Specification (III) corresponds to equation
3.15 where we replace the true allocation structure effect by its proxy AS.
ASy^ + e«,c • •• L , :• (3-18)
To check the robustness of the AS-proxy in specification (IV) we actually
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estimate the coefficient of the allocation structure effect rather than assuming
unity. Comparing the results of both specifications enables us to evaluate the
impact of using the proxy .45 for the real allocation structure effect.
«/ ^j - In -|, J
! (3-19)
We estimate specifications (I), (III) and (IV) by nonlinear least squares method
and specification (II) by ordinary least squares. The results of the estimations
are reported in Table 3.3. When no controls for differences in the allocation
structure are included, changes in wages across countries, through a production
function specification, explain little of the changes in allocation as indicated by
the very low adjusted /?^ of specification (I). Though of a realistic magnitude,"
the estimate of the substitution elasticity parameter obtained via specification
(I) is found insignificant.
The results derived by estimating the model with specification (II) indicate
that differences in allocation across countries are to a large extent due to differ-
ences in allocation structure. The adjusted i?^ increases drastically compared to
that of specification (I) indicating a large explicative power of allocation structure
differences on differences in allocation observed across countries.
Therefore in specification (III) and (IV) we account for the allocation structure
differences when estimating the production function. The results show that once
control for allocation structure differences is included to specification (I), not only
the explanatory power of changes in wages on changes in allocation is significantly
increased,*' but the elasticity of substitution parameter becomes significant (at
1%).
'"*See Hamermesh (1992 and 1993) for an exhaustive survey of empirical estimates of labour-
labour substitution elasticities. 'Hamermesh 's law,' based on empirical regularities, indicates
that labour-labour substitution elasticities lie around 1.4.
'•"An F-test reveals that specification (IV) also fits the data significantly better than specifi-
cation (II), at the 1% level.















* significant at 10%
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Table 3.4: Own-wage elasticities and Allen partial elasticities of substitution




























































The estimated substitution elasticity within occupations equals 2.14. Table
3.4 reports the Allen elasticities of substitution between all pairs of educational
groups to illustrate the substitution possibilities between educational groups. The
elasticities have been evaluated for the nine-country average allocation and equal
wage rates between educational groups. The own-wage elasticities indicate that
countries usually have more difficulties to adjust changes in relative wages of
Health graduates (-0.98) while they can more easily adjust changes in the wage
rate of Social sciences graduates (—1.74). All elasticities lie in the range of em-
pirical regularities observed in Hamermesh and Grant (1979), Hamermesh (1992)
and (1993). Though obtained in a context of cross-country analysis of wage dif-
ferentials, the magnitude of our elasticities is comparable to the magnitude of
elasticities obtained from time-series analyses. Bound and Johnson (1992) find
a parameter of substitution elasticity of 1.75 between skill-groups within sec-
tors once accounting for skilled-biased technological change, Katz and Murphy's
(1992) estimate implies an elasticity of substitution between college and high
school labour of 1.41. In our data, the largest elasticity of substitution is found
between Engineering graduates and graduates in Natural Sciences which equals
3.07 while the lowest elasticity of substitution is found between Engineering grad-
uates and graduates from Law school (0.78). -r;«->T !,;• ^,- , •,. *, j. >;< i
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Table 3.5: Decomposition of international differences in allocation into supply
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3.4.2 A supply and demand explanation of wage differen-
tials across countries
The question is how much of the observed differences in allocation across countries
is due to observed differences in wage rates, allocation structures and other unob-
served differences that might reflect labour market institutions. To answer this
question we decompose the allocation differences between countries into quan-
tity .Ac which measures the distance between observed allocation and the nine-
country average allocation, quantity Be which measures the distance between
country-specific allocation at equalised wage rates by educational fields and the
nine-country average allocation and quantity Cc which measures the distance
between country-specific allocation given the same supply and demand vectors
across countries and the nine-country average allocation matrix.
Table 3.5 reports the results. First, the total actual differences in allocation._«iOt/- ' .-.V^.' -in- ,v,';< 3.5. SUMMAfiY AJVD CXWVCLUSIQN
reduces from 59.7 to 40.9 when wage differentials across countries are eliminated.
This result implies that differences in supply and demand in the nine countries
as measured by the between-educational-group wage differentials across countries
account for 31.6% of the o6sen/ed allocation differences as indicated in the last
row but one of Table 3.5. However, the differences in allocation structure already
account for roughly 51% (30.2/59.7 = .506) of the differences in observed allo-
cation across countries. This shows that differences in the contents of the study
are important across countries. The last row of the Table indicates that, once
we control for the allocation structure differences across countries, the between-
educational-group wage differentials across countries account for 63.9% of the
oftserued allocation differences. This implies that after correcting for differences
in the production function between countries roughly 2/3 of the differences in
allocation can be explained by wage differentials while the remaining 1/3 can be
imputed to unobserved factors, that may be related to labour market institutional
factors like wage-setting, pay norms and minimum wage.
3.5 Summary and conclusion
The analysis pursued in this chapter and the ensuing empirical results highlighted
the relevance of our allocation model in explaining the substitution process that
take place in the labour market between different types of workers. We compared
the allocation of workers with different educational fields to various occupations
and wages across countries. Differences in the relative supply of labour across
countries should coincide with wage differentials if the substitution process be-
tween the various types of labour occurs freely in each country. Blau and Kahn
(1996), reject the supply and demand explanation of wage differentials across
countries because the magnitude of the substitution effect necessary to match
supply and demand differentials with wage differentials is not plausible. However,
several other authors argue that the skill content of educational groups varies a
great deal across countries which makes educational comparisons difficult.
The allocation model developed in Chapter 2, enabled us to detect differences
in the allocation that are not caused by supply and demand factors but caused
by differences in the skill content of the various fields of study across countries.
Therefore, we decomposed the substitution effect into an effect due to differences
in the allocation structure induced by differences in the skill content of educa-
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tional segments and the true substitution effect resulting from supply shifts only.
The true substitution effect can be compared with wage differentials. - • . s
Our empirical results have shown that cross-country differences in allocation
are to a large extent (50%) due to differences in allocation structure. Moreover,
once these differences in allocation structure are controlled for, we found that
wage differentials across countries coincide with at least 64% of employment dif-
ferentials. The remaining differences can be related to differences in the labour
market institutions of the various countries. > - . ;. » ^ :
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Appendix A. Cross-classification of workers' ed-
ucational backgrounds and the various jobs bits
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"Since all individuals have a higher education, only the two Last digits are reported.
Individuals' ISCED first, digits are 5, 6 or 7.
The first 9 occupational categories correspond to jobs for which a higher education
is 'required' while for the last two, i.e. Clerks and Other-lower, a lower educational
level is 'required'.CHAPTER 3. TESTING THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL
Appendix B. Wage premium by educational field
and country f
Table 3.7: Wage-premium by educational field relative to Arts-Humanities grad-
uates for each country and absolute distances in allocation.


























































































The wage-premia by educational field relative to Arts-Humanities graduates are derived
from separate estimations of tlw as/mags regreswofi ^'equation J.2y for each country.
The average absolute distances between the allocation of each country and the nine-country
average allocation are measured as specified in equation 3.1.
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Appendix C. Derived educational changes A,
Table 3.8: Education-specific changes in allocation after controlling for demand
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Appendix D. Derived occupational changes
Table 3.9: Occupation-specific changes in allocation after controlling for demand
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Appendix E. Decomposition of international dif-
ferences in allocation: Weighted absolute distances
Table 3.10: Decomposition of international differences in allocation into supply
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The distances are weighted by the average number of workers by education and occupation.•TGM*. CHAPTERS. TESTING THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL
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Allocation structures, labour
productivity and wage dispersion
4.1 Introduction "••'•
An important implication of the allocation model developed in Chapter 2 is that
the skill content of a study determines the assignment possibilities and therefore
the substitution process in the labour market. In this chapter, we address the
question whether some allocation structures can lead to a substitution process
that is relatively more advantageous in terms of a higher labour productivity and
lower labour market instability.'
For this reason, we analyse the structure of the allocation of workers with
different fields of education to different occupations using the allocation model
developed in Chapter 2. In the model, the optimal assignment of workers to tasks
depends on productivity parameters indicating the range of tasks that workers
with the various educational backgrounds can perform in each occupation. The
allocation model enables us to distinguish between different allocation structures.
Intuitively, the way in which generic and specific skills are integrated in each ed-
ucation would provide a first guess on how the general allocation structure looks
like. Since generic skills provide workers with a wide range of occupational possi-
bilities, we expect that graduates in educational fields that focus on generic skills
'In Newbery and Siglitz's (1981) terminology, we consider in this chapter only «j/siemotic
4upp/y mria&i/ify. In our analysis, labour market instability is brought about by short run
vertical shifts in the supply of labour with different educational backgrounds and these shifts
manifest themselves in between education wage inequality.
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are able to perform a relatively large range of tasks in all specific occupations.
However, we do not expect a linear relationship between the amount of generic
skills someone has and the range of tasks he can perform in all occupations. We
rather argue that the range of tasks that workers with generic skills can perform
in specific occupations levels off after a certain amount of generic skills. For in-
stance, if a person with some math skills would work as a pharmacist, he could
calculate the doses of a prescription but his ability to solve differential equations
will not increase the range of tasks he can perform as a pharmacist.
In contrast, we expect that graduates in educational fields that focus on spe-
cific skills are only able to perform a restricted range of the tasks in occupations
outside their own occupational field. However, we expect that these workers are
more productive in more general occupations than in another specific occupa-
tional field. Since generic skills are often needed to acquire more specific skills,
workers with specific skills also have a fair amount of general skills which enables
these workers to perform quite some tasks in the general occupation.
The question arises what happens when the relative supply of labour shifts
given the allocation structure. Since workers with general education can perform
a rather large range of tasks in every occupation, they can easily switch occu-
pations without any effect on their wage level. We would therefore expect that
a shift in the supply of workers between two specific educational fields leads to
a change in the wage rates of these two types of workers and leaves the wage of
workers with general education unchanged.
In a theoretical section we therefore analyse under what conditions one of the
educational fields takes this role in the labour market. We derive a sufficient
condition for the allocation structure to satisfy this type of reciprocal supply
shifts in a three educational fields-three occupations case. We show that there
is a family of allocation structures that satisfy the sufficient condition. These
allocation structures are characterised by three productivity parameters. The
first productivity parameter indicates the range of tasks that workers with the
two educational backgrounds for which a supply shift is observed can perform
in each other's occupation. The second parameter indicates the range of tasks
that workers with the two educational backgrounds for which a supply shift is
observed can perform in the occupational field of workers with the educational
background for which the supply does not shift. The third parameter indicates
the range of tasks that workers with the educational background for which there
is no supply shift can perform in the occupational fields of workers for which a
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supply shift is observed. Simulations show that both the labour productivity and
wage dispersion are sensitive to the relative magnitude of these three parameters.
As expected, the model shows that the more specific the skills of workers the
larger labour productivity, i.e. increasing the range of tasks that workers can
perform in occupations for which they are not directly trained decreases labour
productivity. This result emphasises the relative importance of specific skills for
productivity. However, the larger the range of tasks that workers can perform
outside their own occupation the smaller the sensitivity of labour productivity to
shifts in the supply of labour, and the smaller the increase in wage dispersion in
case of unexpected supply shifts. This result emphasises the relative importance
of generic skills for labour market stability. :VKK.V. •:.i;» H. ,:t{./i • ,-uti IM-I,,
To illustrate the findings of our theoretical model, we use data on the Dutch
labour market and estimate the elasticity of substitution parameters together
with the allocation structure of workers with general, technical and social ser-
vices educational fields working in three more or less related occupations at the
intermediate level. The estimation results show that the demand for workers with
a general educational background is less elastic than the demand for workers with
technical and social services vocational specialisation. This result corroborates
empirical findings showing that the more general the human capital, the more
inelastic the demand for that group of workers (e.g. Hamermesh (1992)). This
suggests that a relative decrease in the supply of graduates with general educa-
tion can only be absorbed by a relatively large increase in the relative wage of
these graduates. : h ::, >.: .; ; - , •^•-.•>;:.»•.•: ^>-.. i? ;•••••.-.....••-..,• • «
Moreover, the estimated allocation structure indicates that as expected 1)
workers with general education can perform a large range of tasks in technical
and social services occupations, 2) the range of tasks that workers with technical
and social services educational fields can perform in each other's occupation is
rather similar and relatively small and 3) the range of tasks that workers with
technical education can perform in the general occupation is relatively large and
roughly equal to the range of tasks that workers with social services can perform
in this occupation. The role of the general educational field at the intermediate
educational level in the Netherlands is very similar to our theoretical definition of
general education and technical and social services educational fields correspond
to our theoretical definition of more specific vocational education. - -
We show that increasing the amount of specific skills that enables graduates
of general education to be more productive in the general occupational field at
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the expense of their generic skills, will increase labour productivity but will also
increase the sensitivity of labour productivity to shifts in the supply of workers
with technical and social services education. Moreover, wage dispersion would
increase when the supply of workers with general education shifts. Decreasing
the range of tasks that technical and social services graduates can perform in
general occupation, by decreasing the amount of generic skills of these graduates,
will increase labour productivity but make labour productivity more sensitive to
shifts in the supply of labour with general education. Moreover, when the supply
of workers with general education shifts, wage inequality will increase. Finally,
increasing the range of tasks that workers with technical and social services ed-
ucation can perform in each other's occupations by increasing their amount of
generic skills, would decrease both labour productivity and wage dispersion.
Although the specialisation of labour is an important feature of the labour
market, as it enhances workers' productivity in their related occupational field,
our results suggest that the flexibility of the labour market, measured by the
ease to substitute between occupations and between workers with different ed-
ucational backgrounds, should be accounted for when defining the skill content
of the various educational fields. Our results show that the /aroer the ease to
substitute between occupational outputs compared to the ease to substitute be-
tween workers, the /aryer the change in labour productivity associated to a x%
decrease in the range of tasks that workers with general education can perform
outside the general occupation. However, the smaller the ease to substitute be-
tween occupations compared to the ease of substitution between workers, the
larger the change in labour productivity associated to a x% decrease in the range
of tasks that workers with technical and social services can perform in the general
occupation, -,-' >^<•••••• ••-*•' •;»£•«-'•'•••:.-. • .,:. i , .•.•.•.••.•»•••:;:
The question whether the allocation structure in the labour market affects the
labour market outcomes is related to the literature on the relevance of vocational
specialisation in initial education. The relevance of vocational specialisation in
initial education has long been the subject of divergence of opinion. Some au-
thors, e.g. Kang and Bishop (1989) and Bishop (1995), argue that generic skills
are mere tools for developing specific skills but have no direct market value.
Others, e.g. Comay et al. (1973) and Dothan and Williams (1981), argue that
general education^ offers the individuals the option of choosing among additional
*Note that we use the terminology 'general education' for the educational fields that em-
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occupations or careers. This optaon ao/ue hypothesis would imply that workers
with general educational field can perform a rather large range of tasks in the
various occupations. We contribute to this discussion in two ways. First, our
model enables us to account for the option value of generic skills but without im-
posing that the option value increases linearly with the amount of generic skills.
We rather expect the option value to level off at a certain level of generic skills.
Second, we argue that workers with vocational specialisations also have an option
value. Though workers with specific skills can perform a rather restricted range
of tasks in other specific occupations, if generic skills are tools for developing spe-
cific skills, we would expect that workers with specific skills have a fair amount
of general skills which enables them to perform a quite large range of tasks in
the general occupation. This option value is confirmed by our empirical result
showing that workers with vocational specialisations can perform a large range
of tasks in the general occupation.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we adapt
the allocation model developed in Chapter 2 to a three educational fields-three
occupations case. In Section 4.3 we isolate allocation structures such that a
shift in the supply of labour in two educational segments leads to a reciprocal
change in wage rates in these two segments and leaves the wage rate in the
other segment unchanged. We then evaluate how these different structures affect
labour productivity and wage inequality between the various educational groups
of workers. Section 4.4 discusses the data we use for our empirical analysis. In
Section 4.5, we estimate the allocation structure in the Dutch labour market and
discuss some implications of the results we find. Section 4.6 summarises and
concludes.
4.2 The theoretical model
Assume the economy to produce a physical output in time period £, denoted i/j.
Its price is used as a common denominator to all input prices. There are m
phasise on generic skills, e.g. skills that can be used in several occupations, like reading,
mathematics, etc and not to indicate the breadth of the curriculum (see Dolton and Vignoles
(2002) for instance). In both cases, workers can perform a quite large range of tasks in oc-
cupations outside their own occupation. But in the first case, because they have generic skills
that are overall usefull, whereas in the curriculum case, workers have learnt a broad range of
specific skills. • - •->• • •»<!..•.:;-•,«••'• . •-. .•••:-.•••
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distinct occupations and n educational groups of workers. In each occupation,
the various labour groups are combined in certain proportions to produce inter-
mediate output, denoted //<*. These occupational outputs are all intermediates
which serve only to contribute to the production of the physical output. Both
the labour and commodity markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The production function is of the form depicted in the theoretical model of
Chapter 2, i.e. equation 2.7, but with m occupations and n educational groups,
and looks liker* t -. ^;.;-;o5r <: -. •: '; . •:•; «-< !••-'•*, - < •: •'••.->••/ ih:<- •. i' .:••:--
where /?„ is a production technology parameter determining the ease to substitute
5^aijL;'( I is the output in occupation
/
i at time £), a^ is the productivity parameter of workers with education j in
occupation i and satisfies a^ > 0 Vi,j and X^<H? ~ ^- /?e ^ a production
technology parameter determining the ease to substitute between educational
categories within occupations. By definition of the CES production function
/^o' & € (~°o» 0) U (0,1). Lyt denotes the employment of workers with education
j in occupation i at time t. -,.. ., ^r, , ; -.;.> ,. - -• >.
The allocation structure is characterised by the parameters a,j reflecting the
range of tasks in occupation i that workers with education j can perform. Since
occupations are measured in the same dimension as education: 'required' educa-
tion and education attained respectively, in each occupation, we expect that the
workers whose attained education is in the required field are able to perform all
tasks in that occupation, i.e. Ojj > a^ Vj ^ i. . . „• „:* ..„;-,-.•-.
Assume workers' wage with educational background j is uniformly distributed
over occupations. This implies that wherever these workers find employment they
••This CES specification is similar to the specification used in Bound and Johnson (1992)
and is the discrete form of Teulings (1995a, 1995b and 2002). However, we do not restrict the
elasticity of substitution between the various groups of workers to be greater than 1, as in both
Bound and Johnson (1992) and Teulings (1995a and 1995b). This refers to Hamermesh's law
(see Hamermesh (1986)). It reflects apparent regularities in empirical results.
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are offered a standard wage corresponding to their education.^ The demand for
workers with education j in occupation z is derived by equating marginal products
and to competitive wages J^- = w^:
^ • '7n-tii (,>.} f>.ipji "jiJ nai (1 J- air)Jsi;.^ji> .,, A
j(/ ,,,• ,,.••. ••-.»*£;{ - •'<• •
with
(?.- : £/C(ti;i) = (>^[/Q'-^K)| (4-3)
where tUjt stands for the nominal wage of workers with education j and u;t =
(wit,..., ^n(). C/C stands for Unit Cost. The function f/Cj can be viewed as the
shadow price of producing an extra unit of intermediate output //tf. The ratio
between two occupations is exactly defined as minus the marginal rate of technical
substitution between the intermediate outputs of these two occupations. f/C can
be viewed as the shadow price of producing an extra unit of output i/(.
Aggregating equation 4.2 on i gives the labour demand for workers with ed-
ucation j that minimises costs.
= ff, x t/C°K) x «;-"• x £ tfCf•-"•(«/,) x <; (4.5)
•"The analysis assumes that workers are rewarded according to their vocational specialisation
as stated by the human capital theory. Therefore, the optimal allocation path is characterised
by a constant ratio of the relative allocation of workers with one education, say j, in two different
occupations versus the relative allocation of workers with another education, say fc, in these two
occupations. The presence of workers outside their specific occupational field is conditioned to
some extent by the production technology that firms use rather than by wage differentials (as
stated by the comparative advantage theory). We tested the human capital earnings function
specification against competing hypothesis of assignment for the Dutch labour market and did
not find support for the assignment earnings specification. The job competition and human
capital hypotheses where statistically equivalent.
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When the supply of labour with education j is inelastic to the market, i.e.
L.jt, equation 4.5 can be used to derived equilibrium wage rates by solving, for
all educational groups, the system L)t(u;j) = Lj(.
Aggregating equation 4.5 on j gives the total labour demand that minimises
costs given full employment L( = Lf = ^ -^ jt at £•
Z, = L, = £ £ L* = #, x £ J] ;
;:.:••.•- \ , :;•••.• (4.6)
The minimum costs, given the labour supply constraint, are therefore:
and hence, the output price is given by the unit cost function C/C:
(4.8)
The relative educational demand equations in each occupation can be directly
derived from equation 4.2:
(4.9)
Equation 4.9 tells that in a given occupation, i, the relative allocation of
workere with two different types of education is proportional to the relative range
of tasks these workers can perform in occupation i raised to the power of the
elasticity of substitution CTe.
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The relative demand for workers with education j in two different occupations
read as:
•».! -- i>r&-. i-: -.•(-..v%•••;- 1 ••- •- •; • •- - - *-*-•-• -— -'••
where A//?TSj g stands for the marginal rate of technical substitution between
the intermediate outputs in occupation i and 5.
V .;••
Equation 4.10 is somewhat more complicated to interpret. The larger the
range of tasks that workers with education j can perform in occupation i com-
pared to the range of tasks these workers can perform in another occupation,
the larger the relative allocation of workers with education j in occupation i.
Moreover, the larger the costs of producing an extra unit of output in occupation
i compared to the costs of producing an extra unit of output in occupation #,
the larger (smaller) the relative allocation of workers with education j in occu-
pation i when the ease to substitute between educational groups of workers is
larger (smaller) than the ease to substitute between workers within occupations.
Intuitively, as the costs of producing output in occupation i increase, firms will
be willing to substitute production in this occupation for production in other oc-
cupations. As long as firms find it technically possible to substitute occupational
outputs, i.e. large (To, the demand for workers in occupation i will decrease. In
contrast, when the ease to substitute between occupational output is small, final
output is produced with fixed proportions of occupational outputs. However, it
may be technically possible to substitute workers within occupations, i.e. <7e is
large, such that the demand for workers in occupation i increases.
Combining equations 4.9 and 4.10 results in a general expression of the rel-
ative allocation of workers with different educational backgrounds in different
occupations. > < ..•, - .,• • ,
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4.3 Allocation structures *
The economy is assumed to produce output, //,, at the lowest possible costs given
labour supply L.j«. Solving this optimisation problem, the optimal allocation of
workers with a particular education to the various occupations, L^( is derived
from equation 4.2 and the optimal employment of workers by education L j( is
obtained by summing equation 4.2 over i and equating to labour supply L.j,.
Suppose at time £ the economy is in equilibrium for wages w< and allocation L^t
given labour supply by education L.^f. Suppose that the supply of labour shifts
such that the composition of labour by education, L.jt+i, differs from L.jt for some
educational segments. How would this shift affect the allocation of workers with
different educational backgrounds to the various occupations, labour productivity
and wages? Would the wage of workers whose supply does not shift be affected?
The answers to these questions obviously depend on the range of tasks in each
occupation workers with the various educational backgrounds can perform, i.e.
the structure of the productivity parameters a^.
The allocation model enables us to distinguish between different types of al-
location structures. Intuitively, the way in which general and specific skills are
integrated in each educational field would provide a first guess on how the gen-
eral allocation structure looks like. Since general skills are often acknowledged
as providing workers with a wide range of occupational possibilities, we expect
graduates in educational fields that emphasise on general skills to be able to per-
form a relatively large range of tasks in all occupations. In contrast, we expect
graduates in educational fields emphasising on specific skills to be able to perform
a restricted range of the tasks in occupations other than their own occupational
field. However, we expect graduates in educational fields focusing on specific
skills to be relatively productive in general occupations. Indeed, since general
skills are often needed to acquire more specific skills, workers with specific skills
have a fair amount of general skills which enables these workers to perform a quite
large range of tasks in the general occupation. The question arises what happens
when the relative supply of labour shifts given such an allocation structure. Since
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workers with general education can perform a rather large range of tasks in every
occupation, they can easily switch occupations. We would therefore expect a
shift in the supply of workers between two specific educational fields to lead to
a reciprocal change in the wage rate of these two types of workers that leaves
the wage of workers with general education unchanged. We first isolate alloca-
tion structures that satisfy this condition. We then evaluate how these different
structures affect labour productivity and the wage dispersion between the various
educational groups of workers as unexpected shifts in labour supply occur.
4.3.1 Isolating allocation structures , <t v ;
Answering the question how would shifts in the composition of labour supply
affect the allocation of workers with different educational backgrounds to the
various occupations requires first to define a benchmark equilibrium situation to
which unexpected supply shifts will be measured. We will refer to this bench-
mark situation as the long run equilibrium situation. An obvious choice for the
long run equilibrium is the equilibrium associated with equal wage rates between
educational groups of workers, i.e. ifjt = ifjtt = t^t Vj, fc, as the wage dispersion
between groups of workers is 0 for equal wages. In the short run however, un-
expected shifts in labour supply may occur. These shifts generate a substitution
process which will affect labour productivity and wage dispersion relatively more
for some allocation structures than for others.
We consider a labour market with three educational segments, say the edu-
cational segments 1, 2 and 3, and three occupations more or less related to the
educational segments. We focus on reciprocal supply shifts that lead to changes
in the educational composition of labour such that the total level of employment
remains constant. These shifts are defined as follows:
Supply of labour with education 1 and 3 shifts AL.i = —AL.3
Supply of labour with education 2 is unchanged (AL2 = 0).
The changes in wages resulting from these supply shifts are derived by some
back-of-the-envelope calculations. We derive equation 4.2 with respect to (to,-*) -_j 2 3
and solve the system of supply differentials AL.j for (Arui, Ai«2, AUJ3):
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The system defined by equation 4.12 has 2 degrees of freedom for three
unknowns. One way to solve the system is to impose the linear restriction
Au»i = — Ati>3 for instance. This way we simultaneously minimise wage dif-
ferentials by spreading the wage gap evenly on both the wage for education 1 and
3. (see Appendix D for a step by step derivation.) ' • c \*m !i, t< • 5 i . f,. f•
The solution for (AtUi, Ati>2, A1U3) reads as:
At* = -J^r •='••••"'•"• (4.13)
2 <9u>
where T - ^^|^^ and
Note that T ^ 0 for all AL.3 ^ 0. Indeed, since §^£ < 0 and ^ > 0 for
fc ^ j, we have ^-^ - ^f ^£ > 0. Moreover, since |^ is strictly negative
for all Wi, ^2 and W3 we know that Au>i = — Au>3 are different from zero and of
the sign of — AL.3. However Aw^ can be positive, zero or negative depending on
the sien of f-^ - i^L^ me sign 01 ^ ^ 2 a«^ ^/ •
Hence, the reciprocal shifts in the educational composition of labour sup-
ply always lead to changes in the wage rate of workers with education 1 and 3
whereas changes in the wage of workers with education 2 may not be necessary,
i.e. Aw2 = 0 if -f£^ = 5^ for all AL.3. This leads us to isolate conditions
on the productivity parameters for which supply shifts between two educational
fields lead to reciprocal changes in the wage rates of workers in these two educa-
tional fields only, i.e. Au>2 = 0.
Using the notation <v, = 71^/ J^ ^tt Vi, j and 71^ = 1 > 7Tij Vi, to simplify the
expression of the results, it can be shown that 7T2I = 7r23 = a, 7^1 = 7Ti3 = c and
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Table 4.1: Allocation structure: some particularities.


































7T32 = 7Ti2 = 6 is a suS?cieni condition** to achieve the reciprocal changes in the
educational composition of employment with shifts in the wage rate of workers
with education 1 and 3 only. The sufficient condition is visualised in Table 4.1.
The structure of parameters that makes that Au>2 = 0 indicates that the
range of tasks that workers with education 2, that is workers whose employment
does not change, can perform outside their oiwi occupation has to be evenly
distributed. This contrasts with workers with education 1 and 3. However, this
structure indicates that the range of the tasks in occupation 3 that workers with
education 1 can perform must be equivalent to the range of tasks in occupation
1 that workers with education 3 can perform. Moreover, workers with education
1 and 3 must be able to perform the same range of tasks in occupation 2.
Intuitively, we expect studies that emphasise on general skills to satisfy the
characteristics of education 2 with 6 relatively large. Indeed, general skills are
often acknowledged as providing workers with a wide range of occupational pos-
sibilities. In contrast, we expect educational fields emphasising on specific skills
to satisfy the characteristics of education 1 and 3 with a relatively small value
of c. However, we expect a to be relatively large. Indeed, since general skills are
often needed to acquire more specific skills, workers with specific skills have a
fair amount of general skills which enables these workers to perform a quite large
range of tasks in the general occupation.
4.3.2 Simulations
The question arises whether the different allocation structures affect the labour
productivity and wage dispersion. In particular, we are interested in answering
the three following types of questions: would labour productivity and wage dis-
persion increase or decrease if 1) the range of tasks that workers with education 2
Appendix D for more details on the derivation of the sufficient conditions.
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can perform outside their own occupation increases or decreases? 2) the range of
tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can perform in occupation 2 increases
or decreases? and 3) the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3
can perform in each other's occupation increases or decreases? To evaluate the
relative impact of parameters a, 6 and c on labour productivity and the wage
dispersion between educational groups we run simulations of labour productiv-
ity and wage dispersion as we move on the demand curve of each educational
type of labour (supply of each type of labour varies from 0 to oo). We then
compare labour productivity and wage dispersion for two different values of each
parameter. . ,
The relative magnitude of the elasticity of substitution parameters cr,, and
«7e plays an important role in the allocation of workers. Increasing the range
of tasks a group of workers can perform in occupation i decreases (respectively
increases) the costs of producing an extra unit of output in this occupation if
the ease to substitute workers within occupation is larger (smaller) than unity.
As can be seen from equation 4.4, increasing a,j increases f/C* if and only if
<Te < 1. In turn, the demand for workers in occupation i increases (decreases) as
the costs of producing output in occupation i increases if the ease to substitute
between occupations is smaller (larger) than the ease to substitute workers within
occupations. We therefore replicate the comparisons of labour productivity and
wage dispersion for two different values of each parameter for cr<, > <Te and <T<, <
CTe-
Though the mathematical expression of labour productivity in terms of the
supply of labour with the various educational fields only does not exist, we can
derive numerical solutions. The expression of the labour productivity as a func-
tion of the equilibrium wages in the 3x3 situation is derived from equation 4.6.
Denoting labour productivity /i, we obtain:
H
L <=1,2,3
The labour productivity is equal to the average real wage of workers w/p
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as can be seen from the equations 4.7 and 4.8. Numerical solutions for the
labour productivity as a function of labour supply are derived by searching for
the equilibrium wages w = (u>i, u>2, 103) that correspond to the target composition
of labour supply. Hence, we search for the vector:
L.i,L.2,L.3) ,U>2 (L.i,L.2, L.3) ,103 (L,i,L.2, L.3) )•
The same procedure is used to derive numerical solutions for the wage dis-
persion as a function of labour supply only. The variance in real wages between
educational groups of workers, denoted V, reads as: ^ ,'..,<.,-!•.':.- v.,; <
(4.15)
To evaluate the relative impact of the parameters a, 6 and c on labour pro-
ductivity and wage dispersion between educational fields, we evaluate the labour
productivity and wage dispersion given some benchmark allocation structure
and compare them with the labour productivity and wage dispersion obtained
by changing one parameter at a time. The benchmark allocation structure" is
a = 0.5, 6 = 0.5 and c = 0.1 such that education 2 can be seen as a general skill,
and education 1 and 2 as specific skills with a fair amount of general skills (i.e.
a large a).
To test for the effect of decreasing the amount of general skills taught in
vocational education on labour productivity and wage dispersion, we set a' = 0.3.
We let L.i and L.2 vary, one at a time and evaluate the inequalities:^
"We ran the comparative statics for other parameters values as well and found similar
conclusions regarding the relative impact of allocation structures in terms of labour productivity
and wage dispersion.
^Note that ft(I.i,1.2,1.3) = /i(I.3,L.2,I.i) and V(I.i,1.2,1.3) = V(I.3,I.2,I.i) for all a,
b and c and all L.j. Hence varying L.i is equivalent to varying £.3 in terms of productivity and
wage dispersion. -•,-•• . :;>•••• .,«, -Ti---
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We then set 6' = 0.3 such that educational field 2 becomes a rather specific
educational field. With 6' instead of 6, the allocation structure is characterised
by three more or less specific educational fields. This enables us to test for the
relevance of general education. We let L.i and L.2 vary, one at a time and evaluate
the inequalities:
Wage dispersion •',' , > ^ ••>. .•:-•'•• ••.. :.
(IIIIl2,l3)|6|0 . '., (4.19)
To complete this test, we set c/ = 0.3. With c^ instead of c, the allocation
structure is characterised by three more or less general educational fields. This
enables us to test for the relevance of technical education. We let L.i and L.2
vary, one at a time and evaluate the inequalities:
Labour produciu/ity
/i(L.i,L.2,L.3)|c
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dispersion
L.2,l3)|c|0 ;- (4.21)
Since the relative magnitude of the elasticity parameters is determinant for
the evaluation of the inequalities, we run the three sets of inequalities for <To =
0.5 < <7e = 1.5 and cr<, = 2.5 > <7e = 1.5.
La&owr demand ,„-'-*"'" " -
A decrease of the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can
perform in occupation 2, i.e. decreasing a, would make the demand for workers
with education 2 relatively less elastic and leave the demand for labour with
education 1 and 3 unchanged if the elasticity of substitution between occupations
is less than the elasticity of substitution between workers within occupations."
(See Figure 4.1) In contrast, when <7<, > <7e, the demand for labour with education
2 is unchanged, while the demand for labour with education 1 and 3 becomes less
elastic as indicated in Figure 4.2.
A decrease in the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can perform
in occupation 1 and 3, i.e. decreasing 6, would make the demand for labour with
education 1 and 3 relatively less elastic and leaves the demand for labour with
education 1 and 3 unchanged if the elasticity of substitution between occupations
is less than the elasticity of substitution between workers within occupations.
(See Figure 4.3) However, when occupational outputs are better substitutable
than workers, i.e. <7o > <T<,, the demand for labour with education 2 becomes
more elastic, while the demand for labour with education 1 and 3 remains fairly
stable. (See Figure 4.4)
An increase in the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can per-
form in each other's occupation would have no effect on the demand for labour
with education 2 regardless of the relative ease to substitute between occupa-
tional output and between workers within occupations. (See Figure 4.5 and 4.6)
"We normalised employment of each type to unity at the long run (benchmark) equilibrium
(that is for equal wages) for graphical representation.
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Figure 4.2: Shifts in labour demand associated to a decrease in a, <7<, > ^e
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Figure 4.3: Shifts in labour demand associated to a decrease in 6, <TQ <
-Education 1 b=0,5 -«-Education 1 b=0,3
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Figure 4.4: Shifts in labour demand associated to a decrease in 6, <7Q > <7e-







Figure 4.5: Shifts in labour demand associated to an increase in c, CT<, <
-•-Education 1 c











Figure 4.6: Shifts in labour demand associated to an increase in c, (To >
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However, the demand for labour with education 1 and 3 becomes more (less)
elastic when <7<, < Oe (o"o > <7e).
Labour produciraty
Decreasing the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can per-
form in occupation 2 shifts labour productivity upward regardless of the relative
magnitude of the elasticities of substitution. However, labour productivity be-
comes also more sensitive to unexpected supply shifts of workers with education
2 than equivalent supply shifts of workers with education 1 and 3. (See Figure
4.7 and 4.8) ^
As Figure 4.9 and 4.10 indicate, independently of the relative magnitude of CT<,
and <7e, a decrease in the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can perform
in occupation 1 and 3, i.e. a decrease in 6, would increase labour productivity.
Although, labour productivity would become more sensitive to shifts in the supply
of labour with education 1 and 3 than to equivalent shifts in the supply of labour
with education 2.
Increasing the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can per-
form in each other's occupation, increasing c, would decrease labour productivity
regardless of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between occupations
and between workers within occupations, as indicated in Figure 4.11 and 4.12.
Moreover, variation in the magnitude of c appears to have very little effect on
the relative sensitivity of the labour productivity with respect to the respective
supply of labour.
Wage dispersion 6etu;een educationa/ ,/ie/<is
A decrease in the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can
perform in occupation 2 would increase wage dispersion regardless of the labour
supply of workers with education 2, but especially in case of large supply. (See
Figure 4.13 and 4.14) However, the wage dispersion will roughly be unchanged,
irrespective of the labour supply of workers with education 1 and 3.
As the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can perform in occupation
1 and 3 decreases, wage dispersion increases regardless the supply of labour with
education 1 and 3, if workers are more substitutable than occupational outputs.
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Figure 4.7: Shifts in labour productivity associated to a decrease in a, <j<, < a^,.










Figure 4.8: Shifts in labour productivity associated to a decrease in a, <7<, >
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Figure 4.9: Shifts in labour productivity associated to a decrease in 6, <7o <
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Figure 4.10: Shifts in labour productivity associated to a decrease in 6, (To >
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Figure 4.11: Shifts in labour productivity associated to an increase in c, <TO <
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Figure 4.12: Shifts in labour productivity associated to an increase in c, cr<, >
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Figure 4.13: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to a decrease in a, (To < ov
Figure 4.14: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to a decrease in a, <TO >
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In contrast, when occupational outputs are more substitutable than workers
within occupations, wage dispersion increases regardless of the supply of labour
with education 2 and only for large supply of labour with education 1 and 3.(See
Figure 4.15 and 4.16)
As Figure 4.17 and 4.18 indicate, as the range of tasks that workers with edu-
cation 1 and 3 can perform in each other's occupation increases, wage dispersion
decreases regardless of the supply of labour and the relative magnitudes of the
ease to substitute between occupations and between workers within occupations.
To summarise our findings: . • * r
• The narrower the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can
perform in occupation 2, the larger the labour productivity and the larger
the sensitivity of labour productivity to unexpected shifts in the supply of
labour with education 2 compared to the supply of labour with education
1 and 3. However, wage dispersion increases irrespective of the supply of
workers with education 2.
• The narrower the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can perform
in occupation 1 and 3, the larger labour productivity and the larger the
sensitivity of labour productivity to shifts in the supply of workers with
education 1 and 3. However, wage dispersion increases for all supply of
labour with education 1 and 3 when workers are more substitutable than
occupational outputs and wage dispersion increases for all supply of labour
with education 2 when (To > cr,,. ,
• The larger the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can
perform in each other's occupation, the smaller labour productivity and
the smaller wage dispersion, v "* .
• Moreover, the simulations show that the larger the elasticity of substitution
between occupations compared to the elasticity of substitution between
workers, the larger the percentage change in labour productivity associated
to a x% decrease in the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can
perform in occupation 1 and 3. Indeed, decreasing the range of tasks that
workers with education 2 can perform in occupation 1 and 3 by 40% (from
0.5 to 0.3) increases long run labour productivity by 8.5% (see Figure 4.10)
if the elasticity of substitution between occupations is larger than within
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Figure 4.15: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to a decrease in 6, <Jo < <7e
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Figure 4.16: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to a decrease in 6, a« >
121OimT? WHTi-.' y UJ CHAPTER 4. ALLOCATION STRt/CTl/RES
I Education 1 c.0.1 Education 1 c.0.3




Figure 4.17: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to an increase in c, (To <
Figure 4.18: Shifts in wage dispersion associated to an increase in c, cr<, >
122occupations and by 7.0% if the reverse holds (see Figure 4.9). However,
the larger the elasticity of substitution between occupations compared to
the elasticity of substitution between workers, the smaller the percentage
change in labour productivity associated to a x% decrease in the range
of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3 can perform in occupation
2. Decreasing the range of tasks that workers with education 1 and 3
can perform in occupation 2 by the same percentage (and off the same
magnitude to guarantee a fair comparison with the previous test), 40%,
increases the long run labour productivity by 4.8% only, when CTo > <?e (see
Figure 4.8) and by 6.2% when CT<, < <7e (see Figure 4.7).
4.4 Data ..............__. _
4.4.1 Data source , , - i
The data we use for an empirical analysis are taken from the 'Socio Economic
Panel' (SEP)** of Statistics Netherlands for the years 1994-1996. We have bal-
anced the panel by selecting workers present in the three years of observation.
For this study only employees with an intermediate level of education working in
the corresponding occupational level are considered.
The panel contains variables observed at the individual level. We have infor-
mation on gender (dummy for female), age, job tenure, number of hours worked
per week and earnings (monthly net income in guilders'"). Job tenure is mea-
sured by means of workers' answers to the question: In which year did you start
your current job? It therefore refers to an occupation-related-tenure rather than
the tenure in the firm where the worker is employed.
We make use of the information on the individuals' educational and occu-
pational fields provided by the SOI" code (3 digits) and the SBC'92^ code (3
'•*For our purpose, a pooled panel data set is preferable to pooling time-series of cross-sections,
to strictly measure the occupational reallocation of workers in different time periods. In a panel
data set the allocation matrix changes from year to year because people have moved vertically
(different job level) or horizontally (different occupational field) in the whole allocation matrix
(all levels and fields of both education and occupation), not because different individuals are
considered in different time periods.
'"The gross incomes are not available for 1995 and 1996.
"Standaard Opleiding Indeling, in Dutch. There is a direct link between the SOI and the
International Standard Classifictation of Education Diploma (ISCED).
'^Standaard Beroepen Classificatie, in Dutch. This classification is related to the Interna-
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420-439, 450-459, 480-489, 510-539, 550-559
440-449, 460-469
490-499, 540-549, 560-579
digits) respectively. These two classifications distinguish categories, with respect
to both the /ewe/s and the ,/ie/ds of education and occupation. The first digit
of the two codes give the educational and job /eud, respectively, while the two
last digits characterise the vocational ./ie/cis. The individuals selected for an em-
pirical analysis have completed an intermediate vocational education and have a
job corresponding to their educational level (i.e. Educational level ISCED 3 and
Occupational levels ISCO 3). This generates sample sizes of 535, 495 and 506
observations in the three years mentioned above.'^
At this level of education and occupation, three corresponding educational
and occupational fields are distinguished, based on the two last digits of the
SOI and SBC'92 codes respectively. The jobs are coded in terms of 'required'
educational specialisation. Table 4.2 presents the cross-classification of workers'
educational backgrounds and the various jobs. ,,
4.4.2 The allocation matrix
Based on the educational and occupational classifications, the number of workers
per education and occupation for the three years under investigation are com-
tional Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO'88). . •::' -:.:...• ..;.;.-
'•*The panel of all workers for which information is available in the three years is balanced.
Therefore, yearly fluctuations in the number of workers with an intermediate educational level in
intermediate occupations reflects vertical movements along both educational and occupational
scale.
124i \ . •AT-'. /.o\ w: 4.4. DATA



























puted. Table 4.3 shows the allocation matrix for the pooled sample. The table
indicates that the observations are concentrated on the main diagonal, as one
would expect, but with a fair amount of dispersion. Individuals with a given
type of educational specialisation find their jobs in different vocational fields and
a given occupation is by no means necessarily occupied by individuals with the
same educational specialisation.
Digging deeper into these observations, one can confront the two equations
4.9 and 4.10 of the model in section 2 with the actual allocation observed in 1994,
1995 and 1996. These allocation matrices are presented in Table 4.4.
For example, consider the occupation 'requiring' a general education. The
changes in the relative proportion of workers with the required education, i.e.
general education, to workers with a technical background can be explained by
a change in the relative wages as follows. Since the relative proportion is first
constant between 1994 and 1995, i.e. 4.7 (30.1/6.4) in 1994 and 4.7 (31.3/6.7)
in 1995, and increases to 4.8 (33.0/6.9) in 1996, one would conclude from equa-
tion 4.9, which focuses on one occupation only, that the relative wage of workers
with a general educational background first remains constant and decreases in
the last period. However, this simplistic explanation is not in accordance with
the shifts in the relative proportion of workers with the general educational back-
ground compared to workers with a technical education in the other occupations.
Indeed, in the second occupation, where a technical education is the 'required'
specialisation, one would basically find different results, suggesting that the rel-
ative wage first decreased, between 1994 and 1995, and increased in the last year
(2.8/26.5 = 0.11 in 1994; 0.15 = 4.0/25.9 in 1995; and 0.14 = 3.6/24.9 in 1996).
This is typical of the contradictory results that equation 4.10 is designed to deal
with, as this equation focuses on the allocation of workers in two occupations.
Equation 4.9 measures direct effects of changes in the relative wages between
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the educational groups while equation 4.10 models the indirect effects. There-
fore, the picture that emerges on the basis of observed changes in the allocation
resulting from 1994 to 1996 is characterised by a chain of reallocations.- In a
first step, a change in the relative wages of educational groups induces a direct
substitution in each occupation via equation 4.9. These direct effects might be
unsatisfactory to achieve economic goals (minimum costs) such that in a second
step, a rebalancing is carried out via equation 4.10. These indirect effects explain
why the relative allocation of people with a general educational background to
people with a technical background has opposite signs in accordance with their
specific occupational fields. For instance, from 1995 to 1996, the relative alloca-
tion of workers with general education to workers with technical education in the
general occupation increased from 4.7 to 4.8, while in the technical occupation,
the relative allocation has decreased from 0.15 to 0.14.
1264.4. DATA
4.4.3 Earnings function
In order to derive wages by education and time period, u)jt, as needed for the
estimation of equations (4.9) and (4.10), an earnings function of the Human
Capital type is used," controlling for other personal characteristics as well. Since
the data are observed on a rather short run (time periods), the effects of these
personal characteristics can reasonably be assumed to be constant over the three
year-period of our analysis (1994 to 1996).'^ Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that
some cells are poorly filled, so we will estimate the earnings function on the pooled
sample of all three years. However, to allow for changes over time in the effect of
education on earnings, a full dummy specification for the 3x3 — 1 independent
combinations of education and time period is included in the regression. Though
not reported in Table 4.5, two dummies for the interaction of 1994 and 1995 with
general educational field are included in the regression. The model estimated is
therefore a model with all coefficients constant over both cross-sectional and time-
series units except for the educational-earnings profiles, which are assumed to vary
over time."' Coefficients obtained for these dummy variables (a,t), educational
earnings profiles in each time period, are then saved in u>jt (In ^j( = «jt) and used
in the estimation of the supply parameters in the next section.^ Note that in
absence of precise observations, the work experience is omitted. However, since
all individuals selected have the same level of education and left school at more
'•"We have tested this human capital specification against an assignment specification where
occupational dummies are entered in the regression model. The Wald-tests did not support
rejection of the human capital specification, either for yearly regressions nor for the pooled
regression at 5%. Furthermore, the it^ associated to on the one hand regression with occupa-
tional dummies only and on the other hand educational dummies only are equal. The results
are shown in Appendix F.
'"We make use of the panel aspect of our data. Individuals selected are those being employed
in all three years of observation, aged between 16 and 64. However, since workers can move to
an other job level or graduate in an higher educational level in the period of observation, the
number of workers with intermediate educational level working in intermediate occupational
level is not constant over time.
'^Estimates obtained by separate regressions for each year are similar to those presented
here.
'"This method of deriving toj( has the advantage over the mean or median of earnings by
educational categories and time periods, since it controls for cohort effects. While the teclmical
field of study is dominated almost entirely of males (about 95%), females are in a large majority
(65%) in the field social services. Hence, the gap between the average earnings of workers
with technical education and people with social services educational specialisation is partly
attributable to the gender gap in earnings. The results should be viewed as average wages by
educational groups corrected for composition characteristics rather than returns to education
since selectivity bias might be going on. .-••••••
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or less the same age, age is a proxy for work experience. *"9fliirt;>aL $>,£•
J; The following equation is estimated for each worker p: ,
.:,:::ryJt " ' • " ••;;•- '- :;•»?:•.;,
'*• *"i' •
where X contains the set of explanatory variables like age, tenure etc., £3,
are dummy variables for the interaction of year £ with education j and W^,( is the
earnings of worker p in period t.
• ;•.'.. ••'!. • 1 . , • ;"' 1.: • : :', 1! • •! ':.;!.•• ill 1 !i< •<.:.•• -- r T r •- - -.:•.••••..-.' :;\' j, :i ••*
Table 4.5 shows the results of the OLS estimation. The coefficients indicate
that the impact of the field of education is quite substantial. Workers with
a technical educational specialisation have a structural earnings disadvantage
compared to the others: their wage differential with the two other groups is
negative in every period (-0.062 < -0.030 < 0 in 1994, -0.067 < 0 < 0.020 in
1995 and-0.070 <-0.016 < 0 in 1996). • v, -,., .:.;,„:. , r^- ,-/<;
The control variables not reported in Table 4.5 show standard results. Males
do not earn significantly more than females (see Johnson and Stafford (1974)).
However, though there is no significant earnings differential between males and
females as such,'" the career prospects of men are better than those of women.
Indeed, there is an aging effect on earnings differentials between males and females
in favour of the former which is estimated at 0.7% per year^. The effects of age
(experience proxy)^" are in the familiar quadratic shape, with respective peaks
at 48 years old for men and 41 for women (i.e. 31 years of experience for men
'*We ran a regression without, allowing for the interaction of age and job tenure with gender
and found significant earnings differentials in disfavour of females (-0.123). This suggests that
earnings differentials between males and females are due to gender differences in experience and
tenure. Verdugo and Schneider (1994) do indeed find that the level of human capital accounts
for 60% of the wage gap between males and females.
'"Johnson and Stafford's (1974) estimate is 2.6% at the age workers leave school, diminishing
(positive coefficient for the quadratic term) to 0 after 15 years of experience.
A possible interpretation of this empirical result is that women are more likely to be employed
in part-time jobs than men. Stated otherwise (see Mincer 1993), women are likely to invest
less than men in on-the-job training because they 'ezpeet' to spend only part of their adult
lives in the labour force. Hence, women accumulate substantially less experience than men
in the course of their careers, lowering their human capital compared to men and widening
wage-gender differentials (flatter age—experience earnings profiles for women).
**Boumahdi and Plassard's (1992) estimate for experience is 0.082. Griffin and Cox-Edwards
(1993) find 0.069 and Clark and Leslie (1994) find 0.056.
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Table 4.5: Earnings function for pooled sample 1994-1995-1996, the log of net






































Standard deviation (between parentheses)
a significant at 1%
6 significant at 5%
.'•OS ;i i
and 24 years of experience for women). Tenure^' follows a linear trend with a
significantly higher return for women. Furthermore, the elasticity of earnings to
the weekly hours worked is significant and estimated at 0.661 (significant at 1%).
Increasing the number of hours worked per week by 1% increases net earnings by
0.661%. Part-time variables and their interaction with gender are also included
in the model.
•*'Oux estimate of tenure profile, i.e. 0.005, is actually smaller than that of Teulings and
Hartog (1998) for the Netherlands (see table 1.2 p37). However, their estimates refer to firms'
tenure profiles while our measure is a job tenure profile.
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4.5 Allocation structure ,
In Section 4.3 we derived a sufficient condition on the productivity parameters
for which reciprocal supply shifts in two educational fields lead to reciprocal
changes in the wages of workers in these two educational fields and leave the
wages of workers with other educational fields unaffected. The resulting structure
of parameters indicates that the range of tasks that workers with education 2 can
perform has to be evenly distributed outside their owm occupation. We argued
that this condition characterises educational fields that emphasise on general
skills when the range of tasks these workers can perform is relatively large. In
contrast, we expect that educational fields emphasising on specific skills satisfy
the characteristics of education 1 and 3 with a relatively small value of c. However,
we expect a to be relatively large. Indeed, since general skills are often needed
to acquire more specific skills, workers with specific skills have a fair amount of
general skills which enables these workers to perform a quite large range of tasks
in the general occupation.
In this section, we will analyse whether the range of tasks that workers with
general, technical and social services educational fields can perform in the various
occupations corresponds to our ex ante expectations.
4.5.1 Quantitative methodology
Tb estimate the allocation structure parameters we use the first-order conditions
of the Lagrangian function summarised in equation 4.11. This requires that we
use the demand for labour < g, fc > as a reference. Hence we lose one degree of
freedom, which gives a system of n x m— 1 equations. The stochastic specification
of the model is basically obtained by adding disturbances to the right-hand sides
of each equation in the system.^
We estimate equation 4.22 on the data:
the multifactor case, the direct estimation of fr^ and a,,, using the ratio of factor inputs,
requires imposing the restrictions that factor demand is homogenous of degree zero in all factor
prices (see Hamermesh (1993), p72). /Ippendiz C shows that equation (4.22) satisfies these
restrictions.
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In ^- = (ae - a.) x (InC/CiK) - In f/CsM) + (4-22)
CTe x (In aij - In 033 + In u^ - In Wji) + e^t
with zj = {11,12,13,21,22,23,31,32}. Individual components of £, relate to
equation 4.22 and the allocation of people with a social services educational
background working in their specific field is used as a reference, input L33.
It is assumed that e follows a multivariate Laplace-Gauss distribution which is
time-independent. Moreover, attempts to estimate the covariances among the el-
ements of the disturbance vector failed, probably because of collinearity problems
and the relatively small number of measurements in time (T = 3). More seriously,
in the system of equations depicted by equation 4.22 the explanatory variables,
i.e. the wages u>jt, are measured with errors (estimated from an earnings func-
tion) since they are unobservable. Judge et al. (1985) propose to formulate such
a model as a multiple equation model. The underlying stochastic assumptions are
that in each equation the error components are independent of the unobserved
variables (explanatory variables) and therefore:
where fi is diagonal.
Consequently, it is also assumed that e are distributed with a diagonal covari-
ance matrix. Using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method
to simultaneously estimate equations 4.22, provides consistent and efficient esti-
mates of the parameters of the model (see Judge et al. 1985).
The concentrated log-likelihood function of the system containing rr* — 1 equa-
tions, where n is the number of educational and occupational categories consid-
ered, is obtained as:
= - [ ^ ) In (4.23)
where : .
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and
. ; ' > *; :i'
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Thus the size of the final estimation problem is 8 = n^ - 1 equations (L33 is
used as reference) observed in 3 years in order to get estimates of the allocation
structure (6 allocation structure parameters, since the sum by occupation is re-
stricted to one) and the parameters of elasticity of educational substitution CT,,
and occupational substitution u,,. We estimate the 7Ty as denned in section 2,
with 71^ = 1 Vi to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
4.5.2 Empirical results ^ ,^ . , . ,,,.
Results of the FIML estimation procedure are presented in Table 4.6. The
columns refer to the educational specialisation and rows to the occupational field.
The last row contains the estimated educational substitution elasticity parameter
<7e, the occupational substitution elasticity parameter ?„ and the maximum value
of the likelihood function LHF. , ,





























Standard deviations are given (in parentheses).
The estimated allocation structure reported in Table 4.6 indicates that the
range of tasks that workers with general education can perform in technical and
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social services occupations is evenly distributed and relatively large. The produc-
tivity parameters of workers with general education outside their specific occupa-
tional field are equal and relatively high, i.e. 0.25. As expected, general education
satisfies the characteristic of education 2. The estimated allocation structure also
indicates that the range of tasks that workers with technical and social services
educational fields can perform in each other's occupation is relatively small, i.e.
0.17 and 0.10 respectively. Moreover, the range of tasks that workers with tech-
nical education field can perform in general occupation is roughly equal to the
range of tasks that workers with social services can perform and relatively large
(0.31 for technical and 0.32 for social services). This last result indicates the
relative importance of general skills in acquiring specific skills.
The parameter of elasticity of substitution between the various educational
specialisations is estimated at 1.39 whereas the parameter of occupational sub-
stitution elasticity is 2.42. Both parameters are significantly different from 0 and
1 at 1%. A Cobb-Douglas specification would therefore be less accurate than
the CES specification we use here. Although workers with different educational
specialisations are significantly substitutable, they are far from being perfectly
substitutable (cr << oo) as is implicitly assumed in studies focusing on levels
only.*'' The homogeneity of workers with different educational specialisations is
not supported, especially since the productivity parameters differ significantly
overall. ^
In order to compare our results with empirical estimates in related literature,
we derive the Allen partial elasticity of substitution (see Allen (1938)) between
educational groups and the own-price elasticities. The Allen elasticities of sub-
stitution A£Sj/t between workers with education j and fc given an increase in the
wage rate of the latter are obtained by: . ,..,..
^4.E5j/fc = ^ with 77jfc = gj" ^* the corresponding cross-wage elasticity and s;t
the share of input fc in total costs.
From the model of section 2 we derive the cross and own wage elasticities by
educational groups as follows:
j4ppen<fc /I for details.
•'''When running the model with allocation matrices net of vertical movements (those workers
that increase their educational level during the period or change occupational level between 1994
and 1996 are excluded) the coefficients for the supply structure and elasticity of substitution
do not change significantly. The results presented here are robust with respect to vertical
movements. .•- .:.;•: : • • :• ..•••••• . • >'•>: ••( '•*/•-•.:;
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with** = 5^ - ^ '"• •••=•-'-••••• •'••' '• ' '
Table 4:7: Own-wage elasticities and Allen partial elasticities of substitution.


















The elasticity of substitution between workers with technical and social ser-
vices is 2 and larger than the elasticity of substitution between workers with
general education and the two other groups. The magnitude of the elasticities of
substitution between educational fields of study lies in the range of estimates on
elasticity of substitution between workers with different levels of education. (See
Hamermesh and Grant (1979), Hamermesh (1992) and (1993).) Johnson (1970)
estimates the elasticity of substitution between college graduates and high-school
graduates at 1.34 and Grant (1979) finds elasticities between different groups of
years of schooling of 0.77, 0.21 and 1.16 (for 0-8 vs. 9-12, 0-8 vs. 13+ and 9-12 vs.
13+ respectively). Bound and Johnson (1992) find a parameter of substitution
elasticity of 1.75 between skill groups within sectors once accounting for skilled
biased technological change and Katz and Murphy's (1992) estimate implies an
elasticity of substitution between college and high-school labour of 1.41.
4.5.3 Implications: general versus specific education
The estimation results show that the demand for workers with a general edu-
cational background is less elastic than the demand for workers with technical
and social services vocational specialisations. As indicated in Table 4.7, the own-
wage elasticity is lower for general studies than for technical and social services






Figure 4.19: The demand for labour with general and technical education.
studies. This empirical result is consistent with other studies that also show that
the more general the human capital of workers the more inelastic the demand for
that group of workers (see Hamermesh (1986)). To illustrate this result we plot
the demand for labour with general and technical education in the Netherlands
in Figure 4.19. The steeper slope of the demand curve for workers with general
education indicates that the demand for technical labour is more elastic than the
demand for general labour.
To illustrate the implication of this result in terms of labour productivity and
wage dispersion, we also plot the labour productivity, Figure 4.20 and wage dis-
persion, Figure 4.21 as a function of the supply of general and technical labour,
respectively. The results suggest that labour productivity is relatively more sen-
sitive to unexpected shifts in the supply of technical graduates than to shifts in
the supply of workers with general education, whereas wage dispersion is rela-
tively more sensitive to downward shifts in the supply of general graduates than
equivalent downward shifts in the supply of technical graduates.
Hence, a relative decrease in the supply of graduates in general educational
fields can only be absorbed by a relatively large increase in the wage rate of
workers with general education resulting in a relatively large increase in wage
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Figure 4.20: Labour productivity. : '
dispersion and a small decrease in labour productivity.
Since the allocation structure for the Netherlands roughly satisfies the three
conditions derived in Section 4.3 and the parameter of the elasticity of substitu-
tion between occupations is larger than the parameter of substitution between
the different fields of education within occupations, the effects of changing the
range of tasks that workers with general, technical and social services can per-
form in the various occupations on labour productivity and wage inequality in the
Netherlands are similar to those simulated in Section 4.3.2 for an elasticity of sub-
stitution between occupational outputs larger than the elasticity of substitution
between workers, i.e. for CT,, > ov
• The narrower the range of tasks that workers with technical and social
services can perform in general occupation, the larger labour productivity
and the larger the sensitivity of labour productivity to unexpected shifts
in the supply of labour with general education. Moreover, wage dispersion
increases irrespective of the supply of workers with general education.
• The narrower the range of tasks general graduates can perform in the tech-
nical and social services occupations, the larger labour productivity and
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its sensitivity to shifts in the supply of workers with techrilcar and social
services education. However, wage dispersion is also larger for all supply of
workers with general education.
• The larger the range of tasks that workers with technical and social ser-
vices education can perform in each other's occupations, the smaller labour
productivity and the smaller wage dispersion.
Moreover, since the ease to substitute between occupational outputs is larger
than the ease to substitute between workers with the various educational fields,
labour productivity in the Netherlands could be increased relatively more by a i%
decrease in the range of tasks that workers with general education can perform
outside the general occupation than by a 1% decrease in the range of tasks
that workers with technical and social services educational fields can perform
in each other's occupations. The Netherlands may benefit from decreasing the
range of tasks that workers with general education could perform outside general
occupation while countries for which the ease to substitute occupational output
is smaller relative to the ease of substitution between workers may benefit from
decreasing the range of tasks that workers with technical and social services
educational fields can perform in the general occupational field. . i '-^ri/v:: r
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4.6 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, we addressed the question whether some allocation structures,
underlying firms' assignment of workers to jobs, can lead to a substitution process
that is associated with higher labour productivity and lower instability. We anal-
ysed the structure of the allocation of workers with different fields of education
to different occupations using the allocation model developed in Chapter 2.
The allocation model enabled us to distinguish between different types of al-
location structures. Since general skills provide workers with a wide range of
occupational possibilities, we expect that graduates in educational fields that
emphasise on general skills are able to perform a relatively large range of tasks
in all occupations. In contrast, we expect that graduates in educational fields
emphasising on specific skills are able to perform a restricted range of the tasks
in occupations outside their own occupational field. However, we expect that
graduates in educational fields focusing on specific skills are relatively productive
in general occupations. Since general skills are often needed to acquire more spe-
cific skills, workers with specific skills have a fair amount of general skills which
enables these workers to perform quite some tasks in the general occupational
field. The question arises what happens when the relative supply of labour shifts
given the allocation structure. Since workers with general education can perform
a rather large range of tasks in every occupation, they can easily switch occu-
pations. We therefore expect that a shift in the supply of workers between two
specific educational fields will lead to a reciprocal change in the wage rate of these
two types of workers but will leave the wage of workers with general education
unchanged.
We derived a sufficient condition for the type of allocation structure that sat-
isfies this type of reciprocal shifts in a three educational fields-three occupations
case and showed that these allocation structures are such that: 1) the range of
tasks that workers with the education for which employment does not change,
can perform outside their own occupation is evenly distributed and 2) the range
of tasks that workers whose employment increases and workers whose employ-
ment decreases can perform in each other's occupation is equivalent and 3) the
range of tasks that workers whose employment increases and workers whose em-
ployment decreases can perform in the occupation of workers whose employment
does not change is equivalent. The family of allocation structures that satisfy
the sufficient condition is therefore characterised by three productivity parame-
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ters. Simulations have shown that both labour productivity and wage dispersion
are sensitive to the relative magnitude of these three parameters. Increasing the
range of tasks that workers can perform outside their own occupation decreases
labour productivity. The more specific the skills of workers the larger labour
productivity. This result emphasises on the relative importance of specific skills
for labour productivity. However, the larger the range of tasks that workers
can perform outside their own occupation, the smaller the sensitivity of labour
productivity and wage dispersion in case of unexpected supply shifts.
In order to address the question of the relevance of vocational general educa-
tion in initial education, we used data on the Dutch labour market and estimated
the elasticity of substitution parameters together with the allocation structure as-
sociated with workers with general education and workers with vocational special-
isations in technical and social services at the intermediate level and three more
or less related occupations. We found that the demand for workers with a general
educational background is less elastic than the demand for workers with a voca-
tional specialisation in technical and social services. This means that a relative
decrease in the supply of graduates in general education induces a relatively large
increase in their relative wage, a large decrease in labour productivity and a large
increase in wage dispersion. Moreover, the estimated allocation structure indi-
cates that 1) the range of tasks that workers with general education can perform
in technical and social services occupations is evenly distributed and relatively
large, 2) the range of tasks that workers with technical and social services educa-
tional fields can perform in each other's occupation is equal and relatively small
and 3) the range of tasks that workers with technical education field can perform
in the general occupation is relatively large and roughly equal to the range of
tasks that workers with social services can perform. These results confirmed our
expectation: the general educational field at the intermediate educational level
in the Netherlands is very similar to our theoretical definition of general edu-
cation whereas technical and social services educational fields correspond to our
theoretical definition of specific education.
Using the results of the simulations, we can infer further on the relative im-
portance of general education. We have shown that decreasing the range of tasks
that workers with technical and social services can perform in the general occu-
pation, by decreasing the amount of generic skills of technical and social services
graduates, increases the long run labour productivity but would make labour
productivity more sensitive to unexpected shifts in the supply of labour with
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general education. Moreover, it would increase wage dispersion irrespective of j
the supply of workers with general education. Decreasing the range of tasks gen- j
eral graduates can perform in the technical and social services occupations, that ;
is increasing their amount of specific skills at the expense of their generic skills,
would increase labour productivity but also increases the sensitivity of labour
productivity to shifts in the supply of workers with technical and social services
education. Moreover, wage dispersion would increase when the supply of workers
with general education shifts. Finally, increasing the range of tasks that workers
with technical and social services education can perform in each other's occupa-
tions, i.e. increasing their amount of generic skills, would decrease both labour
productivity and wage dispersion.
From an educational policy perspective, we have shown that the skill content
of a study in terms of specific and general skills matters for both labour pro-
ductivity and the stability of the labour market. The more specific the skills of
workers the larger labour productivity. However, the more generic the skills of
workers, the larger the range of tasks these workers can perform outside their
own occupation and the smaller the increase in wage dispersion in case of supply
shifts. Moreover, the simulation results show that the flexibility of the labour
market, measured by the ease to substitute between occupations and between
workers with different educational backgrounds, should be accounted for when
defining the skill content of the various educational fields. Indeed, the /arper the
ease to substitute between occupational outputs compared to the ease to substi-
tute between workers with different educational backgrounds within occupations,
the Zarper the percentage change in labour productivity associated to a decrease
in the range of tasks that workers with general education can perform outside the
general occupation and the sma/Zer percentage change in labour productivity as-
sociated to a decrease in the range of tasks that workers with technical and social
services can perform in the general occupation. This suggests that countries like
the Netherlands, for which the ease to substitute between occupational outputs
is large compared to the ease to substitute between workers within occupational
fields, may benefit from decreasing the range of tasks that workers with general
education could perform outside general occupation, by increasing the amount
of skills that contribute to their productivity in the general occupational field at
the expense of the general skills that contribute to their productivity in the other
occupational fields.
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Appendix A. Homogeneity restrictions FjA
Note that treating graduates from different educational specialisations as homo-
geneous (allocation model applied on levels only) is equivalent to using a linear
or CES production function within each of the cross-level of education and occu-




J^ a,_,L% CES-CES function
with the following restrictions: Linear-Linear production function with (1): 6^ =
1 Vi,j and Linear-CES production function with (1): a^ = 1 Vi,j and (2):
/? = 1 and the CES-CES production function with (1): c^ = 1 Vi, j and (2):
/3 = 3 = 1
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Appendix B. Educational and occupational levels
The levels of education attained and required levels of education are graded in 4
groups:
1 = elementary school SOI (0, 1 and 2) or ISCED" (0, 1)
2 = lower vocational SOI (3) or ISCED (2) .. • -,
3 = intermediate vocational SOI (4) or ISCED (3)
4 = higher vocational and university SOI (5, 6 and 7) or ISCED (6, 7)
and the corresponding job levels (i.e. required level of education):
1 = elementary jobs SBC'92 (1)
2 = lower jobs SBC'92 (2, 3) , . /
3 = intermediate jobs SBC'92 (4, 5)
4 = higher jobs SBC '92 (6, 7, 8 and 9)
where figures between brackets refer to the first digit of the SOI and SBC'92
codes.
•"The ISCED classification (International Standard Classification of EDucation) distinguishes
seven levels. This classification is usually used by the Center of Education Research and Inno-
vation to produce OECD indicators of education systems (see OECD 2001).
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Appendix C. Hamermesh's restrictions ;«
Hamermesh (1993), p. 72, notes that, in the multifactor case, the relative factor-
demand method should not be used to estimate <r directly unless one imposes
the restrictions that factor demand be homogeneous of degree zero in a// /ocfor
prices.
A function /(xi, ...,!„) is called homogeneous of degree zero if and only if it
satisfies the following condition:
= /(car,, ...,««;„) = /(x,, ..,*„) = /(X) Vc € R*
Consider equation 4.22 of Section 4.5 in a particular time period. Here we
have:
/ = In —^- = (<Je — (To) x (lnt/Cj(tO() — lnf/Cg(wt)) + (4.10)
<7e x (In a,j — In a^/t + In u;*^ — In u)jt) + e^t
Z is a function of (wi,..., «;„) of the form:
g x (lna^
Te - CTo) x (Int/Cj(u)i,...,u;n)-Inf/C,,(u;i,...,«;„))
Multiplying all inputs (factor prices) by a constant c G 5R* gives:
,...,«/;„) = Oe x (maf, - ma,,* + lnc x u;*. — lnc x Wj) +
(ere -ffo) x (Inf/Ci(cu;i,...,««„) - Inf/Q(cu;i,...,«(;„)
143<17.f, Y5\M'. CHAPTER 4. ALLOCATION STRL/CTl/RES
where •;**,,) .Xihi?'^
,^,^ lnf/Ci(cu;i,...,ra;«) = In ^a^-c'-^^-"« _^, . , '
... ..,,, ^ ^ y
Hence: ">• ' •'' ''• '"'^' '*' ''' ^^-''
/(cu'i,...,cu'n) = <Te x (lna_, - lnafc + (lnwfc + lnc) - (lnc
\^ (In c
l,...,n} and cG 3t*
Vi,5,j,A; € {1, ...,n} and c 6 3?*
Factor demand, as measured in equation 4.22, is homogeneous of degree zero
in a^/ /actor prices.
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Appendix D. Derivation of the wage changes
Linearising the shifts in employment by educational groups as a function of the
changes in the wage rates gives:
• •; • • ••; - .;;; •'/•!•; ;--,"j.?=vifu-.Taq :.>iiT
AL, = VALH ' ' •''••"• ' " •*•'•-'"' (4.24)
t
— / / Au)fc





Solving the system defined by equation 4.24 for relative wage changes gives:
Aw, -Aw3 = -^r (4.27)
o r
whprp r —
Because the system has only 2 degrees of freedom and we search for three
unknowns (3 wage changes), the system has an infinite set of solutions. To solve
the system, we focus on the set of solutions that minimise wage differentials.
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Since Au>2 G (Au>i, —Au/3), imposing Awi = — AW3 minimises
Doing so, the solution of the problems reads as in equation 4.13.
... . .. ^
The parameters for which the reciprocal shifts in the educational composition
of labour supply lead to changes in the wage rate of workers with education 1
and 3 only, i.e. 1^2 remains constant, are such that:
j2 _ _
where all derivatives are evaluated at the long run equilibrium wage rates,
Replacing the derivatives by their expression in terms of the parameters
the condition reads as: '
where
f/C = t/C(«;)= > £/C,-"
/ V l/(l-<7.)
Using the notation a,j = TT^/ J^ • 7Ty and TT^ = 1 and imposing 7Ti3 = 7^1 and
= 7T32, the condition simplifies to:
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b , .
'''' Hence, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for At«2 = 0 is that 7ri3 = 7T3I ,
7Ti2 = 7T32 3Jld 7T2] = 7T23-
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Appendix E. Estimated short and long run de-
mand
Table 4.8: The long run allocation matrix in annual percentage and the estimates











































































































Short run minus long run wage between (parentheses).
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Appendix F. Wald-test on earnings regressions
specification
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Appendix G. Descriptive statistics of the data
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Do large firms have more ^
• . lit , i = •./ •
possibilities to substitute labour
than small firms?
5.1 Introduction
In the allocation model developed in Chapter 2, the way in which firms assign
workers to tasks is the determinant factor of the substitution process. In Chapter
4 we showed that the structure of workers' productivity in the various occupa-
tions, underlying the way in which firms assign workers to tasks, can lead to a
substitution process associated with a higher labour productivity and a lower
wage inequality. However, empirical analyses show tremendous heterogeneity in
output, productivity and input mix across firms (see Abowd et al. (1999), Baily
et al. (1992) and Olley and Pakes (1996) for instance). A possible explanation of
the heterogeneity in output, productivity and labour composition between firms
is that firms have different modes of production. These modes of production re-
late input quantities to output and productivity and are captured by the concept
of production function. The heterogeneity in output, productivity and input-mix
raises the question whether firms have the same production function whereas the
impact of the substitution process on output and productivity suggests that if
there are differences in the production function these differences may relate to
the substitution possibilities of firms.
In this chapter, we therefore analyse the modes of production of firms and
investigate whether the differences in the modes of production, i.e. differences in
151CHAPTER 5. Sl/BSTJTUTJOIV AT THE FIRM-LEVEL
the production function, are related to the differences in the substitution possi-
bilities between firms. Perhaps the most challenging observation is the positive
effect of a firm's size on its productivity (e.g. Idson and Oi (1999) and Halti-
wanger et al. (1999)), capital intensity, (e.g. Oi (1983)) and the skill composition
of its workforce (see Oi (1983) and Haltiwanger et al. (1999)). In this chapter
we advance the hypothesis that the differences in labour productivity, capital
intensity and the skill composition of the workforce observed between small and
large firms lie in the differences in the production function. Following Klump
and De La Granville (2000) the differences in the capital intensity between large
and small firms can be explained by a larger elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital in large firms. We argue that in a similar way the differences
in the skill composition of the workforce between large and small firms can be ex-
plained by a larger elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour.
To explain the differences in the skill composition between large and small firms
we prove two theorems. We prove that i) if two firms are described by CES pro-
duction functions differing only by their elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour, at an equivalent labour force composition the firm with the
higher elasticity of substitution will have the higher labour productivity. More-
over, we prove that if the two firms also initially share a common skill intensity
and face the same skill-biased technological change, the firm with the highest
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour will have a larger
rate of change in the relative demand for skilled workers. Hence, skill-biased
technological change results in a larger change in the demand for skilled work-
ers in firms with higher elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers. In turn, the larger labour productivity observed in large firms can be
explained by a larger elasticity of substitution between inputs. Using matched
employer-employee data for Denmark, we evaluate the extent to which the elas-
ticities of substitution between capital and labour and between skill-groups differ
between large and small firms and whether these differences explain the firm-size
effects on labour productivity, capital intensity and the skill composition of the
workforce. ' •'•••; M:-.::-:;;' •- .^-^r ' • .--:-•. • .•; . •< •••• .;• •.,!: • .-••••
Our main findings are that large firms indeed have higher elasticities of sub-
stitution between skilled workers in skilled jobs and all other inputs than small
firriEr in all industries. These differences in elasticities of substitution are of the
magnitude to explain the higher labour productivity, capital intensity and skill
intensity observed in large firms. As the skill segregation hypothesis suggests (see
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Haltiwanger et al. (1999)), we find that large firms employ more overeducated
workers than small firms. We relate the tendency of large firms to employ a
relatively overeducated workforce to an arc£ versus cicarfo' behaviour. The larger
productivity enables large firms to build in a reserve capacity of skilled workers
in periods of low wages for skilled people in order to anticipate demand or supply
shocks in the labour market for skilled workers. If the wage of skilled workers
increases, large firms are affected less since they already retain internal reserves
of skilled workers.^ fvom- •*• =••:.<.,-yrijji M>HT •-. •• •;; J;J.-:; (?.J" ••••^-wf-fiisi-.ra.iKW
The question of differences in the production function between firms is related
to the literature on the relation between firm-size and labour productivity. In
this literature, the firm-size effect on labour productivity is often explained by
the efficiency wage theory proposed by Solow (1979) in which productivity is
a function of workers' effort. Idson and Oi (1999) advance the hypothesis that
differences in workers' work effort between firms of different size is at the origin
of the observed productivity differences between firm-size categories. Workers
in large firms have less idle time and hence are more productive which allows
them to command higher wages in a competitive labour market. Idson and Oi
(1999) find that the inter-size range for the change in labour productivity is about
0.17 log-points in the US manufacturing industry in 1992 and is accompanied by
a wage-size elasticity of 0.075. However, the firm-size wage premium becomes
insignificant when they include labour productivity measures in the set of ex-
planatory variables. Prom these results Idson and Oi conclude that the firm-size
wage premium is indeed due to a higher productivity of workers employed in large
firms. However, Idson and Oi do not control for the characteristics of workers
neither in the wage regression nor in the labour productivity regression. Since
skill intensity and labour productivity both increase with firm-size the true effect
of labour productivity on the firm-size wage premium is over-estimated in their
analysis as indicated by Bayard and Troske (1999). The higher labour produc-
tivity related to workers' effort accounts for at most half of the firm-size wage
: I ;•;,)•• •;••;..; -,t
' See De La Fontaine (1668). In this /ofeie Jean De La Fontaine tells the story of an ant that
builds in food reserves during summer, as it abounds, for consumption during winter when food
is scarce and a cicada that spends the summer playing the guitar and starves during winter.
^By analogy to the labour hoarding explanation of procyclical productivity; see e.g. Fair
(1985), Fay and Medoff (1985) and Sbordone (1996). Changes in labour utilisation allow the
firm to react to unexpected changes in product demand without laying off workers. Workers
can be allocated to non-production activities such as maintenance and training rather than
being layed off (Fay and Medoff (1985)).
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premium once controls for skills and other workers' characteristics are included.
Moreover, Haltiwanger et al. (1999) find that it is not merely because firms
of different employment size systematically employ a different skill-mix of work-
ers that their labour productivity significantly differs. For the same workforce
composition, larger firms have higher labour productivity. The positive relation-
ship between firm-size and labour productivity and input mix reflects complex
differences in the modes of production between large and small firms. This sug-
gests that large and small firms choose different modes of production, requiring
a different workers' mix, and lock in. Thereby, changes in workforce composition
reflect transitory shocks in the labour market that yield fluctuations around the
long run levels of workforce compositions these firms have chosen.''
The differences in the production function between firms leading to differences
in the labour productivity, capital to labour ratio and skill workforce composi-
tion may be characterised by differences in the ease to substitute between factors
inputs. Indeed, De La Grandville (1989) shows that there is a relation between
the output increase due to a factor price change and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between factors of production. Following this argument, Klump and De La
Grandville (2000) prove that a higher elasticity of substitution will result into
a higher level of labour productivity in the steady-state. Intuitively, differences
in the ease to substitute between the various input factors across firms as an
explanation of the size effect in labour productivity seems, on a theoretical basis,
consistent. Indeed, the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution actually deter-
mines the range of possibilities available to employers. The higher this elasticity,
the greater the opportunities for employers to produce a given level of output
with different factor combinations.
Yet, the higher skill intensity in large firms has been subject to various in-
terpretations in the literature. The differences in the skill-composition of the
•* Though this heterogeneity across firms is consistent with a conjecture that different firms
choose different modes of production (Haltiwanger et al. (1999), Idson and Oi (1999) and Ba-
yard and Troske (1999) for instance), only few attempts have been made in directly comparing
the shape of the production function across firms. In the exhaustive survey of empirical estima-
tions of production functions by Hamermesh (1993) only two studies distinguish between groups
of firms within industries. Klotz et al. (1980) estimate a translog production function for high
and low productive manufacturing firms in 1967 using three inputs: capital, production and
non-production workers. Field (1988) estimates a translog production function for large and
small farms in the cotton industry in 1860, using land, slaves and free workers as inputs. Since
1993, to our knowledge, only Lever (1996) for the Ducth manufacturing industry and Dhawan
(2001) with U.S. data estimate production function parameters for different firm categories.
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workforce between firms of different sizes might emerge from different sources.^
Building on an assignment hypothesis (see Sattinger (1993)), Haltiwanger et al.
(1999) argue that firms choose different modes of production resulting in skill
segregation. This skill segregation hypothesis implies that different firms em-
ploy workers with different educational attainment to do a job of a given level
of complexity. Yet, as Idson and Oi (1999) acknowledge, large firms adopt new
technologies earlier which probably results in a larger amount of complex jobs.
Therefore, the larger proportion of high skilled workers in larger firms might cor-
respond with a conjecture that in large firms the distribution of jobs by their
level of complexity is relatively more skewed to the right. Large firms have more
complex jobs than smaller firms and therefore employ systematically more skilled
workers. However, strictly speaking, Haltiwanger et al. do not use an assignment
model. Their labour productivity regression'' takes the form of a human capital
specification, i.e. a firm's workforce is decomposed along educational attainment
regardless of the occupational structure, and they do not test empirically for
the skill segregation hypothesis. In the presence of skill segregation, large firms
systematically employ more overeducated workers than small firms. Therefore,
building on the allocation model developed in Chapter 2, for each firm, workers
are grouped according to their educational attainment and their occupational
level.
Following the elasticity hypothesis of Klump and De La Grandville (2000)
differences in the ease to substitute between the various factors of production
may be at the origin of the differences in the skill composition of the workforce
and capital intensity across firms. Klump and De La Grandville (2000) prove
that a higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labour will result into
•*In the literature on job requirements, authors argue that since jobs differ with respect to
the level of skills needed for satisfactory performance, employers classify jobs according to the
minimally "required' levels of education and work experience. Herewith, the minimally required
levels of education and experience define the hiring standards of firms. These hiring standards
are then used as instruments to control for the duration of the vacancies. Since the pool of
applicants might significantly differ in terms of their skill levels between firms of different sizes,
large firms might have incentives to set higher hiring standards than small firms. Therefore,
large firms may employ more skilled workers simply because they observe more favourable pools
of applicants which enable employers in large firms to set higher hiring standards than small
firms. Van Ours and Ridder (1991), however, do not find such evidence for the Netherlands.
^Haltiwanger et al.'s (1999) analysis reads as a production function estimation where ei an/e
assumptions are made on the elasticities of substitution. Therein, the elasticity of substitution
between each pair of labour inputs is constant and equal to unity regardless of the firm's
employment size (Cobb-Douglas production function).
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a higher capital intensity in the steady-state. This results can be used to explain
differences in the capital to labour ratio between firms. Indeed, the larger capital
to labour ratio observed in large firms possibly emerge from a larger elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour input in these large firms. Moreover, the
elasticity hypothesis would be consistent with the observed larger skill intensity
in large firms if the ease to substitute between workers with different skill-levels
increases with firm size/* •-•<.- , . *.-i .,<-.-,-• . ;
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2, a theoretical setting
is developed to show the relationship between elasticity of substitution, labour
productivity and skill-composition. On the basis of four theorems, two by Klump
and De La Grandville (2000) and two proven in this chapter, we show that the
magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between inputs relates to the level
of labour productivity, capital intensity and skill composition of the workforce.
Section 5.3 describes the data. In Section 5.4, we first describe our quantita-
tive approach to measure the elasticities of substitution between labour types,
differentiated by education and occupation, and capital for firms of different em-
ployment size and in different industries and present in the following subsection
the estimates of the elasticities of substitution by industry and firm-size. As pre-
dicted by our theoretical model, we find that large firms have higher elasticities
of substitution between skilled labour with all other inputs (unskilled labour and
capital). To check whether this result is merely driven by specific characteristics
of the data we use, we replicate the analyses of Idson and Oi and Haltiwanger et
al. with our data. The results of these replication analyses are in line with Idson
and Oi and Haltiwanger et al. so that we conclude that our results not driven by
specific characteristics of our data. Some final remarks and conclusions appear
in Section 5.5.
"Klotz et al. (1980) find that plants with large labour productivity have a larger elasticity of
substitution between blue and white collar-workers than plants with a lower labour productivity
(highest quartile elasticity equals 6, lowest quartile equals 2). However, their study does not
include capital input. Lever (1996) on the other hand finds a slightly higher (but not significant)
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in large firms but does not differentiate
between different types of labour.
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5.2 Elasticities of substitution: Four theorems
De La Grandville (1989) sheds some light on the property of the elasticity of
substitution: the increase in the production due to a decrease in one factor price
is an increasing function of the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production. In order to illustrate this relationship, we define a theoretical setting
as follows. ,;, ,; .,,fj , ,*
Consider two firms that maximise profits. Both firms' produce the same
output, //, by combining quantities of two factors of production, </i and (ft- The
two firms' production functions are distinguished by their elasticity of substitution
(firm 1 has an elasticity of substitution equal to 1, i.e. a Cobb-Douglas production
function, and firm CT has an elasticity of substitution equal to CT, i.e. a CES
production function) only and share initially the same baseline values for the
quantities of each input, g° and q^, output level, //° and cost-constraint, C*.
The production function of firm 1 takes the form of a homogeneous of degree
one Cobb-Douglas production function and reads as follows:
_ ax9f(u;,C)x9^(ti;,C) (5.1)
where u; =< wi,u>2 > are the respective prices of inputs qi and 92 and C is
the cost constraint. The 6ar above production parameters indicates that the
parameters are normalised to some baseline values as De La Grandville (1989)
did.
The production function of firm cr takes the form of a homogeneous of degree
one CES production function and reads as follows:
tf,(gi K C),92 Kc)) = 7 («x «i'"'^ Kc) + (1 - 5) x ^'-w* («/,)
(5.2)
where a, V>, 7 and 5 are such that
The elasticities of substitution between input gi and 92 are 1 for firm 1 and
for firm CT, where cr is assumed to be larger than 1 without loss of generality.
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Let us start with a short-run analysis of the impact of the elasticity of sub-
stitution on the optimal output level. The evidence of the positive relationship
between the magnitude of the increase in the maximum production level associ-
ated to a factor price change and the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution is
depicted in Figure 5.1. Both firms share initially in point A the same quantities of
inputs g° and (7°, and the same cost constraint C*. The short-run expansion path
for both firms is reached at point A for input prices u/\ where both isoquants
and the cost constraint are tangent. At point A both firms' production levels are
one unit since we have normalised their production functions. The figure shows
what happens to the respective production levels at given total costs if one of the
input prices decreases, for instance the price of input qj. First, given total costs,
C*\ the new cost constraint, shared by both firms, is depicted by the (dashed)
downward sloping line C. Since firm <r has a higher elasticity of substitution,
the substitution effect is larger in firm er and the new input ratio 72/9} is smaller
in firm <r than in firm 1. This is seen in the graph by the flatter ray from the
origin passing through point /?„ on the original isoquant curve //° where the
tangent and the new cost constraint share the same slope. Furthermore, given
total costs, we know that the new maximum production level must be such that
the new cost constraint is tangent to the associated isoquant. The new short-run
expansion path for firm CT at input prices u>' is achieved by moving on the ray
from the origin to point Z?^ where it crosses the new cost constraint. The new
maximum production level of firm er is defined by the (dashed) isoquant //^ and
maximum production level of firm 1 is defined by the (dashed) isoquant ///. The
derivation of the new equilibrium point for firm 1, i.e. BJ, is similar. Graphically,
we observe that the intersection of the new isoquant (/// and //^) with the initial
ray from the origin moves farther out as the elasticity of substitution increases
(respectively A' for firm 1 and A" for firm <r). The properties of the isoquant
imply that at time 1, firm CT achieves a higher production level than firm 1.
Moreover, the property of the elasticity of substitution is of crucial impor-
tance for the growth of firms. Consider the production function of the two firms
depicted above and suppose 92 is capital input, and qi is labour input. The labour
productivity of each firm can be written as follows:
For firm 1:
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Up* q,
Dp*
Price cf qi fells
Initial irput priass
Figure 5.1: The demand curve for input 91 and 92 and the relationship between
the elasticity of substitution and the change in the maximum production level at
given total cost associated to a decrease in one input price.
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•-.-. — (M) = /ii(t)=5xlfc'-* (5.3)
where fc = ^ is the capital intensity and /ii() is labour productivity function.
For firm or
^(Jfc, 1) = M*) = 7 (5 + (1 - «) x jbC-i)/')^"-" (5.4)
Klump and De La Grandville (2000) have proven that ^M*l > 0 for all A; ^ it
and 4-^- = 0 for A: = A;. From this result they derive their two theorems on the
relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the capital intensity and
labour productivity. -•' --'"' /
Theorem 1 // two /inns are described 6y CE5 production /unctions differing
onZy 6y f/ieir e/as<ici<j/ o/ su6sh£u£ion and s/zare imiia//i/ a common capitaZ-Zabour
ratto A;, t/ie same employment ^rowtft L, and mi;es£men< rote s, tften at ant/ stage
o/ its deve/opment t/ie /irm u;it/i t/ie /ii^/ier e/asticiti/ o/ su6stitution mi/ Ziave a
/eve/ o/ /afcour productivity. fC/: A"/ump and Z?e La Grandvi//e
Theorem 2 // two /irms are described 6y CE5 production /unctions di/ferin<;
on/y 6y t/ieir e/asticity o/substitution and s/iare iniiia/Zy a common capita/-/aftour
ratio A;, t/ie same emp/oyment </rou/t/i L, and investment rate s, and i/ tfte /ewe/s
o/ t/ie e/asticities o/ substitution guarantee t/ie existence o/ steady states, t/ien f/ie
jirm unt/i t/ie /iig/ier e/asticity o/ substitution between capita/ and Zabour wi// /iaue
a /iig/ier capita/ intensity and Aig/zer Zabour productimty in t/ie steady state. f(7/:
/f/ump and De La Grandt^ZZe ^000; p.
The firm's labour productivity is an increasing function of its elasticity of
substitution. If the production functions of the two firms only differ by their
elasticity of substitution, at an equivalent value of capital intensity, any uaZue,
the firm with the highest elasticity of substitution has a higher level of labour
productivity. This theorem is depicted in Figure 5.2. For any vertical line, the
intersection of this line with the labour productivity function shifts upward as
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Figure 5.2: At equivalent capital intensity, a higher elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour implies a higher labour productivity.
the elasticity of substitution increases. Furthermore, if both firms share the same
investment rate and labour force growth, the firm with the highest elasticity of
substitution will have the highest labour productivity and capital intensity in the
steady-state. Indeed, the intersection of the labour productivity curve of firm
CT with a common ray from the origin will be situated above and to the right
of the intersection with the labour productivity curve of firm 1. In Figure 5.2,
the intersection of any ray from the origin with both labour productivity curves
is such that the firm with the highest elasticity of substitution, firm <r, has a
higher capital intensity, fcj < fc*, and a larger labour productivity, /i* = /laCv) >
Suppose now that both inputs <7i and 92 are labour inputs differentiated by
skills and (71 and 92 are respectively the number of unskilled and skilled workers.
The elasticity of substitution considered here are labour-labour elasticities of
substitution. Having normalised the production function of both firms, firm 1
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and firm cr, we can derive the long run labour productivity of both firms as a
function of the proportion of skilled workers in each firm, denoted p (p = —^—)•
Consider that firms maximises profits and produces output, //, by combining
unskilled and skilled labour, say £„ = qi and L« = 92- The production function
of the firms takes the form of a homogeneous of degree one CES production
function:
H,(L«, L.) - 7 (5 x 4T"" + (1 - 3) x L<--I>/»)*/<-'> (5.5)
where 7 and 6 are technology parameters and <r is the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labour.
The long run labour productivity of the firms is derived as a function of the
proportion of skilled workers in the firm, p = ^ ^ .
- p) = *(p) = 7 (*(1 - p)<"-»" + (1 - 3) x p«-i)/")<^^
(5.6)
We are now set to prove our two theorems.
Theorem 3 7/ two /inns are described by CE5 production /unctions
on/y by t/ieir eZasticity 0/ substitution between s/ciZZed and unsfciZZed Zabour, at
eguit/aZeni /abour /orce composition p, any p, t/ie /irm twtft t/ie /li^/ier eZasticitu 0/
substitution unZZ /iat)e t/ie ftio/ier Zabour productiwtw.
Proof. Once recognised that fc = y^- (p = ^) and 5_(p) = ff_(fc^j) =
/i_ (fc) jtTT derivation of the function p with respect to the elasticity of substitution
becomes trivial:
^ J^L . (57)
ftx HI a<7
Since p = ^ > 0 for all fc > 0 we conclude that -J~ > 0 for all p and equal
to zero for p = p. This result, illustrated in Figure 5.3, implies that at equivalent
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labour force composition, the higher the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour the higher labour productivity. •
Also, the differences in the skill composition can be explained by differences
in the ease to substitute between skill-categories in the presence of skill-biased
technological change as the following theorem states/ • •••!-v yjj ,< ^im-'V
Theorem 4 7/ too /inrw ore descrifted 6y CCS production /unctions dij(ferm<7 onZy
feu t/ieir e/asticity o/substitution and s/iare initia/Zy a common sA;ii/ intensity, i.e.
Lj/Lu and a sfciZZed Zabour augmenting tec/moZogica/ c/iange characterised by </ie
same /unction m(t) ('same rate o/sfci/Zed Zabour au^mentinp L«, i.e. m'j, t/ien,
tfte /inn iwit/i t/ie /ii^/ier e/asticity o/ substitution between sfci/Zed and unsfci/Zed
Zabour unZZ Ziave a Zaraer rate o/ c/ian^e in t/ie reZative demand /or sfciZ/ed uwfcers
Lj/Lu and vice versa.
Proof. To prove this, consider a CES production function with two labour
inputs, Lu and L«, with non-neutral, L^ augmenting technological change.
#,(£»,, ^..) = 7 pLir'^ + (1 - «) x (m(t)L.,)<'-'^)^""" (5.8)
where m' = (l/m)(dm/dt) is the rate of skilled labour Lj,, augmenting techno-
logical change at time t and m > 0 and m' > 0.
Deriving equation 5.8 with respect to each input factor yields the marginal
productivity of £„ and Z^:
= «(-p-)"' = «fcf (5.9)
= (l-«)(-^-)^m("-^*(t)=«;rt (5.10)
where ^u( and u>,( are the wage rates of unskilled and skilled workers respectively.
^Among others, Bound and Johnson (1992), Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998),
Berman et al. (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) show that technological developments
are skill biased. New technologies, such as computers, require skills that are more expensive to
acquire than existing skills. Since it is less costly for skilled workers to acquire the new skills,
skilled workers are the first to use the new technology. In turn, their marginal productivity
raises compared to unskilled workers (see Dunne et al. (2000) for instance).
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The relative demand for skilled workers L, reads as: i> -"-•• • •'; '
<Zt = T~ = = — "i W (5-11)
Writing q the rate of change in the relative demand for skilled workers L,,
and assuming constant wages, we have:
9 = (<T - 1)— ,^ ,:.,•: '- (5.12)
m
•-,•••• \i.-- • •-'. >in;-\ > .•:;•.-.-.,V- :• .'<••••.• •••• •" •,.•..',.•...••
Deriving equation 5.12 with respect to cr yields:
Since both m' and m are strictly positive, the derivative of the rate of change
of the relative demand for skilled workers L., associated to the skilled augmenting
technological change, is strictly positive.
Hence, if two firms are described by CES production functions that differ only
by their elasticity of substitution and share initially a common skill intensity, i.e.
Lj/L,, and a skilled labour augmenting technological change characterised by
the same function m(<) (same rate of skilled labour augmenting L,, i.e. m'),
then, the firm with the highest elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour will have a larger rate of change in the relative demand for skilled
workers L,/L«. Skilled-biased technological change results in a larger change in
the demand for skilled workers in firms with higher elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers.** •
Also the differences in the skill composition can be explained by differences
in the ease to substitute between skill-categories under skill-biased technological
change. ... ,,..,• :•,-,..„. •.:.,,:•:.,;--;: j.. >•,(,.:••...-. •;,. :.- ,,;. ;„,,: •••• ••-«•'.-
Hence, if two firms are described by CES production function differing only
by their elasticity of substitution and share initially a common skill intensity, i.e.
"Reciprocally, the change in the demand for unskilled workers will be larger, the larger
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers given an unskilled labour
augmenting technological change.
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Figure 5.3: At equivalent workforce composition, a higher elasticity of substitu-
tion between skilled and unskilled workers implies a higher labour productivity.
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92/91 and a skilled labour augmenting technological change characterised by the
same function ^(t) (same rate of skilled labour augmenting 92, ie. o')> then,
the firm with the highest elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labour will have a larger rate of change in the relative demand for skilled workers
92/91- Skilled-biased technological change results in a larger change in the demand
for skilled workers in firms with higher elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers. Reciprocally, the change in the demand for unskilled
workers will be larger, the larger the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers given an unskilled labour augmenting technological change.
The effect of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution can be summarised
in three points.
Aj TTie elasticity 0/ substitution and s/iort run expansion pai/i.
Firms with a higher elasticity of substitution are better prepared to respond
to changes in relative input prices as shown in Figure 5.1. Moreover, firms with
higher elasticity of substitution will have a larger increase in their maximum level
of output. However, the effect on labour productivity depends on initial relative
prices (slope of the cost constraint). Firms with higher elasticity of substitution
could reach the new short-run expansion path with a higher, equal or lower
labour productivity change. This last results could explain the little variation
explained by workforce changes and labour productivity changes in Haltiwanger
et al. (1999).
5j 77ie e/asticity 0/ substitution between capita/ and /abour and t/ie /ono ran
expansion pat/i.
At any stage of its development and at equivalent capital intensity, the firm
with the highest elasticity of substitution enjoys a higher labour productivity.
When two firms have the same investment rate and employment growth but
different elasticities of substitution between capital and labour, the one with the
highest elasticity will reach its steady-state at a higher capital intensity and with
a higher labour productivity. Both implications coincide with a conjecture that
large firms have a higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.
Cj TTie sfci/Zed /abour unsA^Z/ed /abour e/asticify 0/ substitution and t/ie k>n<? ran
expansion pat/i.
166irM. '.\RAV-n 17 'J '• ;|V>^ .-^•M-:;-^ 5.3. DATA
At equivalent workforce composition, the firm with the highest elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers enjoys a higher labour pro-
ductivity. The labour productivity gap found between large and small firms after
controlling for workforce composition may coincide with a conjecture that large
firms enjoy a larger labour-labour elasticity of substitution. Moreover, given skill-
biased technological change, the firm with the highest elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers will have a higher rate of change in the
relative demand for skilled workers. The larger skill intensity in large firms may
coincide with the conjecture that large firms have higher elasticity of substitution
between skill categories and technological change is skill-biased.
5.3 Data
We use data drawn from the Pay and Performance (P&P) database of Statis-
tics Denmark maintained by the Centre for Labour market and Social research
(CLS). P&P contains registered information on all firms and residents in Den-
mark. At the end of each year (November) workers and firms are matched. This
enables us to derive for each firm an exhaustive and precise decomposition of their
workforce along demographic variables, educational background and occupational
attainment.
Individuals selected are those employed in the private sector during the pe-
riod 1992-1995. The classical demographic variables such as gender, age but
also a direct measure of experience, constructed by backward inspection of pre-
vious professional status since 1964, are available. The educational background
information refers to the highest educational attainment of individuals and is
coded according to the Danish educational classification conceptually similar to
the International Standard Classification of EDucation (ISCED) decomposition.
This data is re-coded into three educational levels: lower education (no school-
ing and elementary schools), intermediate education (high-school and vocational
high-schools) and higher education (college, advanced technical schools and Uni-
versities).^ Similarly, the occupation of each worker is classified according to the
Danish occupational codes and re-coded into three levels: low-skilled occupations,
intermediary skilled occupations and high-skilled and managerial occupations.
"See Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (1998).
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Since each worker is assigned a firm identification number we aggregate work-
ers' characteristics into summary measures for each firm.'" As a result, our data
has the firm as unit of observation. This data combines firms' workforce compo-
sition with capital stock, labour costs and value-added. The employment size of
each firm is obtained by simply counting the number of workers matched to the
firm." The industry codes are used to group firms into distinct industries. In
this paper we focus on the three largest industries in our data: Manufacturing,
Utilities and Construction.^
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of firms and employment shares by industry
and firm-size category. The data covers 6,100 firms and roughly 488,000 workers
for each year over the period 1992-1995. In the empirical analyses of this paper we
have selected the firms with at least 20 employees. Though this implies dropping
'"These summary measures are the proportions of females, the proportion of workers with less
than 5 years of experience, between 5 and 10 years and more than 10 years of experience and the
relative proportions of workers by educational and occupational levels as well as the proportions
by cross-cell of education and occupation (allocation matrix of education by occupation).
"Pull time equivalents are also available. Using this variable did not affect the estimated
results.
'-The sector of industry Transport and Telecommunication, ranked fourth on both the em-
ployment size and the firms density scale, was very unstable during the period 92-95 as the
rates of firm-deaths and mergers of firms in this sector were very high.
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out 15% of the firms, only 3% of the workforce in the private sector is avoided.
To illustrate labour productivity and capital intensity differences across firm-
size, we derive labour productivity as the ratio of value added by the number of
employees and capital intensity as the ratio of capital by the number of employees
of each firm in each industry. The (log) average labour productivity and capital
intensity by firm-size and industry in the period 92-95 are reported in Table 5.2.
The table clearly illustrates that both labour productivity and capital intensity
increase with firm-size. ,, ;; ; > "{'""" 1 Z* >»*• ."/













































Table 5.3 presents summary statistics of the workforce composition of firms
by industry and employment size. As observed in other studies (Oi (1983) and
Haltiwanger et al. (1999)), the proportion of skilled workers increases with the
employment size in all industries. The proportion of workers with a high level
of education differs between small and large firms by roughly 4% points in all
industries.
As mentioned in the introduction, these differences in the skill composition of
the workforce between firms of different sizes might emerge from different sources.
Building on an assignment hypothesis (see Sattinger (1993)), Haltiwanger et al.
argue that firms choose different modes of production resulting in skill segrega-
tion. Yet, as Idson and Oi (1999) acknowledge, large firms adopt new technologies
earlier which probably results in a larger amount of complex jobs. Therefore, the
larger proportion of high skilled workers in larger firms might correspond with a
conjecture that in large firms the distribution of jobs by their level of complexity
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is relatively more skewed to the right. Large firms have more complex jobs than
smaller firms and therefore employ systematically more skilled workers.
Classifying jobs by the level of skills 'required' and looking at the allocation of
workers, differentiated by their educational attainment, to jobs of different levels
of complexity (education required) enables us to indicate differences between
firm-size categories in the extent of workers who are over or undereducated for
their jobs (see Hartog (1992 and 2000)) in Table 5.4. Under the hypothesis
that large firms have more complex jobs the distribution of workers into the
three categories should be independent of the size of employment. The larger
amount of workers with high skills observed in large firms should be allocated to
the larger amount of complex jobs large firms have such that the proportion of
workers being undereducated, overeducated or having the required educational
level for their jobs should roughly be identical across employers. On the other
hand, skill segregation will result into differences in the proportion of workers
overeducated for their jobs across employers. Table 5.4 presents striking stylised
facts on the differences in the allocation of workers between firm-size categories
in the three industries. In all industries, large firms tend to allocate relatively
more workers to occupations in which workers' educational level is above the
'required' job level. The inter firm-size changes in the proportion of workers who
1705.3. DATA
are overeducated for their job varies between 0.3% points in the Utilities sector
and 1.3% points in the Manufacturing industry. This shows that a conjecture
that large firms have more complex jobs is definitively not the only explanation
why large firms employ more skilled workers.


















































































The tendency of large firms to employ a relatively overeducated workforce
can be interpreted as an ani versus cicada behaviour. Large firms build in a
reserve capacity of skilled workers in periods of surplus of skilled people in order
to anticipate either demand or supply shocks in the labour market for skilled
workers. In case of excess demand for skilled workers, large firms are affected
less since they already retain internal reserves of skilled workers. In periods of a
tight labour market for skilled workers, large firms could therefore easily recruit
unskilled workers instead of skilled workers, allocate the newly recruited workers
to low skill jobs and internally reallocate the skilled workers that are working in
these low skill jobs to high skill jobs.
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5.4 Empirical results . , ;.
5.4.1 Production function and firm size ;. . r
In order to derive elasticities of substitution, we estimate a production function
separately for each firm-size category and industry. The analysis is done for each
sector of industry separately since the skill-composition of the workforce and
capital intensity that are related to the size effect on labour productivity vary
systematically across industries.
We approximate the N-factor''* production function for each firm-size category
and industry, H = F (Ln,..., £„„, if), by a translog form:'^
lnH = c*o + a^ ln A -I- a*: ln .ft" -I- ^ a,j ln Ly ' (5-14)
15
+/?*,„ ln A" ln A + £ ^ ln L,, ln A + 1/?^ ln* A
>-j •
where H is output, L^ are labour inputs (number of workers with education
j working in occupation z, i =< l,...,n > and j =< l,...,n >)," /^ is capital
stock, A is a time dependent technological index, the Greek letters are technology
parameters.
We choose for the translog production function form rather than a nested-
CES production function since the translog production function does not require
to impose ex ante restrictions on the substitutability between the various labour
inputs and capital and offers the most flexible functional form. Nested-CES
production functions require to c/ioose for the way in which capital and labour
inputs are nested."* ....,-., v
'"*Let the first A' - 1 input factors be labour inputs differentiated by education, indexed by
j e< 1 n >, and occupation, indexed byt€<l,...,n>, and the Af"" be capital stock.
'*We have dropped firm and time indexes for the sake of convenience. -..,., ..• . :•'•-: --
'*Note that AT = n^ + 1.
'*In the pre\dous chapters we used a CES production function as it offers a convenient way
to derive theoretical results and to estimate relative demand equations. In this chapter, we are
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We assume that the production function of specification (1) is well-behaved so
that it is homogeneous of degree one in inputs quantities. This implies imposing
the following restrictions on the parameters: .,.
ij = 1 (5.15)
(5.16)
A = 0 , . . •'"':"".' •"'"'' •; (5.18)
Note that our model can be viewed as a generalisation of the model of Halti-
wanger et al. Therein, second order and interaction terms are absent (Cobb-
Douglas production function) and all firms have the same production function
except for the technological parameters ao and a^. All /3's parameters are equal
to 0 (i.e. the elasticities of substitution equal unity for each pair of inputs in all
firms.
With the assumption of competitive input markets, <9H/dLy = UJ,J and
9///3A' = r, the factor share equations are derived from the ./V output elas-
ticity equations as follows:
// = Sy,Vi,j (5.19)
= 5A- (5.20)
where u;y and Sy are respectively the price and cost share of factor ij and r and
SJC the price and cost share of capital. ;
^ Equating the costs shares to the logarithmic marginal products yields:
interested in estimating the shape of the production function. To this aim, the translog form
should be prefered for its flexible functional form.
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i,j (5.21)
9*:
£/?,^fclnL,fc + 7^1ii,4 (5.22)
9*:
Any deviations of the cost shares from the logarithmic marginal products
are assumed to be errors in cost minimising behaviour captured in the empirical
estimation by a classical additive disturbance for each of the cost shares equations.
As we are interested in considering the effects of exogenous changes in factor
prices on factor quantities, we derive the Allen partial Elasticities of Substitution
(AES), denoted AES,.^ and AE5/c,ij, and defined as AES,^^
where |G| is the determinant of the symmetric matrix G defined as follows:
G =
K.nn + ^nn X
. S»» /?K,nn + 5nn X 5K /?„„,„„ + $L " '
and |Gy,jfc| is the cofactor of G^^/t in G.
These partial elasticities of substitution register the effect on the relative quan-
tity of two factors, say ij and gfc, of a change in the relative price of these two
factors where output and prices of other factors are held constant.'^ However,
Blackorby and Russel (1989) demonstrate that this concept suffers serious short-
comings. They show that for more than two inputs, the AES are not a measure of
the curvature of the production function and therefore are not a complete measure
• AUen (1938).
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of substitution. Therefore, they propose the concept of elasticity of substitution
developed by Morishima (1969) that does not suffer these shortcomings, t ««>
The Morishima Elasticities of Substitution (MES), given the positive linear
homogeneity of the production function (see Blackorby and Russel (1981) ), are
denned by:
AT - 1 x TV - 1 (5.23)
The MES measure the proportional effect of changing the relative price of
input ij and gfc on the relative quantity of factors ij and gfc. The MES are
divided in two parts: the proportional effect on the quantity of input <?fc of
varying the price of input ij and the proportional effect on the quantity of ij of
varying the price of input iji.
5.4.2 Elasticities of substitution
We estimate simultaneously the equation of the translog production'" (equation
5.14) and the share equations" 5.21 and 5.22 using the iterative Zellner method
'"It is usually argued that factor prices rather than factor quantities should be considered as
exogenous when using firm-level data and therefore a cost function should be estimated rather
than a production function. As Varian (1984) p. 174 explains:
...if the managers observe variables omitted in the model, then they certainly
take that information into account when they determine their optimal choice of
inputs.
The estimates of the model will then be biased. This problem can be solved using a cost
function as prices are exogenous and not determined by the managers. However, estimating a
cost function requires to assume fixed output level. The resulting parameter estimates represent
substitution possibilities along an isoquant but ignore the scale effects on output. As De
La Grandville (1989) shows, the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution determines the
magnitude of the scale effect as well. The larger the elasticity of substitution, i.e. the larger
the substitution effect (trivial) and the larger the scale effect. In order to take scale effects
into account we estimate a production function rather than a cost function. Because of the
endogeneity of input levels, an estimation procedure using instrument variables is required.
To avoid problems inherent in choosing instrumental variables, the Zellner method is prefered.
Berndt and Christensen (1973) indeed find no significant differences in estimates between the
Zellner method and the three stage least squares.
'"One share equation, arbitrarily chosen, was dropped since identification problems results
from the homogeneity restrictions. The translog parameters are though independent of the
choice of which share equation to drop since we use the iterative Zellner-efficient estimation
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(see Chen and Tang (1987) for the estimation of a similar set of equations us-
ing firm-level data).^ For both, occupation and education, intermediate and
higher levels are merged in one group in order to preserve representativeness of
firms within each firm-size categories as for more than 70% of our small firms
no observations are found in at least one of the cells of the allocation matrix de-
fined with three educational levels and three occupational levels. When merging
intermediate and high levels, only 20% of the small firms are dropped.
Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 present the Morishima elasticities of substitution and
factor demand elasticities, i.e. j)^-^, by firm-size in the Manufacturing, Construc-
tion and Utilities industry respectively. The Morishima elasticities refer to a 1%
change in relative factor prices initiated by a change in the price of the input
figuring in the first column.
From the Morishima elasticities of substitution two patterns emerge. First,
the differences in the magnitude of the MES between skilled workers in skilled
jobs and capital across firm-size categories are striking. In the three industries,
the percentage change in the relative quantity of skilled workers in skilled jobs
and capital in response to a 1% change in the relative wages, initiated by a change
in the wage rate only, is larger in large firms. This suggests that large firms can
adjust an increase in the relative price of skilled workers working in skilled jobs
with a larger change in the relative quantities of these workers to capital stock
than smaller firms. Secondly, the magnitudes of the labour-labour elasticities
of substitution in the three industries are clearly related to the size of the firm.
The MES between skilled workers in skilled jobs and all other labour inputs,
associated to a change in the wage rate of skilled workers in skilled jobs, are
larger in large firms.
The direction of the differences in the MES between skilled workers in skilled
jobs and all other inputs across firm-size categories is consistent with the ob-
servation that large firms have a higher skill intensity than small firms given
skill-biased technological change. Indeed, as theorem 4 states the rate of change
in the relative demand for skilled workers under skill-biased technological change
is positively related to the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labour. At an equivalent rate of skilled labour augmenting
(unskilled labour saving), the larger the elasticity of substitution, the larger the
(see Berndt and Christensen (1973).
*>See Zellner (1962 and 1963).
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Table 5.5: Morishima elasticities of substitution and factor demand elasticities



































































































Ly is the number of workers with education J working in occupation I.
rate of change in the relative demand for skilled workers. When firms of different
size share the same rate of skill-augmenting, differences in the magnitude of their
elasticity of substitution between skilled workers and unskilled-workers generate
differences in their rate of change in skilled labour demand. Since large firms have
larger elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in skilled
jobs and technological change is skill-biased, large firms have a larger increase of
the demand for skilled workers which generates differences in the skill intensity
across firms of different employment size.
Overall results are consistent with empirical regularities observed in other
empirical research.^ First, in absolute values, the factor demand elasticity for
*'See Hamermesh (1993) Table 3.7 and 3.8.
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Table 5.6: Morishima elasticities of substitution and factor demand elasticities by




































































































unskilled-workers in low skilled jobs is larger than that for skilled workers in
skilled jobs in all industries and all firm-size categories.^ The results show that
each labour group is substitute with physical capital in all firm-size categories
and all industries. Surprisingly, the results suggest that skilled workers in skilled
jobs (allocation cell < 2,2 >) are p-substitute with capital. However, we find a
larger degree of p-substitutability between unskilled-workers in low skilled jobs
and capital than between skilled workers in skilled jobs and capital.
In all industries, we observe persistent patterns between the magnitude of
both factor demand elasticities and elasticities of substitution and the size of
firms. The magnitude of the own-price factor demand elasticities, in absolute
values, decreases with firm-size for capital and unskilled-workers in low skilled
*See Hamermesh (1993) Table 3.7.
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Table 5.7: Morishima elasticities of substitution and factor demand elasticities
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while it increases for skilled workers in skilled jobs and to some extent
for unskilled-workers in skilled jobs. The differences in magnitude of the own-
price factor demand elasticities of skilled workers in skilled jobs between large
and smaller firms suggest that large firms could accommodate a change in the
relative wage of skilled workers in skilled jobs more easily than smaller firms.
5.4.3 Robustness check
As predicted by our theoretical model, we find that large firms have higher elas-
ticities of substitution between skilled labour with all other inputs (unskilled
labour and capital). To check whether this result is driven by the data we use
^Klotz et al. (1980) find similar results for U.S. manufacturing plants in 1967.
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or really consistent with our theoretical model, we reproduce the analyses of Id-
son and Oi (1999) and Haltiwanger et al. (2000) with our data. These analyses
consist of log-linear regressions relating firms' workforce characteristics to their
labour productivity, separately for each industry. All data are deviations from
year means such that we control for price variation and variations in capital us-
age.^ Since the number of firms varies across size categories, least squares and
means are weighted by the relative number of firms in each firm-size category.
Our measure of labour productivity is the log of value-added per employee in firm
/ in period t, V/< = In -^. The size variables, Si jj, S2,/t and i>3,/t, are dummies
corresponding to firm-size 20 — 49 (Si,/t = 1 for L/t G [20,49] and 0 otherwise,
where L/< is total employment of firm / in period £) and 50 - 99 and 100 and
more respectively. Firm's workforce is further decomposed into the proportion
of female L\/t, the proportion of young and old workers, L\/t and D3jt respec-
tively and the proportion of workers with less than 5 years of experience and
more than 10 years of experience, L\/t and L\/trespectively. P>,/( (j = 1,2,3
are educational levels) capture the distribution of firms' workforce by educational
levels (P;,/< = L,,/,/L/<).
The first model (Model I) is a regression of firms' labour productivity on firm
size only and is conceptually comparable to Idson and Oi (1999)'s estimation of
the size-output elasticity in the US manufacturing industry.
Model (I):
+ e/« (5-24)
where e/t are error terms satisfying the classical assumptions of linear regression.
The results of the estimation of Model I are reported in column (I) of Table
5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. The results indicate that large firms have a higher measure
of labour productivity than smaller firms. In the manufacturing industry, the
labour productivity of firms with more than 100 employees exceeds the labour
productivity of medium-size firms by 13% and that of small-size firms by 18%.
•*•*Including capital in the set of explanatory variables, in order to get closer to a production
function (Cobb-Douglas), increases the percentage of the variation in labour productivity ex-
plained but the magnitude and significativity change neither for the size-effect nor for workforce
composition parameters.
> •
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These results are similar to size-output elasticity of 0.172 in the manufacturing
industry in 1992 (see Idson and Oi (1999)). -;'>:-nvJv j* if>>n. -io -..;
To replicate Haitiwanger et al.'s regression, Model I is extended by including
workforce characteristics in the set of explanatory variables. Firms' workforce is
decomposed into educational attainment as well as sex, age and experience cat-
egories. This model is conceptually equivalent to Haltiwanger et al.'s regression
and the underlying production function has a Cobb-Douglas shape. The elastic-
ity of substitution between all pairs of inputs is therefore assumed to be equal to
1.
Model (II): " '7 ' " '
= 60 + 61S1,/, + 6252,/t + J] QA,,/« + ^ djPj,,, + e/, (5.25)
Results of the estimation of Model (II) are reported in column (II) of Table 5.8,
5.9 and 5.10. The results show that differences in the workforce characteristics
account for roughly 20% of the variation in labour productivity across employers.
Moreover, the results indicate that firms employing more educated-workers are
more productive as predicted by the human capital theory. The inter firm-size
productivity differences are persistent even when controls for workforce compo-
sition are included. The firm-size coefficients remains significant after including
control for workforce composition. This means that the labour productivity gap
between firms of different employment size cannot be imputed completely to sys-
tematic differences in the skill-mix of their workforce. These results are in line
with Haltiwanger et al.'s results for the US industries.
In a third regression, control for the firm's allocation of workers to occupations
is included by adding to the previous regressions information on the allocation of
workers. The underlying production function can be seen as a special case of the
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2, i.e. equation 2.7 where <7<, = ^e = 1-
The model reads as follows:
Model (III):
= 60 + 61S1,/, + k&./t + X] <*A*./« + 5m *j*y./« + «/« (5-26)
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where i = 1,2,3 are occupational levels and Pij,/« (Pij,/< = ^y./t/^/O is the
proportion of workers with educational level j allocated to occupational level t in
firm / at time t.
.•: •.'•••; /'.h •'A- *--.-•. --"iJ"*"- ..-••^!'l;.,-!:r/ V;.-,?; :i;<ki- • *i« :.-•'•• i ''.li -,-.!.-.;••-. .--.;'• . • ., •: hv.'JT:
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** sig 1%
Py is the proportion of workers with educational level j allocated to occupational level I.
Pj is the proportion of workers with educational level j. • .: c • '
As shown in column (III) of Table 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, in all industries, replac-
ing the human capital specification by an allocation specification adds significant
explanatory power (See Wald-tests) but leaves the firm-size effect unaffected.
Though systematic differences in the allocation across employers of different size
do not explain the nature of the employment-size productivity differentials com-
pletely, the results indicate that variations in allocation are significantly related
to differences in productivity levels across employers. Differences in the allocation
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of workers to jobs does explain part of the differences in labour productivity be-
tween different firms. The most striking result is that firms which employ workers
which are overeducated for their jobs are more productive. In the manufacturing,
utilities and construction industries, this pattern is persistent. Firms allocating
1% point more workers with an intermediate educational level in low-skill jobs
than the industry-mean have a labour productivity exceeding the industry-mean
by 0.5%, ceteris parifrus. In all industries, the firms for which the proportion of
workers with high educational level working in low-skill jobs exceeds the industry-
mean by 1% point, enjoy a labour productivity that exceeds the industry-mean
by about 2.5%. These results, especially the significant effect of overeducation
of nonproduction workers (i.e. occupational levels 2 and 3), are consistent with
Black and Lynch (2001) finding that firms with a larger average educational level
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of nonproduction workers have a larger labour productivity.
Both Model (II) and (III) indicate that at equivalent workforce composition,
large firms enjoy a larger labour productivity. This labour productivity gap found
between large and small firms after controlling for workforce composition may
coincide with a conjecture that large firms enjoy a larger labour-labour elasticity
of substitution. Indeed, in Section 5.2 we have shown that at equivalent workforce
composition firms with a higher labour-labour elasticity of substitution enjoy a
larger labour productivity.
To complete the replication of Haltiwanger et al., we evaluate the extent to
which changes in workforce composition reflect transitory shocks in the labour
market that yield fluctuations around the long run levels of workforce composi-
tions firms have chosen. Regressions of four-year labour productivity changes on
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changes in the workforce composition are run. Model (IV) is the human capi-
tal version (the dynamic version of Model (II)) and Model (V) is the allocation
specification (the dynamic version of Model (III)).
Results are reported in Table 5.11. The results indicate that though labour
productivity levels are explained for a great deal by workforce composition,
changes in the workers mix of firms explain very little of the variation in labour
productivity changes. The results are in line with those obtained by Haltiwanger
et al. (1999) for US data. Moreover, even though the allocation specification
adds significant power, the coefficients do not show systematic results across in-
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dustries. Changes in the workforce composition and allocation of workers to jobs
do not explain much of the labour productivity changes. Though the previous
results indicate that firms employing workers with intermediate or high edu-
cational attainment in low-skill jobs have higher labour productivity measures,
firms seeking to increase their labour productivity could not do so by just chang-
ing their workforce composition. Differences in labour productivity between firms
probably rely on differences in the organisation of production and the produc-
tion function itself rather than workforce composition. This is consistent with
Haltiwanger et al. (1999). Different firms choose different modes of production,
requiring a different workers' mix and lock in. Changes in workforce composition
reflect transitory shocks in the labour market that yield fluctuations around the
long run levels of workforce compositions these firms have chosen. As shown
in Section 5.2, changes in workforce composition in response to increase in the
relative wages will be larger in firms with the highest elasticity of substitution.
However, the resulting changes in labour productivity could be either larger or
smaller depending on the initial equilibrium. The fact that little variation in
labour productivity changes is explained by changes in workforce composition
across employers might correspond with significant differences between firms in
their elasticities of substitution.
Results of this subsection clearly show that large firms have higher labour pro-
ductivity even when we control for differences in workforce composition. More-
over, changes in labour productivity do not reflect quite accurately the changes
in workforce composition. Both results are in line with those of Haltiwanger et
al. for the US economy and coincide with a conjecture that firms differ in their
modes of production. In this chapter we have shown that these differences in
the production function consist of differences in the elasticities of substitution
between skill groups of workers and capital.
5.5 Summary and conclusion '•
In this chapter, we analysed the production function between firms and investi-
gated whether these differences are related to the differences in the substitution
possibilities between firms. We advanced the hypothesis that the differences in
labour productivity, capital intensity and the skill composition of the workforce
observed between small and large firms are due to the differences in the produc-
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tion function. We argued that the differences in capital intensity between large
and small firms can be explained by a larger elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital in large firms (theorem 1 and 2 of Klump and De La Grandville
(2000)). Moreover, we proved that i) cetera paritus, the higher the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, the higher the labour produc-
tivity and ii) that given skill-biased technological change, the larger the elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour the larger the skill intensity.
In turn, the larger labour productivity observed in large firms can be explained
by a larger elasticity of substitution between inputs in case of skill-biased tech-
nological change.
In all three industries we analysed, we found that the magnitude of the elastic-
ities of substitution between skilled workers in skilled jobs with all other labour
inputs and capital is larger in large firms. This suggests that large firms can
better adjust their input mix to changes in the relative wage of skilled workers
working in skilled jobs than small firms. These differences explain the higher
labour productivity and capital intensity observed in large firms. Moreover, the
higher elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour in large firms
explains the higher skill intensity in large firms.
As the skill segregation hypothesis suggests, we found that large firms employ
more overeducated workers than small firms. We related the tendency of large
firms to employ a relatively overeducated workforce to an 'an£ versus cicada' be-
haviour. The larger productivity enables large firms to build in a reserve capacity
of skilled workers in periods of low wages for skilled people in order to anticipate
demand or supply shocks in the labour market for skilled workers. If the wage
of skilled workers increases, large firms are affected less since they already retain
an internal reserve of skilled workers.
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The aim of this study was twofold. One was to yield an understanding of what
happens when substitution takes place in the labour market. The other was to
understand why some labour markets are more flexible than others. Although
the specialisation of labour is an important feature, in the labour market no one
is irreplaceable. We argued that if a worker leaves, the firm would perhaps shuffle
some tasks and look for a new worker but production will be almost unaffected.
This (re-)assignment of tasks to workers generates flexibility in the labour market
such that shifts in the demand for and supply of the various types of workers can
be absorbed more easily. However, as this flexibility is probably not unlimited,
we addressed the question: what are the determinants of the possibilities to
substitute workers with different skills. Understanding the mechanism by which
tasks are divided in the labour market may therefore contribute to our insight on
why some labour markets are more flexible than others.
The first main result of this study is that a simple two-level production func-
tion can be used to model the assignment of the tasks of several occupations to
workers with various educational backgrounds. The second main insight is that
the substitution process that takes place in the labour market is consistently
explained by the assignment of workers to jobs. The skill content of the vari-
ous studies is an important determinant of the assignment of workers to tasks
as it sizes the range of tasks that workers with the various educational back-
grounds can perform in the various occupations, i.e. the a/Zocafion stnjctuTie.
The third main result of the study is that when it is easy to substitute between
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occupational outputs, productivity will benefit more from an educational system
with three vocational specialisations. In contrast, when it is easier to substitute
between workers within occupations, productivity will benefit more from an ed-
ucational system with two vocational specialisations and one general educational
field. The fourth main insight of the study is that differences in the shape of the
production function and in particular differences in the substitution possibilities
between large and small firms in the same industry contribute significantly to the
differences in output, productivity and the allocation of workers to occupations
observed between large and small firms. ;^ <-1 { ) f,, J' M *} f ' £ }. ?
6.2 Summary
To understand how the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous
jobs affects the substitution between groups of workers, we developed an alloca-
tion model in Chapter 2. The model provided some insight on how the assignment
of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs relates to the substitution pro-
cess observed in the labour market. The model is an extension of Rosen's (1978)
tasks assignment model in which each occupation has a different continuum of
tasks. We showed that the assignment of workers with various educational back-
grounds to heterogeneous tasks in several occupations can be formalised in an
allocation model by estimating a two-level Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) production function.
The model presented admits two noteworthy special cases. Using a one level
CES production function and differentiating workers according to their education
only (or their occupation only) is comparable to the model of Rosen (1978). Using
a two-level Cobb-Douglas-Linear production function leads to the production
function used in Tinbergen (1973).
The model we developed showed that when the relative wage of workers with
a particular education increases, these workers will be assigned a smaller range of
tasks in all occupations, i.e. only the tasks in which they are good at. Moreover,
when the range of tasks that workers with a particular education perform in their
specific occupation decreases more than the range of tasks these workers perform
in other occupations then, it becomes less (more) efficient to produce intermediate
output in the specific occupation of these workers provided that the parameter
of substitution between occupational output is larger (respectively smaller) than
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We generalised this model by releasing the assumption that within educational
groups workers are homogeneous. In this model workers and jobs are, by analogy
to Tinbergen (1956), heterogeneous with respect to both the skills workers have
and the skills jobs require. However, we emphasised the demand for labour by
solving for the assignment of workers to jobs that maximises firms' production
function. We have shown, using an extension of Rosen's (1978) specification of
the demand for workers per unit of output, that the assignment of heterogeneous
workers to heterogeneous jobs can be formalised in an allocation model by esti-
mating a two-level CES production function where a distinction is made between
the various educational backgrounds of workers and the various occupations.
In Chapter 3, we tested the relevance of our allocation model in explaining
the substitution process between different types of workers. We approached this
question by comparing the allocation of workers with different educational fields
to various occupations and wages across countries. Across countries, differences
in the relative supply of labour should coincide with wage differentials if the
substitution process between the various types of labour occurs freely in each
country. However, we argued that workers who graduated in the same field of
study in different countries differ in the range of tasks they can perform in the
various occupations. These differences are due to differences in the educational
system between countries. For instance, the knowledge taught in the various
educational fields in France is different from the knowledge taught in similar
studies in the UK. These differences in the skill content of educational fields
generate differences in the range of tasks graduates in France and the UK can
perform in the various occupations. An important implication is that the content
of a study determines the assignment possibilities and therefore the substitution
process in the labour market. The analysis pursued in Chapter 3 and the ensuing
empirical results highlighted the relevance of our allocation model in explaining
the substitution process that takes place in the labour market. Empirical results
indeed show that cross-country differences in allocation are to a large extent (50%)
due to differences in the allocation structure. Moreover, once these differences
in the allocation structure are controlled for, we found that wage differentials
across countries coincide with at least 64% of the differences in the employment of
workers with various educational fields in the various occupations. The remaining
36% can be imputed to unobserved factors, that may be related to labour market
institutional factors like wage-setting, pay norms and minimum wage. •••" •7flM;\. i- CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
The differences in the allocation structure between countries indicate that
the choice for the structure of the educational system is the result of an opti-
malisation process. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we addressed the question to what
extent the knowledge taught in each field of education affects the long run labour
productivity and labour market instability.
The allocation model enabled us to distinguish between different structures of
the educational system. We argued that a shift in the supply of workers between
two specific educational fields should to lead to a reciprocal change in the wage
rate of these two types of workers but should leave the wage of workers with
general education unchanged. We derived a sufficient condition for the allocation
structure to satisfy this type of reciprocal shifts in a three educational fields-three
occupations case. The family of allocation structures that satisfies this type of
reciprocal shifts, is characterised by three productivity parameters. The first pa-
rameter indicates the range of tasks that workers with the education for which
employment does not change, can perform outside their own occupation. The
second parameter indicates the range of tasks that workers whose employment
increases and workers whose employment decreases can perform in each other's
occupation. The last parameter indicates the range of tasks that workers whose
employment increases and workers whose employment decreases can perform in
the occupation of workers whose employment does not change. Simulations show
that labour productivity and wage dispersion are sensitive to the relative mag-
nitude of the three parameters. Increasing the range of tasks that workers can
perform outside their own occupation decreases labour productivity. However,
the larger the range of tasks that workers can perform outside their own occupa-
tion, the smaller the increase in wage dispersion in case of supply shifts.
To address the question of the relevance of vocational education in initial ed-
ucation, we used data on the Dutch labour market and estimated the elasticity
of substitution parameters together with the allocation structure associated to
workers with general, technical and social services studies at the intermediate
level, working in three more or less related occupations. We found that the de-
mand for workers with a general educational background is less elastic than the
demand for workers with technical and social services vocational specialisations.
This result indicates that a relative decrease in the supply of graduates of gen-
eral education induces a relatively large increase in the relative wage of these
graduates, a large decrease in labour productivity and a large increase in wage
dispersion.
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We have shown that the skill content of a study in terms of specific and general
skills matters for both labour productivity and wage inequality. The more specific
the skills of workers, the larger labour productivity. However, the more generic
the skills of workers, the larger the range of tasks these workers can perform out-
side their own occupation and the smaller the increase in wage inequality in case
of supply shifts. Moreover, we show that the flexibility of the labour market, mea-
sured by the parameters indicating the ease to substitute between workers with
different educational backgrounds within occupations and the ease to substitute
between occupational output should be accounted for when the skill content of
the various educational fields is defined. When the parameter indicating the ease
to substitute between occupational output is large compared to the parameter in-
dicating the ease to substitute between workers with different educational fields,
like in the Netherlands, the economy may benefit from decreasing the range of
tasks that workers with general education could perform outside the general oc-
cupation, by increasing the amount of skills that contribute to their productivity
in the general occupation at the expense of the general skills that contribute to
their productivity in the other occupational fields.
In the allocation model developed in Chapter 2, the substitution process is
determined by the way in which firms assign workers to tasks. The structure of
workers' productivity in the various occupations, underlying the way in which
firms assign workers to tasks, can lead to a substitution process associated with a
higher labour productivity and a lower wage inequality. In Chapter 5, we analysed
whether the tremendous heterogeneity observed between small and large firms in
terms of output, productivity and input mix is explained by differences in the
modes of production. The heterogeneity in output, productivity and input-mix
raises the question whether small and large firms have the same production func-
tion whereas the impact of the substitution process on output and productivity
suggests that if there are differences in the production function these differences
may relate to the substitution possibilities of firms. We argued that the differ-
ences in capital intensity between large and small firms can be explained by a
larger elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in large firms and we
proved that the higher the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labour, the higher the labour productivity and the larger the skill intensity in
case of skill-biased technological change. In turn, the larger labour productivity
observed in large firms can be explained by a larger elasticity of substitution
between inputs.
1931£ .S-a CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
We used matched employer-employee data for the Danish manufacturing, con-
struction and utilities industries between 1992-1995 to estimate production func-
tions for firms of different sizes in each industry. In all three industries, the
magnitude of the estimated elasticities of substitution between skilled workers in
skilled jobs with all other labour inputs and capital is larger in large firms. These
differences explain the higher labour productivity and capital intensity observed
in large firms. Moreover, at sight of the skill-biased nature of the technological
developments observed since the last decades, the higher elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labour in large firms could explain the higher skill
intensity in large firms. >^Vr jr^;;uijf« «fota>; &!!<.*.',v. .»,•!>* -^TOiwivr.Kig
As the skill segregation hypothesis suggests, we found that large firms employ
more overeducated workers than small firms. We related the tendency of large
firms to employ a relatively overeducated workforce to an 'an< versus cicada'
behaviour. This larger productivity enables large firms to build in a reserve
capacity of skilled workers in periods of low wages for skilled people in order
to anticipate demand or supply shocks in the labour market for skilled workers.
If the wage of skilled workers increases, large firms are affected less since they
already retain an internal reserve of skilled workers. ...--..
6.3 Future research
This study has answered two important questions on the flexibility of the labour
market: i) what happens when substitution takes place in the labour market and
ii) why some labour markets are more flexible than others. However, the study
leaves room for relevant future research in various directions:
In Chapter 3 and 4, we focused our analyses on the various fields of educa-
tion and occupation in order to acknowledge the large variations observed
in wages and allocation between the various fields of education at a par-
ticular level. In Chapter 5, due to data restrictions, only the levels of
education and occupation are considered. A general model including both
vertical and horizontal educational and occupational scales would be a nat-
ural continuation of the analyses of Chapter 3 and 4. Such a general model
would provide more information on the relative importance of vertical sub-
stitution compared to horizontal substitution than the magnitudes of the
respective .elasticities of substitution. This is particularly relevant in the
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light of the findings of Dolton and Makepeace (1990) and Borghans and
Heijke (1998). Both studies find that for some educational categories the
education with the most similar occupational field is situated at a differ-
ent level of education in the same vocational specialisation (indicating the
relevance of uerticaZ su6sta<u<ion) while for other educational categories the
most similar education is found at the same level
The direct implications of the model in Chapter 4 are that if two countries
are differentiated by their ease to substitute between workers with various
educational backgrounds only then, the country with a smaller elasticity
of substitution between workers with the various educational backgrounds
will benefit relatively more from adopting a vocational educational system
whereas the country with a larger elasticity will benefit relatively more from
adopting an educational system that focuses on generic skills. This result
emphasises the relationship between the educational system of a country
and the flexibility of the labour market and calls for replications of the
empirical analysis of Chapter 4 with US and German data as it could
contribute to explaining the fundamental differences in both educational
systems. Indeed, since the US educational system is usually referred to as
producing generic skills in abundance whereas the dual educational system
in Germany produces school-leavers with vocational skills, based on the the-
oretical implications of the model in Chapter 4 we would expect that the
ease to substitute between workers with various educational backgrounds
in the US exceeds that of Germany conditional on the ease to substitute
between occupational output.
A general criticism of labour demand analyses resides in the fact that most
studies do not observe what actually occurs in the workplace. However,
in the 90's more longitudinal data with detailed information on a random
set of workplaces became available. This enables research on the workfloor
level within firms. In Chapter 5, we actually 'got our hands dirty' (Hamer-
mesh (1993) p. 401), and measured production functions at the workplace
level. However, though we were able to shed some light on the differences
in the production function between large and small firms that generate the
observed differences in labour productivity, capital intensity, skill composi-
tion and allocation of workers, we did not infer further on how workers use
their time on the job, how they are supervised and therefore what exactly
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generates the larger substitution possibility for large firms. Although there
is a growing body of empirical and theoretical literature on the impact of
Total Quality Management (TQM), see Black and Lynch (2001) and High
Performance Workplace (HPW), see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003), on pro-
ductivity and wages, to our knowledge none of these studies have analysed
their impact on the ease to substitute between inputs.* This would be an
interesting and challenging extension of Chapter 5.
Finally, the idea of using the allocation model developed in this study in the
context of regional labour mobility is very appealing. Think of an allocation
model of the type depicted in Chapter 4. Replace workers' education by
workers' region of origin and workers' occupation by the region in which
workers are employed. Suppose there are three regions, North, Centre and
South. When shortages of labour are observed in the northern region, and
labour surpluses characterise the local labour market in the southern region,
the model developed in this study could be used in order to underpin the
regionaZ substitution process. In other words, would workers move from
South to work in North (direct substitution) or would workers move from
South to Centre, replace some workers from the Centre who themselves
would move to North (indirect substitution).^ Such an analysis is highly
relevant for analysing the (re-)allocation of workers between the various
member states of the European Union, as a reallocation of labour between
EU countries should be a major adjustment process if countries in the
Euro-area are affected by different exogenous shocks to the economy. If for
instance the three regions are France, Belgium and the Netherlands, one
would expect indirect reallocation of labour surpluses in France to labour
shortages in the Netherlands, for as long as the range of tasks that French
workers can perform in each country, the a^ parameters, depend on whether
French workers, workers from j, can talk Dutch, language of i. The use of a
neutral language, English for instance, could shift the reallocation from an
indirect route to a direct route between the Netherlands and France. Half of
the way back to direct reallocation is already available since Dutch workers
'Black and Lynch (2001) use a Cobb-Douglas production function where the ease to substi-
tute between production and nonproduction workers is equal to unit for all firms regardless of
their Human Resources Management (HRM) system.
^See among others, Creedy (1974) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) and Davis and
Patterson (2000).
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do talk English. However, English is not as spread a skill in Prance as it is
in the Netherlands. This asymmetry guarantees indirect substitution.
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Summary in Dutch >
Het doel van deze studie is tweevoudig: het ene is om inzicht te brengen in wat er
gebeurt als er op de arbeidsmarkt substitutieprocessen plaatsvinden. Het andere
doel is te begrijpen waarom sommige arbeidsmarkten flexibeler zijn dan anderen.
Hoewel de specialisatie van arbeid een belangrijke eigenschap is, is op de arbeids-
markt niemand onvervangbaar. Wij beweren dat als een arbeidskracht weggaat,
het bedrijf misschien enkele taken zal verschuiven en een nieuwe arbeidskracht zal
zoeken maar de productie zal hierdoor vrijwel onaangetast blijven. Deze (her-)
toewijzing van taken aan arbeidskrachten creeert een dusdanige flexibiliteit op de
arbeidsmarkt waardoor de verschuivingen in de vraag naar en de aanbod van de
diverse soorten arbeidskracht gemakkelijker kunnen worden geabsorbeerd. Maar,
aangezien deze flexibiliteit waarschijnlijk niet onbeperkt is, stellen wij de vraag:
wat zijn de beslissende factoren in de mogelijkheden om arbeidskrachten met ver-
schillende vaardigheden te substitueren. Begrip van het mechanisme waardoor
de taken op de arbeidsmarkt verdeeld worden geeft inzicht in de vraag waarom
sommige arbeidsmarkten flexibeler zijn dan anderen.
Om te begrijpen hoe de toewijzing van taken in heterogene banen aan hetero-
gene arbeidskrachten de substitutie tussen groepen arbeidskrachten beinvloedt,
wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 een allocatiemodel ontwikkeld. Het model laat zien hoe
de toewijzing van heterogene arbeidskrachten aan heterogene banen verbonden
is met het substitutieproces dat op de arbeidsmarkt wordt waargenomen. Het
model is een uitbreiding van het 'taaktoewijzingsmodel' (task assignment model)
van Rosen (1978) waarin elk beroep een verschillend continuum van taken heeft.
Wij tonen aan dat de toewijzing van arbeidskrachten met uiteenlopende oplei-
dingsachtergronden naar heterogene taken in verschillende beroepen in een allo-
catiemodel kan worden geformaliseerd door een 2-niveau Constante Elasticiteit
Substitutie (CES) productie functie te schatten. , . .
Het gepresenteerde model laat twee opmerkelijke speciale gevallen toe. Het
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gebruiken van een 1-niveau CES productie functie waarin alleen een onderscheid
wordt gemaakt tussen arbeidskrachten naar opleidingsachtergrond (of beroep)
is vergelijkbaar met het model van Rosen (1978). Het gebruiken van een 2-
niveau Cobb-Douglas-Lineaire productie functie leidt tot de productie functie die
gebruikt wordt door Tinbergen (1973).
Het gepresenteerde model laat zien dat wanneer het relatieve loon van ar-
beidskrachten met een bepaalde opleidingsachtergrond toeneemt, ze een kleiner
aantal taken in alle beroepen zullen worden toevertrouwd, i.e. slechts de taken
waarin zij heel goed zijn. Wanneer het aantal verschillende taken die arbeid-
skrachten met een bepaalde opleidingsachtergrond in hun specifieke beroep uitvo-
eren meer afneemt dan het aantal taken dat deze arbeidskrachten uitvoeren in
andere beroepen, dan wordt het minder efficient om output in het specifieke
beroep van deze arbeidskrachten te produceren op voorwaarde dat de parameter
van substitutie tussen beroepsoutput groter is dan 1. Het omgekeerde is het geval
waarbij de parameter van subsitutie tussen beroepsoutput kleiner is dan 1.
We generaliseren dit model door de veronderstelling dat binnen opleidings-
groepen, arbeidskrachten homogeen zijn los te laten. In dit model, zijn arbei-
dskrachten en banen, naar analogie met Tinbergen (1956), heterogeen met be-
trekking tot respectievelijk de vaardigheden die arbeidskrachten hebben en de
vaardigheden die de verschillende beroepen vereisen. Wij benadrukken echter
de vraag naar arbeid door de toewijzing van arbeidskrachten aan banen die de
productiefunctie van bedrijven maximaliseert op te lossen. Door het gebruiken
van een uitbreiding van Rosen's (1978) specificatie van de vraag naar arbeid-
skrachten per eenheid output, tonen wij aan dat de toewijzing van heterogene
arbeidskrachten aan heterogene banen in een allocatiemodel kan worden gefor-
maliseerd door het schatten van een 2-niveau CES productie functie, waarbij
een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de diverse opleidingsachtergronden van
arbeidskrachten en de diverse beroepen.
In Hoofdstuk 3, testen wij de relevantie van ons allocatiemodel voor het verk-
laren van het substitutieproces tussen verschillende soorten arbeidskracht. Wij
doen dit door het vergelijken van de allocatie van arbeidskrachten met verschil-
lende opleidingsrichtingen naar diverse beroepen en lonen in verschillende landen.
Als het substitutieproces tussen de diverse soorten arbeidskrachten in alle landen
onbelemmerd plaatsvindt, zouden de verschillen tussen het relatieve aanbod van
arbeidskrachten moeten samenvallen met de loonverschillen. We tonen echter aan
dat arbeidskrachten> met een diploma in dezelfde studierichting maar in verschil-
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lende landen, verschillen in het aantal verschillende taken die zij in de diverse
beroepen kunnen uitvoeren. Deze verschillen zijn toe te schrijven aan verschillen
in het onderwijssysteem tussen landen. Zo verschilt de kennis die op de diverse
opleidingsrichtingen in Frankrijk wordt onderwezen van de kennis die in gelijk-
waardige studies in het Verenigd Koninkrijk wordt onderwezen. Deze verschillen
in de inhoud van een bepaalde opleidingsrichting veroorzaken verschillen in het
aantal verschillende taken dat gediplomeerden in Frankrijk en het VK kunnen
uitvoeren in de diverse beroepen. Een belangrijke implicatie is dat de inhoud van
een studie de 'taak-toewijzingsmogelijkheden' en daarmee het substitutieproces
op de arbeidsmarkt bepaalt. De analyse die in Hoofdstuk 3 wordt uitgevoerd
en de daaruit vloeiende empirische resultaten benadrukten de relevantie van ons
allocatiemodel bij het verklaren van het substitutieproces dat op de arbeidsmarkt
plaatsvindt. De empirische resultaten tonen inderdaad aan dat de verschillen in
allocatie tussen landen in hoge en belangrijke mate (50%) de verschillen in de
allocatiestructuur volgen. Zodra voor deze verschillen in de allocatiestructuur
wordt gecontroleerd, vinden wij dat de loonverschillen tussen landen met min-
stens 64% van de verschillen in de aanwending van arbeidskrachten met diverse
opleidingsachtergronden in diverse beroepen samenvallen. De resterende 36% kan
aan niet waargenomen factoren worden toegeschreven, die gerelateerd kunnen zijn
aan institutionele factoren zoals vastgestelde salarisschalen of minimumlonen.
De verschillen in de allocatiestructuur tussen landen wijzen erop dat de keus
voor de structuur van het onderwijssysteem het resultaat is van een optimaliser-
ingsproces. Daarom stellen wij in Hoofdstuk 4 de vraag in welke mate de kennis
die in elke studierichting wordt onderwezen de arbeidsproductiviteit en de arbei-
dsmarkt instabiliteit op de lange termijn beinvloedt.
Wij stellen dat een verschuiving in het aanbod van arbeidskrachten met
twee specifieke beroepsopleidingsrichtingen tot een verandering in het relatieve
loon van deze twee soorten arbeidskracht zou moeten leiden, maar het loon van
arbeidskrachten met een algemene opleidingsrichting onveranderd zou moeten
laten. Wij leiden een toerijkende voorwaarde voor de allocatiestructuur af, waar-
bij voldaan wordt aan dit type wederzijdige verschuiving in het geval van 3-
opleidingsrichtingen/3-beroepen. Allocatiestructuren die aan dit type verschuivin-
gen voldoen worden gekenmerkt door drie productiviteitsparameters. De eerste
parameter duidt op het aantal taken die arbeidskrachten met een opleidingsricht-
ing waarvoor de werkgelegenheid niet verandert, buiten hun eigen beroep kun-
nen uitvoeren. De tweede parameter heeft betrekking op het aantal taken die;Y/.r, W-;//:-,U.*.'.••',->•• iv. .^ i -i-' Sl/MMAflY IN D[/TCH
de arbeidskrachten waarvoor de werkgelegenheid toeneemt en de arbeidskrachten
waarvoor de werkgelegenheid daalt in elkaars beroep kunnen uitoefenen. De derde
parameter wijst op het aantal taken die de arbeidskrachten waarvoor de werkgele-
genheid toeneemt en de arbeidskrachten waarvoor de werkgelegenheid daalt, kun-
nen uitvoeren in het beroep van de arbeidskrachten waarvoor de werkgelegenheid
niet verandert. De simulaties tonen aan dat zowel de arbeidsproductiviteit als
de loonspreiding gevoelig zijn voor de relatieve omvang van de drie parameters.
Het vergroten van het aantal taken die arbeidskrachten buiten hun eigen beroep
kunnen uitvoeren vermindert de arbeidsproductiviteit. Echter, des te groter het
aantal taken die arbeidskrachten buiten hun eigen beroep kunnen uitvoeren, des
te kleiner de toename van de loonspreiding wanneer er sprake is van verschuivin-
gen in de samenstelling van het arbeidsaanbod.
Om de relevantie van het beroepsonderwijs in initieel onderwijs te onder-
zoeken, gebruiken we Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt gegevens. Wij schatten de elas-
ticiteit van substitutieparameters en de allocatiestructuurparameters voor ar-
beidskrachten met algemene, technische en sociale-en-diensten studies op het
middelbaar (HAVO/VWO en MBO) niveau, die in drie min of meer aan de
opleidingsrichting verwante beroepen werken. We zien dat de vraag naar ar-
beidskrachten met een algemene/administratieve opleidingsachtergrond minder
elastisch is dan de vraag naar arbeidskrachten met technische en sociale-en-
diensten beroepsspecialisaties. Dit resultaat wijst erop dat een relatieve daling
van gediplomeerden met een algemene opleiding een vrij hoge toename van het
relatieve loon van deze gediplomeerden, een grote daling van de gemiddelde ar-
beidsproductiviteit en een hoge toename van loonspreiding veroorzaakt.
We tonen aan dat de inhoud van een studie in termen van specifieke en al-
gemene vaardigheden voor zowel arbeidsproductiviteit als loonongelijkheid van
belang is. Hoe specifieker de vaardigheden van arbeidskrachten hoe groter de
arbeidsproductiviteit. Niettemin, hoe algemener de vaardigheden van arbeid-
skrachten hoe groter het aantal taken dat deze arbeidskrachten buiten hun eigen
beroep kunnen uitvoeren en hoe kleiner de toename van de loonongelijkheid in het
geval van aanbodverschuivingen. Voorts tonen wij aan dat er rekening zou moeten
worden gehouden met de flexibiliteit van de arbeidsmarkt wanneer de inhoud
van de diverse opleidingsrichtingen wordt vastgesteld. Wanneer, zoals in Neder-
land het geval is, de parameter van substitutie-elasticiteit tussen beroepsoutput
groot is in vergelijking met de parameter van substitutie-elasticiteit tussen ar-
beidskrachten met verschillende opleidingsrichtingen kan de economie profiteren
218• ••.••: /> ' •••..(: 1-' •-• JVEDERLANDSE SAMEJWAT77NG
van het verminderen van het aantal taken dat arbeidskrachten met een algemene
opleiding buiten het algeraene beroep kunnen uitvoeren, door de vaardigheden te
verhogen die tot hun productiviteit in het algemene beroep bijdragen ten koste
van de algemene vaardigheden die tot hun productiviteit op de andere beroep-
srichtingen bijdragen. ' -;,:<,
In het allocatiemodel dat in Hoofdstuk 2 wordt ontwikkeld, wordt het substi-
tutieproces bepaald door de manier waarop bedrijven aan arbeidskrachten hun
taken toewijzen. De structuur van de productiviteit van arbeidskrachten in de
diverse beroepen kan tot een substitutieproces leiden met een hogere arbeidspro-
ductiviteit en een lagere loonongelijkheid. In Hoofdstuk 5 analyseren we of de
grote verschillen die tussen kleine en grote bedrijven in termen van output, pro-
ductiviteit en de inputs in het productieproces verklaard kunnen worden door
verschillen in de wijze van productie. Deze verschillen wijzen er op dat kleine
en grote bedrijven niet dezelfde productiefunctie hebben. Wij stellen dat de
verschillen in kapitaalintensiteit tussen grote en kleine bedrijven kunnen worden
verklaard door een grotere substitutieelasticiteit tussen arbeidskracht en kapitaal
in grote bedrijven. Ook, laten wij zien dat hoe hoger de substitutieelasticiteit
tussen geschoolde en ongeschoolde arbeidskrachten, hoe groter het werkgelegen-
heidsaandeel van de geschoolde arbeidskrachten in het geval van 'skill-biased'
technologische verandering. Bovendien, kan de hogere arbeidsproductiviteit die
in grote bedrijven wordt waargenomen door een grotere substitutieelasticiteit
tussen inputs worden verklaard.
Om productiefuncties voor bedrijven van verschillende grootte in elke indus-
trietak te schatten, gebruiken wij 'matched employer-employee' gegevens voor
de Deense industrie, bouwsector en nutsbedrijven tussen 1992-1995. In alle
drie de bedrijfssectoren is de omvang van de geschatte substitutieelasticiteit
tussen geschoolde arbeidskrachten in hoge functies met alle andere arbeidsin-
put en het kapitaal groter in grote bedrijven. Deze verschillen verklaren de
hogere arbeidsproductiviteit en de kapitaalintensiteit die in grote bedrijven wordt
waargenomen. Gegeven het 'skill-biased' karakter van de technologische on-
twikkelingen die in de laatste decennia wordt waargenomen, kan de hogere sub-
stitutieelasticiteit tussen geschoolde en ongeschoolde arbeidskrachten in grote
bedrijven de hogere proportie van geschoolde arbeidskracht in grote bedrijven
verklaren.
In overeenkomst met de 'skill segregation' hypothese, vinden we dat er in
grote bedrijven meer overgeschoolde arbeidskrachten werkzaam zijn. Dit kan
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gezien worden als een vorm van 'ant versus cicada' gedrag. De hogere produc-
tiviteit stelt grote bedrijven in staat om een reservecapaciteit van geschoolde
arbeidskrachten op te bouwen tijdens periodes van lage lonen voor geschoolde
arbeidskrachten. Daardoor kunnen grote bedrijven bij vraag- of aanbodschokken
op de arbeidsmarkt voor geschoolde arbeidskrachten voorzien in hun behoefte aan
geschoold personeel. Bij het stijgen van het loon van geschoolde arbeidskrachten,
worden grote bedrijven minder beinvloed aangezien zij reeds een interne reserve
van geschoolde arbeidskrachten in huis hadden. »;.;••;,, .;-:•;»••.* .;w\|iwi<-.•
Samenvattend, leiden de analyses in dit proefschrift tot vier belangrijk resul-
taten. Het eerste belangrijke resultaat van deze proefschriftstudie is dat een een-
voudige productiefunctie op twee niveaus de toewijzing van arbeidskrachten met
uiteenlopende onderwijsachtergronden aan de taken van verschillenden beroepen
in kaart kan worden gebracht. Het tweede belangrijke inzicht is dat het substi-
tutieproces dat op de arbeidsmarkt plaatsvindt op consistente wijze verklaard
kan worden op basis van het allocatiemodel waarin arbeidskrachten met uiteen-
lopende opleidingsachtergronden worden toegewezen aan verschillende banen. De
inhoud van de diverse opleidingen is een belangrijke determinant in de toewijzing
van arbeidskrachten aan taken aangezien de inhoud van een opleiding het aantal
taken die arbeidskrachten met een opleidingsachtergrond in de diverse beroepen
kunnen uitvoeren bepaalt, i.e. de allocatiestructuur. Het derde belangrijke re-
sultaat van deze proefschriftstudie is dat wanneer het makkelijk is om de out-
put van de verschillende beroepen onderling te vervangen, een onderwijssysteem
met beroepsspecialisaties tot een hogere productiviteit zal leiden. Wanneer het
daarentegen gemakkelijker is om tussen arbeidskrachten binnen beroepen te sub-
stitueren, een onderwijssysteem met twee beroepsspecialisaties en een algemene
opleidingsrichting tot een hogere productiviteit zal leiden. Het vierde belangrijke
inzicht dat de studie oplevert is dat de verschillen in de vorm van de produc-
tiefunctie en in het bijzonder verschillen in de substitutiemogelijkheden tussen
grote en kleine bedrijven in dezelfde bedrijfssector een belangrijk oorzaak zijn
van de verschillen in output, productiviteit en de allocatie van arbeidskracht.
.•>«• •?(;??•=•."
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Conventions
Some notational conventions are needed to ease the reader's mind throughout
this study.
• Variables: , . .-
- // is the level of output produced either by a firm or the economy
and when indexed by occupation (see index conventions) represents
intermediate output produced in that particular occupation.
- /i is the labour productivity measured in units of output per worker.
- L is the labour demand measured as the number of workers employed
and will often be indexed by education and occupation (see index
conventions).
- if is the level of capital engaged in the production of output.
- fc is the capital intensity measured in units of capital per worker.
- C are the input costs engaged to produce output.
- u; is the wage rate of workers and will be indexed by education.
- f/C is the unitary cost function and when indexed by occupation rep-
resents the unitary cost function in a particular occupation.
- £ stands for the level of skills a worker possesses and when indexed on
r refers to the skill of type r.
- s stands for the level of skills required to do a task and when indexed
on r refers to the skill of type r.
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• Parameters: ,
— a and 7r represent productivity parameters defined by the technology
used to produce output and therefore are parameters of the production
function. These parameters will be indexed by education and occupa-
tion such that they reflect the range of tasks of an occupation workers
with each educational background can perform. The a parameters sum
to unity in each occupation while the largest 7r in each occupation is
equal to unity.
— /? is a technology parameter that expresses the ease to substitute be-
tween the various inputs.
— cr is the parameter of substitution elasticity.
• Indexes: ^
— < indexes occupations or when relevant tasks, and therefore refer to a
demand side index. When a comparison between two occupations or
tasks is needed, the second index is g.
, — j indexes education or when relevant individual workers and there-
fore refer to a supply side index. When a comparison between two
educational groups or workers is needed, the second index is &.
— r indexes the types of skill.
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